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The case of the blameworthy-but-fortunate defendant has 
emerged as one of the most perplexing scenarios in mass tort 
litigation today.1 One need look no further than the front page of 
* Assistant Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. A.B. 1985, Stanford; J.D. 
1988, University of Chicago. - Ed. Anne Dupre, Richard Epstein, Mark Gergen, Samuel 
Issacharoff, Paul Kurtz, John Longwell, Thomas McGarity, Ruth Nagareda, John Robertson, 
Michael Wells, Patrick Woolley, and participants in a faculty colloquium at the University of 
Texas School of Law provided helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
1. The term "mass torts" refers to conduct alleged both to be tortious in nature and to 
produce injuries dispersed over time to large numbers of persons nationwide. The discussion 
here of the appropriate legal treatment of blameworthy conduct by mass tort defendants has 
potential applications in other tort contexts. I focus here upon mass torts because they, due 
to their scope and concomitant potential for harm on a catastrophic scale, set forth most 
starkly the major themes at issue. 
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the newspaper to find examples of mass tort defendants said to 
have engaged in irresponsible conduct - even conduct that one 
might regard as morally outrageous in character2 - but that 
n,onetheless advance eminently plausible contentions that they have 
not caused harm to others. 
This issue is· not merely a matter for abstract speculation. A 
now-familiar mass tort scenario involves a defendant that markets a 
product without informing consumers about tentative suspicions of 
some health hazard. These initial suspicions, however, ultimately 
may not prove true. In fact, subsequent scientific research may 
support, perhaps convincingly, a contention by such a defendant 
that there simply is no causal link between its product and the 
malady from which the plaintiff suffers. The most prominent 
example of this first scenario is the ongoing controversy over 
silicone gel breast implants. 3 
As Margaret Berger observes in a provocative new essay, mass tort litigation often deals 
with situations in which a corporation "did not test its product adequately initially, failed to 
impart information when potential problems emerged, and did not undertake further 
research in response to adverse information." Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General 
Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 CoLUM. L. RE.v. 2117, 
2135 (1997) (calling for abolition of the usual tort requirement of general causation in such 
cases). Such misconduct, however, may not necessarily cause harm to consumers. For earlier 
co=entary, drawing attention to the doctrinal problems posed by blameworthy defendants 
at a time when mass tort litigation was still in its infancy, see David G. Owen, The Highly 
Blamewonhy Manufacturer: Implications on Rules of Liability and Defense in Prodt1cts 
Liability Actions, 10 INo. L. RE.v. 769 (1977). 
2. For front-page accounts of misconduct on the part of the tobacco industry, see Alix M. 
Freedman, Cigarette Defector Says CEO Lied to Congress About View of Nicotine, WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 26, 1996, at Al [hereinafter Freedman, CEO Lied] (su=arizing the deposition of 
whistleblower Jeffrey Wigand indicating that Brown & Williamson chairman Thomas 
Sandefur lied to a congressional committee concerning his· views about the addictiveness of 
nicotine); Alix M. Freedman, Tobacco Firm Shows How Ammonia Spurs Delivery of 
Nicotine, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 1995, at Al [hereinafter Freedman, Ammonia Spurs Delivery] 
(discussing internal documents from Brown & Williamson on the addition of ammonia-based 
compounds to increase the potency of nicotine inhaled by smokers); Philip J. Hilts & Glenn 
Collins, Documents Disclose Philip Morris Studied Nicotine's Effect on Body, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 8, 1995, at 1 (discussing previously undisclosed research by Philip Morris into the 
pharmacological effects of nicotine). 
As for accounts of misconduct by the leading maker of silicone gel breast implants, see 
Philip J. Hilts, Maker of Implants Balked at Testing, Its Records Show, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 
1992, at Al (revealing that Dow Corning scientists pressed for further study of implants but 
that the corporation put off such tests for more than a decade); Philip J. Hilts, Strange History 
of Silicone Held Many Warning Signs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1992, at 1 (discussing Dow 
Corning's disregard of early indications that silicone might affect the immune system). 
3. See infra section II.Al. Although it remains far too early to tell with certainty, there 
are at least some preliminary indications that manufacturers of diet drugs used in 
combination under the popular name "fen-phen" may have been aware of the potential for 
the drugs to damage the heart valves of users. See Laura Johannes & Steve Stecklow, Heart­
Valve Problem That Felled Diet Pills Had Arisen Previously, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 1997, at 
Al. 
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A second and even more problematic situation involves a 
defendant that does not merely fail to warn consumers about a risk 
that may be associated with its product, but that affirmatively 
induces repeated use through outright fraud or obfuscation of the 
product's risk. This second scenario describes the allegations 
advanced in the current controversy over nicotine in tobacco 
products.4 Here, the problem also is one of causation, but of a 
different sort: the centuries-old awareness of the hazards of 
smoking, including the widespread recognition that the practice can 
be exceedingly hard to quit,5 makes it difficult to attribute the 
maladies of current smokers to an informational shortfall brought 
about by the tobacco industry. Fraud is the cause of harm, after all, 
only when one's fraudulent misrepresentations are apt to be 
believed and acted upon - only when, at the very least, other 
people are not saying loudly that one is lying. 
In this respect, the causal problem posed by the tobacco 
litigation is by no means restricted to that particular context. 
Rather, the same concerns likely would surface with respect to the 
many variations on the same theme that one might envision in the 
future for the alcohol industry, the fast-food industry, or the 
purveyors of other products with long-recognized health risks. 
For all their salient differences, the contentions raised in both 
the tobacco wars and the breast implant litigation reflect a common 
theme. Both litigations are instances of what I describe here as 
"outrageous fortune" - situations in which a manufacturer may 
have engaged in conduct that many might regard as irresponsible or 
morally culpable, but where that manufacturer, nonetheless, may 
have had the sheer good luck not to cause harm to consumers. 
To put the point mildly, the results thus far in the implant and 
tobacco litigations have not tracked neatly what one might have 
expected from substantive tort doctrine. Notwithstanding what 
appear to be formidable obstacles grounded in the tort requirement 
of causation, defendants have not emerged unscathed. Quite to the 
contrary, the leading implant manufacturer, Dow Corning, 
currently is in the midst of a lengthy reorganization proceeding 
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.6 
4. See infra section II.B.1. 
5. See infra section II.B.2 (detailing public awareness that it is hard to quit smoking), and 
especially infra note 178 (discussing a successful defense along these lines by RJ. Reynolds in 
a recent individual lawsuit). 
6. See infra section II.A.2. 
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The tobacco industry has been affected even more dramatically, 
in the form of congressional consideration of national legislation. 
Although its precise parameters remain to be seen, such legislation 
will seek to build upon the much-debated $368.5 billion proposal 
hammered out in the summer of 1997 by the tobacco industry and 
various state attorneys general.7 In exchange for more definite 
limitations upon its long-term financial obligations in tort, the 
tobacco industry has demonstrated its willingness to embrace 
measures that not only would require the payment of billions of 
dollars, but also would entail unprecedented government regulation 
of the marketing and advertising of tobacco products. Whatever 
the ultimate fate of any national legislation, both the process that 
led to its formulation and the treatment that it receives in the 
political arena are likely to be the subjects of extensive discussion 
within the legal, public health, and public policy communities for 
many years to come. 
The foregoing developments, I submit, are not readily 
comprehensible within the framework of existing mass tort 
scholarship, which has tended to take as its principal focus the ways 
in which mass tort litigation has pushed at the boundaries of 
existing legal procedures. The debates over both the desirability of 
class actions8 and the merits of bankruptcy proceedings9 in this area 
are just two of the more prominent illustrations of this procedural 
perspective. These certainly remain important and challenging 
issues, but, in focusing on them, both courts and commentators 
have devoted too little attention to the ways in which mass tort 
litigation increasingly pushes at the boundaries between systems of 
substantive law: specifically, the border between tort and criminal 
law. A blurring of substantive law, and of the institutional roles 
contemplated by each system, has taken place virtually 
unacknowledged by courts, litigators, or the legal academy. Put 
simply, recent developments reflect the use of mass tort litigation as 
7. The proposal, labeled simply "Proposed Resolution" and so cited hereinafter, is 
reprinted in MEALEY's LmG. REP.: TOBACCO, July 3, 1997, at A-1. The proposal also is 
available on the Worldwide Web, at a site maintained by the state attorneys general: <http:// 
stic.neu.edu/settlement/6-20-settle.htm>. As reproduced by both sources, the proposal 
appears with universal page numbers and, for the sake of uniformity, I use those references 
here. For the $368.5 billion figure, see Proposed Resolution, supra, at 34. 
The terms of the proposal vaguely approximate those originally advanced by Richard 
Kluger in his comprehensive history of the tobacco industry. See RICHARD Kr.uGER, ASHES 
TO AsHES 761-63 (1996). Kluger subsequently elaborated upon his suggested approach in 
Richard Kluger, A Peace Plan for the Cigarette Wars, N.Y. T1MES, Apr. 7, 1996, § 6 
(Magazine), at 28. 
8. See infra note 76. . 
9. See infra section II.A.2. 
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a vehicle for moral condemnation of defendants, wholly apart from 
the causation of harm to tort plaintiffs. My contention here is that 
moral condemnation should take place not through the vehicle of 
tort litigation but, if at all, through democratic deliberation in the 
political process. 
This is not to say that tort litigation and democratic deliberation 
are completely unrelated to one another. Insofar as the tobacco 
litigation has provided a significant impetus for debate through 
legislative channels, that debate itself stands as a desirable and 
long-overdue effort to grapple seriously with the difficult issues of 
public policy in the area - potentially in ways that may focus the 
moral opprobrium of society upon the tobacco industry. By 
contrast, there has been little public deliberation over the basic 
question of wh�ther the conduct of implant manufacturers warrants 
moral condemnation of any sort in the face of formidable doubt 
about the causation of harm. Tort litigation can play a useful role in 
identifying product safety issues in a manner independent from 
political institutions, but such litigation represents an unwieldy 
vehicle for the societal resolution of such matters, especially when 
moral condemnation of defendants might be warranted wholly 
apart from the compensation of tort plaintiffs. 
In Part I, I start with the familiar observation that tort law 
insists upon a causal connection between even a highly 
blameworthy defendant and some injured plaintiff as the essential 
predicate for a judgment of liability. By contrast, criminal law has 
long punished conduct that falls well short of a completed crime, 
though it does so subject to important institutional and doctrinal 
limitations. 
As detailed in Part II, the practical effect of recent mass tort 
litigation has been to draw haphazardly and without any apparent 
acknowledgement upon the moral condemnation function of the 
criminal law. Here, I analyze two sorts of mass tort disputes: the 
first, as suggested above, centers upon science - specifically, the 
question of whether the product at issue is capable of causing harm 
to anyone. As I explain, the results of the implant litigation are 
explicable not by any resolution of the debate· over scientific 
causation squarely in plaintiffs' favor; indeed, that debate has 
largely been resolved to the contrary. Instead, the ·progress of the 
implant litigation is explicable more by a concern on the part of 
manufacturers like Dow Coming - well-grounded in the results of 
early implant lawsuits - that jurors might be prepared to return 
1126 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 96:1121 
damage verdicts based principally upon a sense of moral outrage 
over defendants' conduct. 
A second type of mass tort dispute also implicates the 
requirement of causation, but it focuses upon the decision of the 
plaintiff to use the product in question. Litigation of this sort turns 
heavily upon the availability of risk information from sources other 
than the defendant - information that may shed considerable 
doubt upon the contention that the defendant's silence, or even 
outright fraud, caused the plaintiff to use the product. To illustrate 
this second category, I take as my focal point the tobacco litigation. 
In fact, recent events in the tobacco area stand as the most striking 
example of the degree to which mass tort litigation has drawn, sub 
silentio, upon criminal notions. 
In the same Part, I go on to observe that the breast implant and 
tobacco litigations - two of the most sharply debated mass tort 
scenarios in recent years - are not simply the products of 
idiosyncratic situations. Instead, I contend, the bringing of mass 
tort claims against arguably blameworthy defendants in the face of 
substantial causation questions stems from broader and more 
enduring suppositions - specifically, from the ways in which mass 
tort litigators conceive of jury decisionmaking and from the 
interaction between litigation and other means by which to draw 
public attention to product safety issues. These suppositions are a 
symptom of a much deeper convergence of tort and criminal law. 
In Part III, I evaluate the merits of this convergence, noting 
initially its potential to lend a welcome degree of flexibility to the 
treatment of blameworthy-but-fortunate mass tort defendants. The 
prospect of national legislation in the tobacco area points in a 
promising direction, insofar as it may create a virtual rehabilitation 
program for the industry centered upon measures to reduce 
smoking in the future. In a manner characteristic of criminal 
sanctions, the goal should be to bring moral condemnation upon 
defendants through public law that would not entail the transfer of 
billions of dollars to current smokers. In light of the centuries-old 
awareness of smoking hazards, it is eminently sensible to place a 
priority upon prospective measures to reduce smoking over 
payment to present-day plaintiffs. In fact, one may understand the 
likely impact of tobacco legislation in terms of the growing 
recognition among criminal law scholars of the expressive 
dimension of public law - its capacity to alter the underlying social 
culture of smoking. 
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One may draw useful lessons from the tobacco litigation for the 
appropriate resolution of the breast implant controversy. Given the 
relative dearth of scientific evidence to link silicone with connective 
tissue diseases, there are strong grounds to deny compensation to 
breast implant plaintiffs. At the same time, the burdens of the 
bankruptcy process itself may serve as a form of punishment for 
implant makers that, at least arguably, did not take seriously the 
possibility of a causal link to disease. But decisions of this sort -
to leave present-day plaintiffs with little or nothing and to address 
the conduct of defendants through other means - are 
appropriately made not by litigation or private negotiation alone, 
but, rather, upon public deliberation through political channels. 
Apart from the appropriate resolution of current disputes, one 
should not overlook the potential mass tort defendants of the 
future. The proposals that have arisen from the tobacco litigation 
have the praiseworthy capacity to overcome political logjams in the 
regulatory system, but only at the risk of triggering indiscriminate 
assaults in tort upon other manufacturers that sell products with 
long-recognized hazards. It is this prospect, not any great sympathy 
for the tobacco industry, that understandably , has led some 
observers to express formidable discomfort with the tobacco wars.10 
In light of these concerns, I argue that recent developments in 
mass tort litigation, if anything, have drawn too little upon the 
criminal law. Specifically, close attention to both institutional and 
doctrinal limitations upon the application of moral condemnation 
by way of the criminal system suggests an important caveat that · 
should be heeded in this area. This institutional caveat centers 
upon the essential role that politically accountable bodies should 
play in the resolution of mass torts, much the same as legislatures 
and public prosecutors serve in tempering the moral sentiments of 
the community in the criminal area. Consideration by political 
bodies is vastly superior to lawyer- or. court-centered mechanisms 
such as reorganizations in bankruptcy, both to facilitate public 
debate for its own sake and as a vehicle for appropriate treatment 
of present-day plaintiffs and prospective defendants. I discuss how 
deliberation in political fora may come about, adding that familiar 
criminal doctrines of mens rea and deterrence help considerably to 
frame the issues for debate. 
10. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Big Tobacco's Big Mistake, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1997, 
at A21; Richard Klein, Prohibition JI . . . , WALL ST. J., June 26, 1997, at AlS; A Tobacco 
Settlement?, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1997, at A14 (editorial). 
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I. OUTRAGEOUS FORTUNE IN TORT AND CRIME 
Both tort and criminal law take as a significant objective the 
prevention of socially undesirable conduct, through the threat of a 
damage verdict in tort or of incarceration in criminal law. In fact, a 
substantial scholarly literature has developed in recent years on 
various points of contrast between criminal and civil law 
generally.11 
On the whole, this literature expresses considerable trepidation 
over the intermingling of tort and criminal systems. Several com­
mentators have discussed the expansion of criminal sanctions into 
areas previously dominated by civil controls. A significant concern, 
for example, is that the criminalization of matters heretofore con­
sidered only regulatory infractions might reduce the moral oppro­
brium needed to induce adherence to criminal prohibitions upon 
more serious forms of misconduct.12 Conversely, other commenta­
tors have focused upon the application of civil penalties - for ex­
ample, civil forfeitures - in tandem with criminal prosecutions. 
The fear is that use of civil actions by the government may under­
mine the procedural protections afforded to defendants in the crim­
inal context.13 Indeed, this second concern is likely to loom even 
larger in the literature after the Supreme Court's recent decision 
upholding a Kansas statute for the indefinite commitment of sexu­
ally violent predators on the ground that the law does not implicate 
11. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the 
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REv. 193 (1991) [hereinaf· 
ter Coffee, Reflections]; John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal 
and Civil Law Models - And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875 (1992) 
[hereinafter Coffee, Paradigms]; Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground 
Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE LJ. 1795 (1992); Carol S. Steiker, Punishment 
and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEo. L.J. 
775 (1997); Symposium, The Civil-Criminal Distinction, 7 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES at 1 
{1996); Symposium, The Intersection of Tort and Criminal Law, 76 B.U. L. Rav. 1 (1996). 
But cf. JULES L. COLEMAN, RlsKS AND WRONGS 222 (1992) ("The differences between torts 
and the criminal law are so fundamental that the net result of applying one's understanding 
of the criminal law to torts is bad philosophy and total confusion."). 
For scholarship on the same subject by an earlier generation of commentators, see, e.g., 
Jerome Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts (pts. 1 & 2), 43 COLUM. L. Rav. 753, 
967 (1943); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRons. 
401 (1958). 
12. See Coffee, Reflections, supra note 11, at 234-38. As Coffee acknowledges, this view 
echoes the concerns voiced earlier by Hart, supra note 11, at 423. 
13. See Susan R. Klein, Civil In Rem Forfeiture and Double Jeopardy, 82 low A L. Rav. 
183, 189 (1996) (criticizing the Supreme Court's civil forfeiture jurisprudence as undermining 
the F"lfth Amendment protection against double jeopardy); Steiker, supra note 11, at 814-19 
(arguing that many procedures labeled as civil are more properly understood as implicating 
longstanding justifications for criminal punishment); see also Mann, supra note 11, at 1869-71 
(arguing for a "middleground" approach that would call for application of at least some crim· 
inal procedures). 
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the distinctive constitutional protections required in the criminal 
context.14 
I draw upon this comparative approach to shed new light upon 
problems of mass tort litigation. As set forth in greater depth in 
Part ID, the handling of outrageous fortune in the mass tort setting 
may benefit in several significant respects from a rethinking of the 
conventional tort-crime distinction. At the same time, however, I 
share quite strongly the concern expressed in the recent literature 
about the serious potential for abuse that may accompany the indis­
criminate intermingling of tort and criminal concepts. 
A. Linking Plaintiffs and Defendants in Tort 
One of the fundamental differences between tort and criminal 
law lies in the legal consequences that flow from conduct - how­
ever irresponsible, blameworthy, or manifestly evil - that does not 
produce a proscribed result that the law is prepared to attribute to 
the defendant. As a matter of hornbook doctrine, the absence of 
causation in a tort suit means that the plaintiff should lose.15 In 
principle, that result should not change, even if the defendant ig­
nored the possibility of a causal link or sought affirmatively to pro­
mote it without success. 
This emphasis upon causation stems from the foundations of 
tort law as a system to resolve disputes that arise from interactions 
between strangers that are not otherwise governed by contract. In 
fact, some have contended that the element of causation represents 
the crucial link that identifies a particular injured plaintiff as the 
person to whom a particular defendant owes compensation.16 This 
link between plaintiffs and defendants accounts for many other fea­
tures of the tort system - for example, the characteristic tort rem­
edy in the form of damages paid from the defendant to the 
plaintiff.17 As John Coffee aptly observes, "the question in [the 
14. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct 2072 (1997). 
15. See w. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 
263 (5th ed. 1984). 
16. Ernest Weinrib defends the traditional approach to causation in tort on the ground 
that "[c]ausation particularizes the plaintiff against the background of the defendant's wrong­
ful risk creation, and wrongdoing particularizes the defendant against the background of the 
totality of the injury's causes." Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 Cm.-KENT 
L. REv. 407, 430 (1987). Other co=entators, however, have argued that corrective justice 
in tort does not require such a matching of wrongful risk creation and injury. See, e.g., Jules 
Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 421, 426 (1982); 
Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. 
REv. 439, 466, 468-69 (1990). 
17. As Gail Heriot observes, 
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tort] context is not whether to impose a substantial penalty on the 
defendant,, but rather how to divide losses actually incurred be­
tween plaintiff and defendant."18 
Given the importance of causation in tort law generally, it 
comes as no surprise that mass tort litigation has served to highlight 
the many subtle shadings of that general concept. In the mass tort 
context, causation issues have arisen in two forms. In its most fa­
miliar guise, causation simply may be a question of science. In par­
ticular, causation often turns upon the science of toxicology, a body 
of learning that governs the methods by which scientists test hy­
potheses of causal links between external forces and human disease. 
Such methods usually consist of laboratory studies on cells or ani­
mals and, in more advanced stages of research, epidemiological 
studies that compare the incidence of disease in persons exposed to 
the disputed·product against the incidence in a group of unexposed 
persons.19 Before one can say that a product caused a given disease 
in a, particular person, for example, one first must show that the 
product is capable of causing that disease in humans generally. In 
the parlance of mass tort litigation, one must show general causa­
tion before one even gets to the question of specific causation.20 
Relatively few mass torts, however, center upon diseases that 
stem from a single, distinctive source.21 Rather, the challenge for 
both scientists and litigants is to identify the risk, if any, associated 
with the defendant's product, as distinct from the background risk 
of the particular disease. Specifically, the plaintiff might have de­
veloped the disease from some other source or simply as a result of 
the causation requirement severely curtails the ability of the plaintiffs and courts to de· 
termine the appropriate level of "punishment." The appropriate remedy [in tort] will be 
an order requiring the defendant to pay to plaintiff an amount designed to compensate 
plaintiff for his damages - not twice his damages, not three times his damages, but 
precisely his damages. 
Gail Heriot, An Essay on the Civil-Criminal Distinction with Special Reference to Punitive 
Damages, 7 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL IssUES 43, 59 (1996). 
18. Coffee, Paradigms, supra note 11, at 1878. 
19. On the basics of toxicology for purposes of mass torts, see MICHAEL D. GREEN, 
BENDECTIN AND BmTII DEFECTS 26-37 (1996). See also Gerald W. Boston, A Mass­
Exposure Model of Toxic Causation: The Content of Scientific Proof and the Regulatory Ex­
perience, 18 CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 181, 234-37 (1993). 
20. See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1200 (6th Cir. 1988) (distinguish­
ing between general causation and specific causation); Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 
MINN. L. REv. 1219, 1227-28 (1987) (same). For an argument to do away with the require­
ment of general causation in mass tort cases, see Berger, supra note 1, at 2132-34, 2143. 
21. Mesothelioma - an especially deadly form of cancer in the lining of the lung - is a 
notable exception. It is virtually always associated with the inhalation of asbestos. See In re 
Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 740 (Bankr. E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991), revd. on 
other grounds, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992). 
March 1998] Mass Torts 1131 
random chance.22 The combination of product use and the subse­
quent onset of disease, in other words, does not prove the existence 
of a causal relationship as distinct from a mere coincidence. Tort 
defendants must pay for the former, but not the latter. 
A second kind of mass tort dispute centers not upon science per 
se but, instead, upon the risk decision made by the plainti:ff.23 Here 
the question is whether the plaintiff would have used the product -
for example, whether the plaintiff would have started ot continued 
to smoke - even if the defendant had not misrepresented the asso­
ciated risks. For present purposes, it is illuminating to consider 
such a dispute as a problem of causation - whether the plaintiff 
would have suffered the same harm but for the alleged misdeeds of 
the defendant.24 Such a conception usefully underscores the affin­
ity between this second situation and mass tort cases centered upon 
scientific causation: both require one to separate the effects of the 
defendant's misconduct from those that stem·from background phe­
nomena, whether the background risk of disease as a scientific mat.:. 
ter or the information otherwise available in society as a whole on 
the subject of product risk.25 
22. See infra note 54 and accompanying text {illustrating this problem by reference to the 
breast implant litigation). 
23. A case of scientific causation certainly may raise further questions about the risk deci­
sion of the plaintiff. In addition to establishing whether the disputed product causes disease 
in humans generally, there may be some dispute as to whether a particular plaintiff would 
have used the product even if warned that usage would entail some health risk. 
Some forms of mass tort litigation, however, do not involve serious disputes over scien­
tific causation. Certain products, such as cigarettes, pose well-documented risks of disease. 
Mass tort litigation over such a product nonetheless may raise substantial questions about the 
influence, if any, of the defendant's misdeeds upon the plaintiff's decision to use the product. 
Some products known to be harmful nonetheless remain on the market, because they also 
provide significant utility to consumers - what may amount to very powerful reasons for 
consumers to use the product, notwithstanding the attendant risks. Cf. infra notes 122-24 
(discussing the benefits of nicotine). 
24. There are, of course, alternate labels that one might use. One might say that this 
second kind of mass tort dispute implicates the affirmative defense of assumption of risk, 
insofar as the plaintiff was aware of the risk from other sources and still proceeded to use the 
product, wholly apart from the defendant's misdeeds. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, 
§ 68, at 481; cf. Kenneth W. Simons, Assumption of Risk and Consent in the Law of Torts: A 
Theory of Full Preference, 61 B.U. L. REv. 213 {1987) (defending the concept of l!Ssumption 
of risk against modern critics). Alternatively, one might cast the dispute in terms of tort 
duties, by positing that defendants are under no obligation to warn with respect to risks that 
are well known from other sources. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIA­
BILITY § 2 cmt. j (Proposed Fmal Draft 1997). Whatever the doctrinal label, however, it is 
crucial in this second sort of case to ascertain the influence, if any, that the withholding or 
misstating of information by the defendant has had upon the likelihood of product use by the 
plaintiff. 
25. Even when the plaintiff's claim is not predicated upon the content of a product warn­
ing, but instead focuses upon some fraudulent misrepresentation by other means, it still re­
mains necessary to evaluate the purported fraud in light of the other information available to 
the plaintiff. See infra note 162. 
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These two aspects of causation in mass tort disputes - scientific 
and risk-decisional causation - both ask whether the plaintiff 
would have suffered harm in the absence of the defendant's alleged 
misdeeds. Both pose a counterfactual question, in that both require 
one to imagine a world in which the defendant's misdeeds did not 
occur.26 In cases that center upon scientific causation, the answer 
to this question will be essentially independent from the gravity of 
the defendant's misconduct. Either the product causes the particu­
lar disease in question, or it does not. Though the limitations of 
science may make it difficult to answer that question,27 the answer 
will not change even if the defendant behaved in an egregiously 
irresponsible manner in the face of suspicions of a causal link. In­
deed, it is precisely such a defendant that one fairly may regard as 
the unwitting beneficiary of outrageous fortune, in the event that 
the product ultimately turns out to be innocuous. Good things oc­
casionally happen to bad people. 
Risk-decisional causation is different in that it is inherently in­
teractive. As noted earlier, it focuses upon the effect of the defend­
ant's misconduct upon the plaintiff's risk decision. Here, at least 
potentially, the defendant's misconduct can influence quite signifi­
cantly the likelihood that the plaintiff will use the product; indeed, 
the whole point of the misconduct may be to induce such behavior. 
Insofar as one might consider a defendant of this sort to be the 
beneficiary of outrageous fortune, such a characterization will arise 
only upon the defendant's failure to achieve its objective - a fail­
ure that might stem, for example, from the availability, from other 
sources, of accurate information about the risks of the product.2s 
B. Causation, Crime, and Moral Condemnation 
Issues of causation are not unknown to criminal law. When one 
of the elements of a crime consists of producing a particular result 
26. One must approach this counterfactual exercise with considerable care: 
One creates a mental picture of a situation identical to the actual facts of the case in all 
respects save one: the defendant's wrongful conduct is now "corrected" to the minimal 
extent necessary to make it conform to the law's requirements. It is important to stress 
that the mental operation performed . .. must be careful, conservative, and modest; the 
hypothesis must be counterfactual only to the extent necessary to ask the but-for 
question. 
David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEXAS L. REv. 1765, 1770 
(1997). 
27. See Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 
CoRNELL L. REv. 773, 777-80 (1997) (explaining why methodological, ethical, and technical 
limitations upon scientific techniques may make some causal questions difficult or impossible 
to answer). 
28. See infra section 11.B.2 (considering the tobacco litigation in this light). 
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- for example, the crime of murder necessarily entails the death of 
the victim29 - criminal law applies much the same concepts of cau­
sation as the law of torts.30 Unlike tort law, however, the strictures 
of criminal law do not end in the absence of a causal link to some 
harm suffered by some victim. 
As Henry Hart stated eloquently in his classic article on the re­
lationship between criminal and civil law, the distinctive feature of 
the criminal system lies in its moral dimension - its focus not upon 
the reshuffling of money from one private person to another, but 
instead upon the bringing to bear of moral condemnation from the 
community upon culpable behavior.31 As others have echoed to 
the present day, "the factor that most distinguishes the criminal law 
is its operation as a system of moral education and socialization."32 
This moral dimension of the criminal law manifests itself in any 
number of familiar aspects of substantive doctrine that stand in 
sharp contrast to the law of tort. Take just two prominent 
examples. 
First, unlike tort law, criminal law generally is not concerned 
with the level of care taken by victims. A criminal defendant will 
not be heard to say, for example, that the victim of a robbery 
should not have been walking obliviously down the street with $100 
bills dangling from his pockets.33 Contributory negligence, in short, 
is not a criminal defense. This feature of substantive criminal doc­
trine makes eminent sense, given the focus upon the culpability of 
the defendant rather than upon a comparison between his conduct 
and that of a person seeking monetary recompense from him. The 
29. See MoDEL PENAL CODE § 210.1(1) (1985) (providing that all crimes of homicide 
require that the defendant "cause[] the death of another human being"). 
30. See MoDEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 (1985). 
31. In Hart's words, 
[a crime] is not simply anything which a legislature chooses to call a "crime." It is not 
simply antisocial conduct which public officers are given a responsibility to suppress. It 
is not simply any conduct to which a legislature chooses to attach a "criminal" penalty. 
It is conduct which, if duly shown to have taken place, will incur a formal and solemn 
pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the community. 
Hart, supra note 11, at 405 (emphasis added). 
32. Coffee, Reflections, supra note 11, at 193. 
33. Law and economics scholars have criticized the lack of attention to caretaking by the 
victims of crime, especially with regard to crimes of attempt. See, e.g., Omri Beh-Shahar & 
Alon Harel, The Economics of the Law of Criminal Attempts: A Victim-Centered Perspective, 
145 U. PA. L. REv. 299, 301 (1996) ("Criminal law norms can induce victims to take efficient 
levels of precaution by graduating the sanctions imposed upon criminals in accordance with 
the behavior of their victims."). This view has yet to have an impact upon criminal doctrine, 
however, and itself has encountered criticism. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social 
Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REv. 349, 385-86 (1997) (arguing that public enforce­
ment and private precautions do not necessarily "convey public aversion to crime" with the 
same degree of effectiveness). 
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prohibition on robbery reflects a moral judgment that people 
should be punished for robbing others, regardless of whether those 
others might have made themselves vulnerable to robbers. 
Second, criminal law punishes attempted as well as completed 
crimes.34 It does so even if there has been harm whatsoever to the 
would-be victim, much less a causal link between any such harm 
and the culpable conduct of the defendant. In fact, with rare excep­
tions, modem criminal law punishes attempts even when comple­
tion of the crime would have been impossible under the 
c,ircumstances.35 
Attempt crimes, however, are not simply completed crimes with 
a reduced actus reus; rather, relaxation of the actus reus otherwise 
required for a completed crime comes only with a considerable 
heightening of the mens rea element.36 Completed crimes ordinar­
ily require a mental state of recklessness, unless the legislature 
specifies otherwise.37 Attempt crimes, by contrast, generally call 
for proof that the defendant acted purposely38 - that it was his 
"conscious object[ive ]" to complete the crime in question, not sim­
ply that he proceeded forward in disregard of some "substantial and 
unjustifiable" risk that he might complete the crime.39 The conven­
tional rationale for this heightened mens rea requirement rests 
upon the need to draw lines between what is and is not worthy of 
moral condemnation: absent an insistence upon a purposeful state 
of mind, sanctions for attempt crimes would extend to conduct that 
might be wholly innocent or, at least, that the community would not 
regard as quite so blameworthy as to call for moral opprobrium.4° 
Apart from the contrasts in doctrine illustrated above, the moral 
dimension of criminal law also gives rise to significant contrasts in 
34. See, e.g. , MoDEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 {1985). 
35. See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW § 13.1, at 680-87 {1997) (tracing the 
evolution of criminal law in this regard from early efforts, now largely abandoned, to distin­
guish between permissible defenses of factual impossibility and impermissible defenses of 
legal impossibility). The major exceptions that remain, in which impossibility is a defense to 
a charge of attempt, consist of situations in which the attempt was inherently unlikely to 
succeed - for example, sticking pins in a voodoo doll in an effort to commit murder - or 
would not have constituted a crime at all even if completed. See id. § 13.1, at 687-89. 
36. Criminal law also insists upon the existence of conduct amounting to a "substantial 
step" toward completion of the crime. See, e.g., MoDEL PENAL CODE § 5.0l{l){c) {1985). 
37. See, e.g., MoDEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) {1985). 
38. See, e.g., MoDEL PENAL CODE § 5.01{1) {1985) {defining criminal attempt). Some 
jurisdictions refer to the same mental state as "specific intent." See ROBINSON, supra note 35, 
§ 11.2, at 636. 
39. Compare MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.02(2){a)(i) {1985) {defining "purposely") with 
MoDEL PENAL CODE § 2.02{c) {defining "recklessly"). 
40. See ROBINSON, supra note 35, § 11.2, at 631-32. 
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institutional roles. In the tort system, the power to articulate new 
standards of conduct lies primarily in the hands of politically unac­
countable actors - namely, common law judges. It is not consid­
ered illegitimate for courts to recognize new theories of tort 
liability, even to the shock of defendants in the very case that serves 
as the vehicle for doctrinal change.41 The �riminal system, by com­
parison, allocates power to politically accountable institutions -
legislatures - to set forth, in advance, criminal standards of con­
duct. In modem America, courts have no authority to create com­
mon law crimes,42 and even the legislature lacks the authority to 
enact ex post facto laws.43 Given the importance of moral condem­
nation as an objective of the criminal system, it is essential for the 
community to deliberate as to whether, and under what circum­
stances, to bring public disapproval upon defendants. Political insti­
tutions are the natural vehicles for such deliberation. 
There also is an institutional aspect to the identification of de­
fendants. Tort suits begin at the behest of private persons; one 
need not ask the government's permission to sue. Indeed, the ab­
sence of governmental control over claim initiation remains one of 
the major strengths of the private law of tort.44 A tort plaintiff can­
not sue just anyone, however, even if the target of the slit has acted 
abominably. In particular, a tort plaintiff cannot "select [a] defend­
ant[ ] based largely on the likelihood of [its] unattractiveness" to a 
jury, but instead may sue only those defendants whose misdeeds are 
causally linked to some harm that the plaintiff has suffered.45 
The criminal system is radically different. It lodges the power to 
bring criminal charges in the hands of politically accountable prose­
cutors who, due to limited enforcement resources, necessarily exer­
cise broad discretion in the selection of those to be charged.46 
41. A legislature might enact a statute to define a new theory of tort liability, but the 
possibility of legislative intervention has never been thought to preclude or to make illegiti­
mate the development of tort doctrine through common law decisions. 
42. This is true at both federal and state levels. See United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 
Wheat.) 415, 416 (1816) (holding that federal judges have no authority to create common law 
crimes); United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32-34 (1812) (same); 
ROBINSON, supra note 35, at 67 (observing that "no state continues to permit judges to create 
crimes"). 
43. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 9; TEX. CoNST. art. I, § 16. 
44. See Richard B. Stewart, Crisis in Tort Law? The Institutional Perspective, 54 U. Cm. 
L. REv. 184, 198 (1987). 
45. See Gail L. Heriot, The Practical Role of Harm in the Criminal Law and the Law of 
Tort, 5 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL lssUES 145, 153 (1994). 
46. This is not to deny the potential for abuse of prosecutorial discretion. The point sim­
ply is that such discretion itself originated as a source of constraint insofar as it tempers the 
effects of broad criminal statutes. This remains among the most powerful justifications for 
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Moreover, apart from the identity of the party empowered to bring 
suit, criminal trials themselves carry a panoply of protections with 
no analogue in ordinary civil law. Most prominent among these 
protections is the insistence upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
rather than by a simple preponderance of the evidence.47 
Causation of harm, in short, is not essential when the objective 
is the moral condemnation of the defendant rather than the reallo­
cation of losses between two private parties. The lack of insistence 
upon causation, however, comes only with significant doctrinal and 
institutional constraints. 
II. BLAME, FORTUNE, AND MA.ss TORTS 
The previous discussion identifies the two sorts of disputes that 
have come to be the focus of widespread public attention upon 
mass tort litigation in recent years. The breast implant litigation 
poses a problem of scientific causation, while the tobacco litigation 
poses a question of risk-decisional causation. I discuss each in turn. 
As I explain in this Part, these examples illustrate the degree to 
which mass tort litigation has come to disregard considerations of 
causation in the interest of serving, in practical effect, as a vehicle 
for punishment based largely upon outrage over defendants' behav­
ior. Mass tort litigation has done so, however, with little regard for 
the constraints upon the process of moral condemnation that lie at 
the core of criminal law. 
It would be noteworthy enough if the foregoing developments 
represented the response of the law to anomalous situations. As I 
explain at the end of this Part, however, recent events are not sim­
ply the products of unusual circumstances; rather, there are strong 
grounds upon which to believe that both the phenomenon of outra-
the political accountability of prosecutors to the present day, as the authors of one leading 
treatise summarize, 
[w]here appropriate decisionmaking requires consideration of numerous factors that 
vary with each case, an attempt to regulate that decision as to all of the situations likely 
to arise (assuming that they all could be envisioned) would require an elaborate statute, 
containing many detailed provisos, exceptions, and qualifications. Such a statute would 
often be cumbersome . . . . [E]ven where the law can appropriately regulate by refer­
ence to a few factually-based circumstances, it must be recognized that other circum­
stances generally deemed irrelevant may nonetheless have a just bearing on the exercise 
of authority in the exceptional case. . . .  That need is exacerbated by the legislative 
tendency in the area of crime control to frame legislation with an eye to its political 
symbolism, to focus on the wors[t] scenario, and to overgeneralize . ... 
WAYNER. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 7-8 (2d ed. 1992). 
47. See In re Wmship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("[T]he Due Process Clause protects the 
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact neces­
sary to constitute the crime . .. charged."). 
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geous fortune and the associated influx of moral condemnation will 
persist in the mass tort disputes of the twenty-first century. 
A. Scientific Causation 
Mass torts characteristically involve allegations of latent disease 
- harmful medical conditions that do not immediately manifest 
themselves upon exposure to the product in question. In this con­
nection, the law of torts looks to the science of toxicology. As com­
mentators have recognized, toxicology generates only aggregate 
estimates of risk, such as an estimate of the number of lung cancers 
that one would expect in a large group of smokers relative to the 
number that one would expect in a group of nonsmokers similar in 
other relevant respects.48 The early scholarly literature on mass 
torts, in fact, explored the difficulties posed for plaintiffs by the in­
sistence in conventional tort doctrine upon proof by a preponder­
ance of the evidence that the product in question caused a 
particular, individual case of disease.49 
Until recently, however, commentators have devoted relatively 
little attention to a different aspect of the problem: What if scien­
tific research ultimately shows that the product does not increase 
the risk of disease at all? illustrating this situation, several com­
mentators have recounted in considerable detail the controversy 
surrounding the safety of silicone gel breast implants.5° For present 
purposes, an overview of the essential events in this area will more 
than suffice. 
1. When Initial Suspicions Prove Wrong 
The central question posed by lawsuits involving silicone gel 
breast implants is whether that product causes connective tissue dis­
eases, either as conventionally conceived or in some new "atypical" 
form involving a constellation of symptoms not previously defined 
48. For an explanation of relative risk, see GREEN, supra note 19, at 28. 
49. Tue leading article of this sort remains David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in 
Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HAR.v. L. REv. 851 
(1984). 
50. See MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND 
TiiE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE 50-68, 79-89 (1996); JOHN A. BYRNE, INFORMED 
CoNSENT 71-81, 93-107, 165-85 (1996); Rebecca S. Dresser et al., Breast Implants Revisited: 
Beyond Science on Trial, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 705, 709-15; Richard A. Nagareda, In the After­
math of the Mass Tort Class Action, 85 GEo. L.J. 295, 330-39 (1996); see also Deborah R. 
Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal 
Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 961, 992-98 (1993). 
1138 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 96:1121 
by scientists.51 All such diseases center upon the immune system. 
In essence, the fear is that silicone leaching from a breast implant 
somehow might trigger a response by the body that would turn the 
immune system against itself.52 
For purposes of scientific causation, two additional facts stand 
out: Approximately one in every hundred women will develop 
some form of connective tissue disease for reasons that science has 
yet to understand fully; and roughly the same ratio of women in this 
country have received silicone gel breast implants.53 As a result, 
one would expect "on the basis of chance alone" that some ten 
thousand women would have both connective tissue disease and im­
plants. 54 From a scientific standpoint, then, the implant litigation 
turns upon the separation of causal relationships, if any, from mere 
coincidences. 
As is typical of many mass tort disputes, the legal controversy 
surrounding breast implants started with multimillion-dollar ver­
dicts in early, pathbreaking lawsuits: first for plaintiff Marcia Stern 
in 1984 and then for plaintiff Mariann Hopkins in 1991.55 At the 
time, scientists had yet to initiate epidemiological studies that 
would compare the incidence of connective tissue diseases in 
women with and without implants.56 In the absence of such studies, 
plaintiffs instead relied upon expert testimony that conveyed pre-
51. For an explanation of connective tissue diseases, see ANGELL, supra note 50, at 21-22. 
As to the notion of "atypical" connective tissue diseases, see Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 
947 F. Supp. 1387, 1402 (D. Or. 1996) (emphasizing that scientists have yet to settle upon the 
criteria by which to define such atypical forms of disease). 
The fears regarding connective tissue diseases are distinct from the local complications 
that may result from the hardening or rupturing of the implant itself. See generally Sherine 
E. Gabriel et al., Complications Leading to Surgery After Breast Implantation, 336 NE W ENG. 
J. MEo. 677, 681 (1997) (finding that nearly 24% of women with implants suffer complica­
tions serious enough to warrant reoperation within five years). Though certainly problematic 
in their own -right, these local complications have not been the driving force of mass tort 
litigation against implant manufacturers. See ANGELL, supra note 50, at 21. 
52. For a more detailed explanation of this asserted effect, see Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1401. 
53. See ANGELL, supra note 50, at 111. The absolute number of women in the United 
States who have received breast implants has been estimated to be between 815,000 and 2 
million. See Joseph Sanders & D.H. Kaye, Expert Advice on Silicone Implants: Hall v. 
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 37 JuRIMETRics J. 113, 114 n.4 (1997). 
54. See ANGELL, supra note 50, at 111-12 (basing the 10,000 figure on a population esti­
mate of 100 million U.S. adult women). 
55. For a more detailed account of these lawsuits, see BYRNE, supra note 50, at 93-107, 
165-71. 
56. See ANGELL, supra note 50, at 27 ("[M]edical researchers did not systematically begin 
to collect evidence on breast implants until around the time of the FDA ban [in 1992], when 
several large [epidemiological] studies were initiated."). 
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liminary suggestions of causation drawn from animal studies, bio­
physical data, and the experts' own clinical observations.57 
The pathbreaking implant lawsuits are noteworthy not simply 
for their outcomes but, even more significantly, for the revelation of 
troubling conduct on the part of implant makers - particularly the 
leading manufacturer, Dow Corning.58 The essence of these revela­
tions is that manufacturers, based upon their own internal experi­
ments on laboratory animals during the 1960s and 1970s, had 
reason to suspect that silicone might trigger some sort of response 
in the immune systems of mammals but nonetheless proceeded for­
ward with the marketing of breast implants.59 The Stern case also 
featured evidence to suggest that Dow Corning had altered experi­
mental data to disguise the results of one internal study indicating 
that silicone implants produced a response in the immune systems 
of laboratory dogs.60 
The generation of a response in the immune system, of course, 
does not necessarily amount to the causation of disease; the whole 
point of immune systems, after all, is to keep the body healthy by 
combating intrusions of various sorts. Likewise, risks identified in 
laboratory animals do not necessarily translate into similar risks for 
humans.61 Legitimate debate certainly remains over whether the 
benefits of implants - essentially psychological - are sufficiently 
great as to justify the availability of the product, even in the face of 
the early concerns about some form of immune system response. It 
is one thing, however, to press forward with the marketing of a 
57. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1123-25 {9th Cir. 1994) {up­
holding the admission of such testimony under the standard of Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 {1993), in the course of upholding the verdict for 
Hopkins). For a critical assessment of this testimony, see ANGELL, supra note 50, at 118-25. 
58. See In re Dow Corning Corp., 86 F.3d 482, 485 (6th Cir. 1996) ("Until it ceased their 
manufacture in 1992, Dow Corning was the predominant producer of silicone gel breast im­
plants, accounting for nearly 50% of the entire market."). 
59. See BYRNE, supra note 50, at 175-77 (summarizing documents used in Hopkins's law­
suit); see also Hopkins, 33 F.3d at 1119, 1127 (same). These documents later would form the 
basis for front-page news stories in the general-interest press. See supra note 2. 
60. See BYRNE, supra note 50, at 103-04. Counsel for plaintiff Marcia Stem regarded this 
evidence as "a key reason . . .  that the jury . . .  [found] the company guilty of fraud." Id. at 
104. Along similar lines, the jury in a class action in Louisiana state court recently found that 
Dow Corning's parent corporation, Dow Chemical, did " 'knowingly or intentionally remain 
silent, conceal or suppress information about the harms and dangers of using silicone in the 
human body."' Thomas M. Burton, Dow Chemical Found Negligent in Silicone Case, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 19, 1997, at A3 (quoting a question posed to the jury). The Louisiana court 
subsequently dissolved the class prior to the next anticipated phase of trial, which was to 
have focused upon damages. See Judge Limits Lawsuits over Breast Implants in a Louisiana 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1997, at A23. 
61. On the difficulties associated with inferring risk in humans based upon research on 
laboratory animals, see GREEN, supra note 19, at 35-36. 
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product with ·disclosure to consumers of any lingering uncertainty 
about its long-term effects; it is quite another to put the product on 
the market while saying nothing in the face of what were, at the 
very least, red flags. In any event, from the apportionment of com­
pensatory and, punitive damages in the pathbreaking implant law­
suits, one can sense the impact that these revelations had upon 
juries, as compared to the more murky issue of scientific causation: 
Stem received $211,000 in compensatory damages coupled with 
$1.5 million in punitive damages;62 Hopkins received $840,000 in 
compensatory damages plus $6.5 million in punitive damages.63 
The documentary evidence of implant manufacturers' conduct, 
however, had implications far beyond individual cases. Media at­
tention brought the controversy to the public eye in 1990, "con­
vey[ing] the clear message that implants were dangerous devices 
foisted off on unsuspecting women. "64 The documents themselves 
soon found their way by back channels to federal Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) Commissioner David Kessler,6s whose 
agency subsequently imposed a moratorium on silicone gel implant 
sales that remains in effect to the present day.66 By then, Dow 
Coming had ceased to manufacture the product.67 
Regulatory action, however, was not the end of the story. As 
one observer has remarked, 
once it got out that a link between [implants and connective tissue 
diseases] had been accepted in court, women who had both . . .  would 
be bound to consider whether they, too, should sue. Even those who 
only thought they might have connective-tissue-like disease also be­
gan to take notice. 68 
The understandable suspicions of women with implants coincided 
with the economic opportunity that implant litigation offered both 
to mass tort plaintiffs' attorneys, some of whom set up "assembly 
62. See BYRNE, supra note 50, at 105. 
63. See Hopkins, 33 F.3d at 1119-20. 
64. ANGELL, supra note 50, at 53 (describing a report on the CBS television program Face 
to Face with Connie Chung); see also BYRNE, supra note 50, at 121 (quoting one pathologist 
interviewed on the same program as stating, as a scientific fact, that "[s]ilicone gets right into 
the heart of the immune system"). 
65. There is considerable doubt about the propriety of the transfer of documents from 
Hopkins's attorney to Dr. Kessler via an intermediary in the public health community. Much 
of the documentation ostensibly was under a protective order at the time. See BYRNE, supra 
note 50, at 175. 
66. On the decisionmaking process and justification for the FDA's action, see generally 
David A. Kessler, The Basis of the FDA's Decision on Breast Implants, 326 NEW ENO. J. 
MEo. 1713 (1992). 
67. See supra note 58. 
68. ANGELL, supra note 50, at 112. 
March 1998] Mass Torts 1141 
line" office procedures to conduct the legal representation of such 
women,69 and to members of the medical profession, some of whom 
would earn millions of dollars for the handling of "bulk referrals" 
from plaintiffs' lawyers.7o 
Within two years of the FDA moratorium and the revelations 
about the behavior of manufacturers, approximately 16,000 women 
had filed suit nationwide.71 The sheer number of actions led ini­
tially to the consolidation of federal implant suits by the Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation (MDL Panel) before District Judge Sam 
Pointer72 and later, in 1994, to an attempt to resolve all present and 
future implant claims through a multibillion-dollar class action set­
tlement.73 The settlement sought to establish a private compensa­
tion scheme that promised specific payments for particular diseases, 
subdivided by severity.74 Claimants would be required to submit 
little more than documentation that they had received a silicone gel 
breast implant; no further showing of causation was required,75 the 
settlement having factored the uncertainty on that score into the 
compensation scheme. 
Subsequent guidance from the Supreme Court sheds considera­
ble doubt upon the legal basis for certification of settlement class 
actions, particularly in the mass tort area.76 In its time, however, 
69. See Max Boot, Queen of Torts, WALL ST. J., May 16, 1996, at A14 (characterizing the 
law firm of Williams & Troutwine as such); see also Max Boot, A Tale of Silicone City, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 29, 1995, at Al4 (characterizing similarly O'Quinn, Kerensky, McAninch & 
Laminack). 
70. See Gina Kolata & Barry Meier, Implant Lawsuits Create a Medical Rush To Cash In, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1995, at Al. 
71. See Gina Kolata, Details of Implant Settlement Announced by Federal Judge, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 5, 1994, at A16. Tue most significant individual verdict during this period came 
in an action brought in Texas by plaintiff Pamela Johnson. Tue jury awarded $5 million in 
compensatory damages and $20 million in punitive damages. See Amy Singer, Look over 
Here, AM. LAW., Mar. 1993, at 86, 87. Indeed, shortly thereafter, The American Lawyer of­
fered readers a videotape detailing how Johnson's lawyer, John O'Quinn, had managed to 
"direct[ ] the jury's attention . . .  toward the least assailable aspects of his case" and away 
from the uncertainties surrounding scientific causation. See id. 
72. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L. 
1992). 
73. See Lindsey v. Dow Corning Corp., No. CV94-P-11558-S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
12521, at *l (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994). But cf Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Wmdsor, 117 S. Ct. 
2231, 2238-39 & n.3 (1997) (holding that the consolidation of pending federal lawsuits by the 
MDL Panel does not, in itself, provide authority for the disposition of future claims). 
74. See Breast Implant Litigation Settlement Notice at 6, Lindsey v. Dow Corning Corp., 
No. CV94-P-11558-S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994) (on file with 
author). 
75. See Lindsey, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521, at *5. 
76. Certification of a nationwide class of implant recipients for purposes of settlement 
suffers from virtually all of the same flaws that the Supreme Court recently found to doom a 
class action settlement in the asbestos context. See Amchem Prods., 117 S. Ct. at 2249-52 
(holding that formidable differences amongst class members' claims, circumstances of expo-
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the settlement fell apart for a more practical reason: an unexpect­
edly large number of claims - by then, some 440,000 - quickly 
made it clear that the :fixed sum of $4.2 billion set aside by manufac­
turers for purposes of the settlement would be grossly insufficient 
to fund the compensation payments described therein.77 Shortly 
before the collapse of the settlement, Dow Corning sought protec­
tion under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code,78 and the proceed­
ings thereunder continue to grind slowly forward.79 
sure, and financial interests preclude class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(b)(3)). In light of the Court's reasoning in Amchem Products, academic commentators 
have opined that nationwide class action settlements in the mass tort area rarely, if ever, will 
satisfy the requirements for class certification set forth in the current Rule 23 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. See John C. Coffee, Jr., After the High Court Decision in 'Amchem 
Products Inc. v. Windsor,' Can a Class Action Ever Be Certified Only for the Purpose of 
Settlement?, NATL. LJ., July 21, 1997, at B4; Eric D. Green, What Will We Do When Adjudi· 
cation Ends? We'll Settle in Bunches: Bringing Rule 23 into the Twenty-First Century, 44 
UCLA L. REv. 1773, 1778 (1997). 
The prospects for revision of Rule 23 in such a way as to loosen, much less undo, the 
strictures of Amchem Products likewise appear slim. See Linda S. Mullenix, Court Settles 
Settlement Class Issue, NATL. L.J., Aug. 11, 1997, at B12 (considering it "highly unlikely" that 
a preexisting proposal to revise Rule 23 will continue forward as formulated and speculating 
that, even if it did, "it is highly dubious that the same nine justices will then approve a rule 
they apparently have rejected in Amchem"). Indeed, the Court itself has alluded to serious 
questions about the viability of any class action settlements that would seek to resolve future 
mass tort claims - which any settlement must attempt to do in order to offer peace of mind 
to defendants. In contrast to the text of Rule 23, these concerns are not amenable to legisla­
tive tinkering, for they go to constitutional limitations upon both personal jurisdiction and 
the authority of the federal courts. Cf. Amchem Prods., 117 S. Ct. at 2252 (declining to rule 
upon the adequacy of notice to class members under the Due Process Clause, but noting that 
"[m]any persons" who merely have been exposed to asbestos "may not even know of their 
exposure, or realize the extent of the harm they may incur"); 117 S. Ct. at 2244 ( acknowledg­
ing but finding it unnecessary to resolve objections based upon Article III). 
77. See In re Dow Coming Corp., 86 F.3d 482, 485, 486 n.4 (6th Cir. 1996). By its terms, 
the settlement afforded implant recipients the opportunity to opt out of the deal in the event 
of such a precipitous reduction of compensation levels. See Lindsey, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
12521, at *22-24. 
78. See Dow Coming, 86 F.3d at 486. On the major features and significance of Chapter 
11, see infra section 11.A.2. As to the reasons for use of this particular chapter of the Bank· 
ruptcy Code in the mass tort context, see DouGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS oF BANK· 
RUPTCY 90 (rev. ed. 1993) ("Most bankruptcy cases involving mass torts are filed under 
Chapter 11 [providing for reorganization of the debtor], rather than Chapter 7 [providing for 
liquidation of the debtor's assets]."). Whether the Bankruptcy Code should provide a reor­
ganization alternative to liquidation in the first place remains a debated point. See generally 
THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE Lome AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY 209-24 (1986); Douglas G. 
Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL Sroo. 127 (1986). 
79. For their part, manufacturers other than Dow Coming proposed a revised settlement 
to compensate those women who received implants made by those particular companies. See 
Barry Meier, 3 Implant Companies Offer a New Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1995, at Al. 
Compensation from the non-Dow Coming manufacturers would not come from a fixed sum 
set aside for that purpose. Rather, the companies would be obligated to pay compensation at 
the levels specified in the settlement, though those levels would be less than the ones de­
scribed in the original deal. Claimants also would have to "submit more medical documenta­
tion than required by the first settlement and could have to undergo new tests." Id. 
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In the meantime, however, a substantial body of epidemiologi­
cal studies failed to demonstrate a causal connection between im­
plants and connective tissue diseases, as conventionally defined -
so extensive a body of research that observers began to ask whether 
the implant litigation is "a case of justice, or a total travesty."8° A 
1996 review of the epidemiological literature by FDA scientists -
including Dr. Kessler himself - arrived at much the same conclu­
sion on scientific causation,81 as did professional scientific organiza­
tions in this country and regulatory agencies in other Western 
nations.82 The weakness of any remaining indications to the con­
trary is reinforced by two recent district court opinions, rejecting as 
insufficiently grounded in science expert testimony offered to show 
that implants cause connective tissue diseases - either in a conven­
tional or an atypical form.83 Both courts, however, declined to dis­
miss implant plaintiffs' cases outright, pending review of the 
available scientific research by a national committee of experts ap­
pointed by Judge Pointer to assist the federal judiciary in determin­
ing the admissibility under the Federal Rules of Evidence of expert 
80. Gina Kolata, A Case of Justice, or a Total Travesty?, N.Y. TIMEs, June 13, 1995, at Cl 
(surveying the epidemiological literature). For an even more alarmed assessment, see Max 
Boot, The Tort Case That Killed the Truth, WALL ST. J., June 26, 1996, at A16. 
81. See Barbara G. Silverman et al., Reported Complications of Silicone Gel Breast Im­
plants: An Epidemiologic Review, 124 .ANNALS INTERNAL MEo. 744, 754-55 {1996) (noting 
that epidemiological research has "tended to rule out large increases in risk for connective 
tissue disease" but could not yet exclude completely the prospect of atypical disease). 
82. See ANGELL, supra note 50, at 201-02. 
83. In Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., Judge Robert Jones flatly deemed "irrelevant any 
testimony or evidence of . . .  ACID [atypical connective tissue disease]" or of "any systemic 
illness or syndrome or autoimmune disorder of any kind." 947 F. Supp. at 1414. Likewise, in 
In re Breast Implant Cases, Judges Harold Baer and Jack Weinstein, in a joint opinion, em­
phasized not only that current science "supports the conclusion that the silicone implants at 
issue do not cause classical recognized [connective tissue] diseases," but also that science has 
yet to offer more than a "scintilla of plausibility" for the further claim of atypical disease. 942 
F. Supp. 958, 960-61 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1996). In these judges' words, 
[t]he hundreds of symptoms associated with [atypical connective tissue] disease, the lack 
of any acceptable agreed upon definition, the inadequacy of any satisfactory supporting 
epidemiological or animal studies, the lack of a scientifically acceptable showing of med­
ical plausibility, and the questionable nature of the clinical conclusions of treating doc­
tors, all point to a failure of proof in making a prima facie case that silicone implants 
cause any of the [atypical] syndromes claimed . . . .  
942 F. Supp. at 961 (acknowledging, however, that implants may lead to local complications). 
As a procedural matter, Hall arose from 15 consolidated cases brought by Oregon women 
against manufacturers other than Dow Corning. In the wake of the collapse of the class 
action settlement, Judge Pointer had remanded these cases for trial in the District of Oregon. 
See 947 F. Supp. at 1392. Likewise, the judges in the Breast Implant Cases issued their opin­
ion in anticipation of similar action with respect to cases originally filed in New York. See 
942 F. Supp. at 959. 
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testimony as to the existence of causation in the face of extensive 
research to the contrary. 84 
One could draw upon the breast implant experience as a vehicle 
through which to address any number of important questions, from 
the wisdom of permitting juries to render verdicts in early, path­
breaking lawsuits when the then-available scientific research on 
causation is sketchy and preliminary at best,85 to the need for im­
proved coordination of the tort system and regulatory agencies like 
84. See Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1415; Breast Implant Cases, 942 F. Supp. at 961. The notion 
that tentative fears of scientific causation ultimately might prove untrue is not confined to 
mass tort litigation over breast implants. One may find an earlier illustration of the same 
phenomenon in the litigation over Bendectin, a drug prescribed to reduce morning sickness 
during pregnancy. Early lawsuits generated mixed results, with some notable victories for 
plaintiffs who alleged that Bendectin caused birth defects in children in the form of horrible 
limb deformities. See Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Ca11Sa· 
tion in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1, 6 tbl.1 (1993) (summarizing results in 
Bendectin lawsuits). 
These early lawsuits had the salutary effect of bringing to light conduct that, if anything, 
exceeds that of implant manufacturers in its lack of concern for consumer safety. See GREEN, 
supra note 19, at 128 (noting that the results of internal experiments on rabbits resembled 
early indications of the disastrous birth defects previously associated with the sedative 
thalidomide); id. at 129 (noting the reclassification of reports that children exposed to 
Bendectin had suffered birth defects so as to deflect further inquiry from doctors). Later 
lawsuits, undertaken in the face of a growing epidemiological literature that failed to show 
scientific causation, ultimately turned the tide in favor of the defense. See id. at 274; Sanders, 
supra, at 4-12. 
The early Bendectin verdicts did not precipitate an avalanche of lawsuits on a scale simi­
lar to the implant litigation and, hence, did not create a need to resort to either bankruptcy or 
a class action settlement. But this feature is attributable to factors that distinguish the 
Bendectin experience from the implant example and, if anything, support the inference that 
the latter is more likely to be characteristic of future disputes over scientific causation. The 
Bendectin litigation arose in the early 1980s, before the full-fledged development of a highly 
coordinated mass tort plaintiffs' bar with the capacity quickly to bring forth claims in large 
numbers and on a national scale. See Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort 
Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 469, 480 (1994) (attributing "[t]he speed with which the 
number of breast implant cases exploded on the scene" in part to "a well-organized plaintiffs' 
bar, which now has the capital, organizational skills, and advertising techniques to seek clien· 
tele"); cf. Hensler & Peterson, supra note 50, at 1026 (discussing the innovative techniques 
developed by the mass tort plaintiffs' bar to support implant litigation, including the creation 
by some 150 lawyers of an "information clearing-house" on the subject). Moreover, even if 
all potential Bendectin claims had been litigated, they would have amounted to roughly 
115,000-168,000 in total, see GREEN, supra note 19, at 221, as compared to the over 440,000 
implant claims, the defense of which pushed Dow Coming into bankruptcy in the wake of the 
proposed class action settlement. 
In short, the Bendectin experience further attests to the notion that suspicions of scien· 
tific causation may prove unfounded, without dispelling the need to assess the merits of 
bankruptcy as a vehicle of resolution. 
85. A full-scale exposition of this significant question is beyond the scope of this article. 
At least with respect to early breast implant cases such as Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 
F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1994), the problem does not appear to be one of slipshod scientific meth· 
odology, insofar as the plaintiffs' experts appear to have relied upon modes of inquiry that 
reputable toxicologists use to identify products that may warrant closer examination through 
more elaborate toxicological studies. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. At this early 
juncture, the problem is not so much one of admissibility as it is one of sufficiency: whether 
scientific knowledge in such a preliminary state should be considered sufficient to permit the 
case to go to the jury at all. 
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the FDA.86 For present purposes, the implant litigation is equally 
notable for the light that it sheds upon the similarity between mass 
tort litigation and criminal law objectives and remedies. 
2. Bankruptcy as Moral Condemnation 
Reorganization proceedings under Chapter 11 have become a 
familiar feature of the mass tort landscape and are likely to remain 
so.87 In fact, a recent report to Congress by the National Bank­
ruptcy Review Commission counsels the enactment of measures to 
facilitate even greater use of Chapter 11 in this area.88 
The most widely known application of Chapter 11 in the mass 
tort context remains the lengthy reorganization of the Johns­
Manville Corporation, the leading member of the asbestos indus­
try. 89 By the time the asbestos litigation had advanced to that 
point, however, the harmful nature of the underlying product was 
beyond serious dispute. No substantial doubt remained as to the 
existence of a causal relationship, extensively documented in the 
scientific literature, between the inhalation of asbestos and any 
number of serious diseases.90 The same was true with respect to the 
tort claims concerning the Dalkon Shield contraceptive device that 
precipitated the bankruptcy of the A.H. Robins Company.91 In 
these situations, with the underlying merits of tort claims against 
the debtor corporation well established, bankruptcy serves its ac­
customed role simply as a procedure for the orderly resolution of 
competing claims - in essence, as a way to avoid a madcap rush of 
meritorious creditors upon the debtor.92 
86. For my prescriptions on this subject, see Nagareda, supra note 50, at 351-67. 
87. On the challenges of Chapter 11 bankruptcies in the mass tort context, see, e.g., Mark 
J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 CoLUM. L. REv. 846 (1984); Thomas A. Smith, A 
Capital Markets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 104 YALE LJ. 367 (1994). 
88. See NATIONAL BANKR. REvmw CoMMN., BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT 'TwENTY YEARS 
315-50 (1997). For example, the Commission reco=ends amendment of the Bankruptcy 
Code to provide explicitly for the appointment of "a mass future claims representative," id. 
at 329, and for authority on the part of the bankruptcy court "to make determinations of the 
present value of mass future claims," id. at 342. Perhaps most strikingly, the Commission's 
proposal contemplates the possibility that property of the debtor might be transferred to a 
successor corporation "free and clear of mass future claims" under certain circumstances. 
See id. at 347. I leave for another day the wisdom of these reco=endations. 
89. See generally Frank J. Macchiarola, The Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust: 
Lessons for the Future, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 583, 596-617 (1996) (recounting the history of 
the Manville reorganization). 
90. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 739 (Bankr. E. & S.D.N.Y. 
1991) ("The capacity of asbestos fibers to cause serious injuries is no longer disputed."), revd. 
on other grounds, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992). 
91. See generally RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON 
SHIELD BANKRUPTCY (1991). 
92. See JACKSON, supra note 78, at 12-13. 
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When the merits of the underlying tort claims are open to 
doubt, the reorganization process set forth in Chapter 11 takes on a 
different light. Here, the process itself acts as a vehicle for condem­
nation of the defendant manufacturers' conduct, wholly apart from 
the causation of harm. In fact, those who defend the application of 
Chapter 11 in the mass tort context lapse, on occasion, into rhetoric 
vaguely familiar to the criminal law. For example, it is common­
place to see bankruptcy described as a vehicle with a praiseworthy 
"capacity for debtor rehabilitation."93 In criminal law, notions of 
rehabilitation are closely connected to the moral condemnation of 
the defendant's earlier conduct. The whole point of rehabilitation, 
of course, is not merely to deter future misdeeds through the fear of 
punishment, though deterrence too is a familiar objective of crimi­
nal sanctions. Instead, rehabilitation seeks to change the defend­
ant's moral compass itself, such that he will make better choices in 
the future. Consistent with a notion of promoting change in the 
way a debtor corporation conducts its business, Chapter 11 pro­
ceedings often coincide with the replacement of corporate manag­
ers,94 though that is not actually required by the Bankruptcy 
Code.95 Indeed, invocation of Chapter 11 can be the source of con­
siderable public shame for the corporation,96 even as it stays tort 
litigation.97 As one commentator has observed, there is a long-term 
"stigma of Chapter 11 in the marketplace."98 
93. E.g. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 
CoLUM. L. REv. 1343, 1460 n.468 (1995). 
94. There is some uncertainty in the empirical literature as to the precise rate of turnover. 
Compare Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganiza­
tion of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 597, 610 (1993) (reporting a 
70% turnover rate for the chief executive officer during or in contemplation of reorganiza­
tion, based upon a study of 43 bankruptcies under Chapter 11 involving large, publicly traded 
firms) with Stuart C. Gilson & Michael R. Vetsuypens, CEO Compensation in Financially 
Distressed Firms: An Empirical Analysis, 48 J. FIN. 425, 442 (1993) (reporting a 39.2% turn­
over rate before or during reorganization, based upon a study of 77 publicly traded firms that 
either filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 or restructured their debt outside of 
bankruptcy). 
95. The presumption of Chapter 11 "is the reverse: namely, that Chapter 11 allows the 
debtor-in-possession to retain management and control of the debtor's business operations 
unless a party can prove that appointment of a trustee is warranted." Coffee, supra note 93, 
at 1460 n.468. 
96. Dow Coming's action in this regard met with formidable adverse coverage from the 
general-interest press. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, Don't Sue, They Say. We Went Bankrupt., 
N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1995, § 4, at 16; Don Lee et al., Twice Distressed, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 
1995, at Dl. 
97. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(l) (1994). This, of course, is the major advantage to Chapter 
11 from the standpoint of a manufacturer that otherwise would have to fund the defense of 
tort suits. 
98. Edward I. Altman, A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Ques­
tion, 39 J. FIN. 1067, 1071 (1984). 
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The principal feature of a Chapter 11 proceeding consists of the 
formulation of a reorganization plan99 that satisfies principles of ab­
solute priority - that tort creditors shall be paid ahead of many 
other sorts of creditors, including shareholders - and temporal eq­
uity - that "creditors within the same class [shall] be treated 
equally, regardless of when their claims mature."100 In fact, some 
commentators have pointed specifically to these limitations as 
grounds for the superiority of Chapter 11 over other means, such as 
class action settlements, for the safeguarding of future mass tort 
claimants.101 In addition, the Bankruptcy Code limits the business 
operations of the debtor corporation during the formulation of a 
reorganization plan, such that initiatives beyond the ordinary 
course of business cannot go forward to the detriment of creditors' 
interests.1°2 
Although the objective behind Chapter 11 is to enable the 
debtor corporation to continue as a going concern on the theory 
that this will produce more value for creditors than outright liquida­
tion of the debtor's assets,103 the wrangling over the reorganization 
plan itself can be lengthy.104 Dow Coming reportedly invoked 
Chapter 11 as part of a strategy to obtain a quick, definitive deter­
mination of whether breast implants are capable of causing auto-
99. For an overview of the reorganization process under Chapter 11, see BAIRD, supra 
note 78, at 230-46. 
100. Coffee, supra note 93, at 1458; see also Roe, supra note 87, at 852-54. For an expla­
nation of how these principles affect the voice that creditors will be given in the reorganiza-
tion plan, see BAIRD, supra note 78, at 81. 
· 
101. See Coffee, supra note 93, at 1459 {"Although in practice bankruptcy reorganiza­
tions may not always fully comply with these two normative principles, mass tort class action 
settlements violate both principles openly and egregiously."). 
102. See DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 10-5, at 738 (1993) {"The court may 
condition or prohibit use of various forms of collateral including buildings, machinery, equip­
ment, fixtures, inventory, or cash and accounts receivable generated by the business; pass on 
certain business decisions of the debtor; and approve or disapprove financing arrangements 
and credit transactions made outside of the ordinary course of business."); Altman, supra 
note 98, at 1071 (noting that the indirect costs of bankruptcy include "lost managerial 
opportunities"). 
103. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganization, 101 
HAR.v. L. REv. 775, 776 {1988); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case 
for Chapter 11, 101 YALE LJ. 1043, 1043-44 (1992). 
104. Even absent questions of scientific causation, the trust ultimately established to com­
pensate tort creditors of Johns-Manville took some 13 years to become operational. See 
Macchiarola, supra note 89, at 583, 598 (reporting that Manville filed for bankruptcy in 1982 
but that the trust did not begin substantial operation until 1995). 
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immune disorders,1os but such a determination has yet to come.106 
Today, more than two years after the filing of Dow Corning's Chap­
ter 11 petition, competing reorganization plans continue to be 
tossed back and forth between representatives of the debtor corpo­
ration and those of tort claimants.107 In fact, the bankruptcy court 
recently rejected the proposals put forward by both groups, calling 
upon them to hammer out a joint reorganization plan.108 Here, the 
process itself - even one that someday might deem tort claims to 
be worthless - operates as a kind of purgatory. 
This experience is consistent with tb,e growing empirical litera­
ture that has led some to question the wisdom of Chapter 11 as a 
whole.109 Estimates of the direct costs associated with Chapter 11 
proceedings - legal and other administrative costs involved in the 
formulation and approval of a reorganization plan - have been in 
the neighborhood of three to six percent of the firm's preban­
kruptcy value.110 Indirect costs - a notoriously difficult phenome­
non to measure, consisting of the business opportunities lost due to 
the pendency and stigma of reorganization proceedings111 - may 
be even higher.112 
105. See Alison Frankel, Dow Coming Goes for Broke, AM. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 78, 
80. Scientific causation is the crucial consideration in the determination of the value, if any, 
that the bankruptcy court should assign to tort claims against Dow Coming. 
106. See In re Dow Coming Corp., 187 B.R. 919, 929 {Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1995) (declining 
to place the initial focus of reorganization proceedings upon the valuation of pending tort 
claims). 
107. See Thomas M. Burton, Dow Coming Creditors Offer Proposal That Would Give 
Them Stake in Firm, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 1996, at A4 (comparing reorganization plans 
offered by Dow Coming and tort creditors). 
108. See In re Dow Coming Corp., 211 B.R. 545, 602-03 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997). In the 
aftermath of the bankruptcy judge's decision to reject both proposals, Dow Corning has put 
forth yet another reorganization plan under which it would pay $2.4 billion to implant recipi­
ents. "Under the [proposed] plan, women could receive $650 to $200,000, based on their 
claims of injury, how well the claims were documented and how many women voted to ac­
cept the settlement." Gina Kolata, Dow Coming Seeks to Settle Implant Cases, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 26, 1997, at Dl. 
· 109. For overviews of the empirical literature supporting criticism of Chapter 11, see, e.g., 
Barry E. Adler, A Theory of Corporate Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 343, 350 & n.24 (1997); 
Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11, 36 J.L. & EcoN. 633, 641-45 (1993). 
110. Compare Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of 
Priority of Claims, 27 J. FIN. EcoN. 285, 290 (1990) with Altman, supra note 98, at 1077-78. 
See also Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy Costs and the New Bankruptcy Code, 38 J. FIN. 477, 
484 (1983) (estimating direct costs as six percent of the amount paid to creditors by way of 
reorganization). 
111. See Altman, supra note 98, at 1071 (citing examples of indirect costs); id. at 1072 
(acknowledging that "indirect costs are illusive and difficult to specify, let alone measure"); 
Weiss, supra note 110, at 288 (offering a similar description of indirect costs and calling them 
"unmeasurable"). 
112. See Altman, supra note 98, at 1077-78 (estimating indirect costs at 10% of pre­
bankruptcy value). But cf. Adler, supra note 109, at 351 n.25 (cautioning that Altman's data 
constitute "a rough estimate"). 
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For many firms . . .  simply preserving the status quo for two or three 
years will come at a large cost. Managers preoccupied with a Chapter 
11 reorganization may not make the bold and innovative decisions 
needed to remain competitive, or they may not make them soon 
enough. Even if Chapter 11 only slows down the development of a 
new product, such a delay may itself be fatal in some industries. In 
some high-technology industries, a product that is only a step behind 
the competition may not even be marketable. 
Costs such as these, however, are not easy to measure.113 
Taking a slightly different approach, other commentators have 
pointed to dramatic reductions in returns to shareholders in bank­
rupt firms under the current Chapter 11 as evidence of "the stock 
market's expectation that the reorganization process itself will exact 
greater losses . . .  than under prior law."114 The process of Chapter 
11 thus is costly in itself. . 
It is a familiar adage in criminal law that a defendant might 
"beat the rap, but he can't beat the ride"115 - in other words, that 
the process for the determination of guilt in the criminal system can 
be arduous in itself, even if the jury ultimately finds the defendant 
not guilty. With regard to mass tort bankruptcies, the foregoing 
analysis of Chapter 11 indicates that "the ride" can be quite severe 
in its own right. It is one thing for a mass tort defendant to be put 
in the position of invoking Chapter 11 as a way to provide, admit­
tedly at considerable transaction cost, for the orderly disposition of 
thousands of meritorious claims. As commentators have observed, 
individuals who happen to manifest disease years or decades in the 
future as a causal result of the defendant's product might stand lit­
tle chance of recovery absent the establishment of a viable frame­
.work for the payment of claims over such an extended time 
period.116 It is quite another thing for a defendant to be put in the 
position of invoking Chapter 11 to deal with a deluge of litigation 
predicated largely upon the perceived blameworthiness of its con­
duct, apart from whether its product actually caused harm to any­
one.117 That is a use of bankruptcy whose practical effect is to serve 
as a vehicle for moral condemnation in its own right and for its own 
sake, not simply as a process for the orderly payment of claims that 
113. Baird, supra note 109, at 643-44. 
114. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 103, at 1069. 
115. I am grateful to John Robertson for drawing my attention to this adage. 
116. On the difficulties of providing adequately for the compensation of future claimants, 
see, e.g., Smith, supra note 87, at 383-97. 
117. See infra section II.C (explaining the strategic considerations and expectations about 
jury decisionmaking that lead to the bringing of such lawsuits in the first place and to the 
invocation of Chapter 11 by defendants, notwithstanding serious doubts about causation). 
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satisfy the substantive requirements of some other body of law: 
namely, tort.us 
Some might say that manufacturers like Dow Corning did not 
act in a manner worthy of moral rebuke when they declined to 
scare consumers with tentative - now, in retrospect, unfounded -
suspicions about adverse effects upon the immune system. Others 
might say that the marketing of implants without a peep about such 
a possibility is eminently worthy of moral condemnation. Whatever 
one's personal reaction, however, it is clear that there has been no 
determination that moral condemnation is warranted through the 
process of public deliberation and political accountability on which 
the law ordinarily relies when condemnation is the dominant objec­
tive. As I discuss in greater depth later,119 however one reads the 
record, it clearly was not the conscious objective of Dow Corning to 
cause connective tissue disease; here, there is not the culpable 
mental state that criminal law ordinarily would demand for the con­
demnation of conduct that falls short of a completed crime.120 
Insofar as the reorganization process under Chapter 11 has 
served as a vehicle for the condemnation of defendants, it has done 
so without any of the salient constraints that characterize criminal 
law. One hardly could have anticipated that Chapter 11 would be­
come a vehicle for such a reworking of the conventional tort-crime 
distinction. That it has so served, by all appearances unwittingly, 
suggests deeper forces at work. But the breast implant litigation is 
not the only indication that the conventional tort-crime distinction 
has eroded. The most remarkable evidence has come elsewhere. 
B. Risk-Decisional Causation 
The tobacco litigation is perhaps the most prominent illustration 
of the influx of criminal law principles into mass tort litigation.121 It 
combines what many consider to be shockingly high levels of 
blameworthiness with substantial questions of risk-decisional causa­
tion. I identify below the major features of the conduct at the heart 
of the tobacco wars, noting the strategic considerations on the part 
of the mass tort plaintiffs' bar that have led it to focus upon defend-
118. The typical claims against a debtor corporation, of course, arise under the law of 
contract. 
119. See infra section III.B.2. 
120. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (observing that purposeful conduct is ordi­
narily required for attempt crimes). 
121. Cf. Anita Bernstein, Better Living Through Crime and Tort, 76 B.U. L. REv. 169, 172 
(1996) (alluding, in passing, to the similarities between aspects of the tobacco litigation and 
criminal law principles). 
March 1998] Mass Torts 1151 
ants' blameworthiness. I then discuss the existence of independent 
sources of information concerning the risks of smoking - espe­
cially the notion that smoking can be difficult to quit - and relate 
the debate on that score to the tort requirement of causation. 
1. Addiction and Fraud 
Nicotine is why people smoke, at least as a matter of biochemis­
try. Nicotine triggers the release of dopamine in the brain, a neuro­
transmitter associated with sensations of pleasure.122 For this 
reason, cigarettes "have served generations of men ru+d women, in 
periods of acute distress, as an incomparable tool for managing and 
mitigating an:xiety."123 Nicotine also improves mental efficiency 
and information processing.124 Although nicotine is by no means 
innocuous in its own right, tar is the major cause of smoking-related 
disease.125 In recent years, the tobacco industry has moved increas­
ingly to the production of low-tar cigarettes in light of public con­
cern over lung cancer, emphysema,_ and other diseases, but 
inhalation of at least some tar still remains inherent in the act of 
smoking a conventional cigarette;126 and smoking remains the 
method by which to get nicotine into the bloodstream ."more effi­
ciently than almost anything else."121 
Early efforts to sue the tobacco industry in tort based simply 
upon the link between smoking and lung cancer, among other dis­
eases, proved dismally unsuccessful.128 In its landmark decision in 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,129 the Supreme Court held that 
government-mandated warnings on cigarettes preempt tort actions 
predicated upon the failure to provide warnings with content other 
122. For concise explanations in lay terms of the basic biochemistry of nicotine in the 
brain, see, e.g., JORDAN GOODMAN, TOBACCO IN HISTORY: THE CuLTURES OF DEPENDENCE 
5-6 (1993); The Science of Smoking, EcoNOMIST, May 11, 1996, at 22. 
123. RICHARD KLEIN, C!:GARETIES ARE SUBLIME 184 (1993). 
124. See generally Keith Wesnes, Nicotine Increases Mental Efficiency: But How?, in 
TOBACCO SMOKING AND NICOTINE: A NEUROBIOLOGICAL APPROACH 63-79 (William R. 
Martin et al. eds., 1987). 
125. See Barry Meier, Hunt for Safe Cigarettes: Study in Failure, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1997, 
at A8. 
126. - Cf. id. (discussing efforts to develop new types of cigarettes that would reduce tar 
intake). 
127. The Science of Smoking, supra note 122, at 22; cf. GOODMAN, supra note 122, at 6 
(comparing nicotine absorption from cigarette smoking with that from the use of other forms 
of tobacco). 
128. On these early attacks, see Robert L. Rabin, Institutional and Historical Perspectives 
in Tobacco Tort Liability, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS, & CuLTURE 110 (Robert L. 
Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993); Gary T. Schwartz, Tobacco Liability in the Courts, 
in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, PoLITics, & CuLTURE, supra, at 131. 
129. 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
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than that required by federal law.130 The Court, however, notably 
left open the possibility of lawsuits that center upon fraud accom­
plished through other means - for example, the fraudulent misrep­
resentation of a material fact or the concealment thereof in ways 
that do not turn upon product warnings.131 Apart from the techni­
cal niceties of federal preemption law, an even more significant 
practical barrier existed to suits against the tobacco industry: plain­
tiffs' lawyers came away with the distinct impression that jurors 
were unsympathetic to their clients' demands - specifically, that 
jurors tended to believe that, however harmful smoking might be, 
individuals choose to smoke and thus should have to face the conse­
quences of their own actions.132 
The recent legal assaults upon the tobacco industry have taken 
several forms, including conventional tort suits brought by individu­
als, class actions, suits by state attorneys general seeking to recoup 
Medicaid expenditures for smoking-related diseases, and regulatory 
initiatives by the federal FDA directed to the marketing and adver­
tising of cigarettes.133 The common theme, replayed in each of 
these contexts and virtually invited by the holding in Cipollone, 
centers upon information about the nature of nicotine. In essence, 
the argument is that the tobacco industry did not simply fail to warn 
consumers about the addictiveness of nicotine, but that the industry 
committed outright fraud by conveying misinformation as part of a 
strategy to produce and maintain addiction in smokers, including 
the young.134 
130. See 505 U.S. at 530-31 (plurality opinion); see also 505 U.S. at 544 (Scalia, J., concur­
ring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that federal labeling requirements preempt all 
tort actions). 
131. See 505 U.S. at 528 (plurality opinion); see also 505 U.S. at 531 (Blackmun, J,, con­
curring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that federal labeling requirements do not 
preempt co=on law tort actions in any form). 
132. See Rabin, supra note 128, at 124; Benjamin Weiser, Tobacco's Trials, WASH. PosT, 
Dec. 8, 1996, Magazine at 19. 
133. For a sn=ary of these various attacks, see Paul A. LeBel, "Of Deaths Put on by 
Cunning and Forced Cause": Reality Bites the Tobacco Industry, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 
605, 615-35 (1997) (reviewing STANTON A. GLANTZ ET AL., THE CIGARETI'E p APERS (1996); 
PHrr.IP J. Rn.TS, SMOKESCREEN: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY COVER-UP 
(1996); and Kr.uoER, supra note 7). 
134. For an overview by two prominent antitobacco activists of the allegations with re­
gard to nicotine addiction as they relate to both tort litigation and state Medicaid actions, see 
Graham E. Kelder, Jr. & Richard A. Daynard, The Role of Litigation in the Effective Control 
of the Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN. L. & POLY. REv. 63, 73-82 (1997). Virtually all of the 
complaints filed by state attorneys general, as well as a handful of localities, are available on 
·the Worldwide Web at <http://stic.neu.edu>. 
On the significance of nicotine addition for FDA jurisdiction, see Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. 
FDA, 958 F. Supp. 1060, 1074-75 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (upholding FDA jurisdiction), appeal 
pending, No. 97-1581 (4th Cir.). 
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The plaintiffs' bar has focused upon nicotine addiction specifi­
cally in order to overcome juror resistance to damage verdicts 
against the industry.135 This observation, if anything, lends a degree 
of support to the far broader contention - hotly debated by schol­
ars - that one may explain much of the doctrinal development of 
tort law based upon the economic incentives of the practicing 
bar.136 This is not to say that the recent legal challenges have for­
saken the basic contention that smoking causes disease; far from it, 
the hubbub about Medicaid expenditures for smokers continues to 
center upon smoking-related diseases.137 Instead, the significance 
of the focus upon nicotine addiction is more subtle in four respects. 
First, and most important, it is an effort to strike directly at the 
supposition that individuals choose to smoke. It is one thing to say 
that the industry simply made available a product that people know 
causes disease but choose to use anyway. It is quite another for that 
industry to have sought to addict consumers to a harmful product 
while publicly disclaiming any such intention, any capability to put 
such an intention into effect, and - until recently - even any pros­
pect of addiction itself.138 Arguments along these lines fit neatly 
In the face of this onslaught and as part of a settlement with both tobacco plaintiffs' 
attorneys and state attorneys general in March 1997, one relatively minor player in the indus­
try - the Liggett Group - acknowledged both the addictiveness of nicotine and the indus­
try's attempts to market cigarettes to underage consumers. See John M. Broder, Cigarette 
Maker Concedes Smoking Can Cause Cancer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1997, at Al. Among 
other obligations under this separate settlement, Liggett must add to its cigarette packs warn­
ings that refer to addictiveness expressly. See id. 
135. See Weiser, supra note 132, at 15, 30-31. In the words of this source, 
[New Orleans plaintiffs' attorney Wendell] Gauthier decided that the industry's ma-
, 'rupulation of nicotine was the best way to rebut its claim that smokers knew their risks: 
Addiction was a risk that the industry had not warned about If the industry secretly 
maintained nicotine at addictive levels, smoking was no longer a matter of personal 
choice; the industry was seeing to it that smokers could not stop. 
Id. at 30. 
136. For such a sweeping claim, see Paul H. Rubin & Martin J. Bailey, The Role of Law­
yers in Changing the Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 807 (1994). For criticism, see Frank B. Cross, 
The Role of Lawyers in Positive Theories of Doctrinal Evolution, 45 EMORY LJ. 523 (1996). 
137. Cf. Stanton A. Glantz, Tobacco Litigation: Issues for Public Health and Public Pol­
icy, 277 JAMA 751, 752 (1997) ("The total US Medicaid costs due to tobacco were $6.3 
billion . . .  in 1993."). 
138. Under the proposal for federal legislation negotiated this past summer with the state 
attorneys general, the industry indicated its willingness to use labels that would state explic­
itly that "[c]igarettes are addictive." See Proposed Resolution, supra note 7, at 10. In the 
context of congressional hearings after the announcement of the proposal, the industry ini­
tially characterized such a statement simply as a '"true and acceptable reflection[ ] of the 
predominant public health view'." See Jeffrey Taylor & Suein L. Hwang, Tobacco Finns' 
Cautious Letters Deny That Nicotine Is Addictive, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 1997, at B4 (quoting 
the industry's statement). In subsequent testimony, however, industry executives have "ac­
knowledged that nicotine is addictive, as the term is commonly understood," and have "said 
that smoking either caused lung cancer or was a risk factor in the disease." Barry Meier, 
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into the exception to federal preemption left open by Cipollone 
for fraud-based actions.139 
The evidentiary support for this first dimension of the nicotine 
addiction argument is voluminous and comes virtually entirely from 
the industry's own files. Look at only the most prominent exam­
ples. First, based upon internal documents, medical researchers 
have concluded that the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company 
and its parent British American Tobacco "had a sophisticated and 
scientifically accurate understanding of nicotine's pharmacology, in­
cluding an explicit recognition of nicotine's addictiveness, more 
than thirty years ago."14o The same researchers offer a stark com­
parison between ·these manufacturers' awareness of the addictive­
ness of nicotine, as revealed in internal documents, and their 
simultaneous public denials thereof.141 
Such conduct is by no means confined to a single manufac­
turer.142 In the regulatory context, the FDA has put forward essen­
tially the same claim with regard to the industry as a whole. In fact, 
proof of conduct that would support allegations of fraud in tort 
dovetails with the FDA's assertion of jurisdiction over nicotine as a 
"drug" under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, given that the 
statutory definition of that term speaks of articles "intended to af­
fect the structure or any function of the body."143 It is now abun­
dantly clear that the tobacco industry controls the level of nicotine 
Tobacco Executives Wax Penitent Before House Panel in Hopes of Preserving Accord, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 30, 1998, at A15. 
139. See supra note 131. 
140. GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 133, at 15 tbl.1.1 (comparing "public versus private stat'e· 
ments made by the tobacco industry" concerning "nicotine and addiction"). The underlying 
documents are summarized in id. at 58-107. As to whether research into the precise pharma· 
cology of nicotine represents much of a revelation at all, see infra section II.B.2 (discussing 
the centuries-old awareness that smoking is hard to quit as well as scientific research on 
addictiveness dating from the 1930s). 
The publicizing of the Brown & Williamson materials is itself the subject of considerable 
controversy, the documents having been removed from one of the law firms representing the 
company by a paralegal acting without authorization. See Max Boot, On the Trail of the 
Cigarette Papers, WAU. ST. J., Apr. 10, 1996, at A17 (noting that tobacco plaintiffs' attorney 
Richard Scruggs "paid $109,600 in cash to buy a house" for paralegal Merrell Williams after 
he obtained the Brown & Williamson documents and, further, that Scruggs "helped Mr. 
Williams buy two cars and a sailboat"). 
141. See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 133, at 58. 
142. See Hn.TS, supra note 133, at 42-56; Freedman, CEO Lied, supra note 2, at Al; Hilts 
& Collins, supra note 2, at Al; Kelder & Daynard, supra note 134, at 77-80. 
143. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(l)(C) (1994) (emphasis added); cf. Nicotine in Cigarettes and 
Smokeless Tobacco Is a Drug and These Products Are Nicotine Delivery Devices Under the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: Jurisdictional Determination, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,619, 
44,912 (1996) [hereinafter FDA Jurisdictional Determination]. 
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in cigarettes in order to maintain desirable levels of that substance, 
at the same time that the industry has reduced levels of tar.144 
The industry's efforts have taken some quite surreptitious 
forms, including the addition of ammonia to boost the concentra­
tion of nicotine inhaled by smokers in a manner heretofore beyond 
the detection capabilities of government smoking machines.145 One 
recent scientific study, for example, finds that "the role of ammonia 
in tobacco smoke is analogous to what occurs when . . . cocaine is 
'free-based', or used in 'crack' form."146 
Second, the focus on nicotine addiction lends favorable atmo­
spherics to the demands of the vast majority of states for Medicaid 
reimbursement.147 Though not enacted with the tobacco industry in 
144. See id. at 259-61 (discussing industry research to "[o]ptimize" delivery of nicotine); 
id. at 266-67 (efforts by Philip Morris to maintain nicotine levels while removing tar); id. at 
270 (similar efforts by RJ. Reynolds); id. at 295-307 (use of "[n]icotine-[r]ich" tobacco in 
low-tar cigarettes); id. at 324-30 (control of nicotine to satisfy consumer preferences); cf. infra 
note 216 (discussing the multibillion-dollar libel action by Philip Morris against the television 
network ABC based upon similar allegations in a television news program). 
145. See FDA Jurisdictional Determination, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,970-75; Freedman, Ammo­
nia Spurs Delivery, supra note 2, at Al. 
Apart from the production of cigarettes, allegations of fraud also have swirled around 
industry-funded organizations such as the Council for Tobacco Research and the Tobacco 
Industry Research Committee, ostensibly established to get to the bottom of the various 
health controversies surrounding smoking but, instead, deployed simply as a virtual "dis­
information machine." See Hu.TS, supra note 133, at 8. For detailed accounts of the efforts 
by these organizations to suppress adverse research and to disseminate reassurances that 
even the industry did not regard as truthful, see GLANIZ ET AL., supra note 133, at 288-338; 
HILTS, supra note 133, at 8-22; Kr.uGER, supra note 7, at 164-67, 205-12, 466-68. 
The allegation of fraud in connection with such organizations has gained a degree of judi­
cial acceptance in the context of disputes over the application of evidentiary privileges to 
internal industry documents. Under the law of privilege, a litigant may obtain otherwise 
protected documents from an opposing party upon a showing of probable cause that the 
requested documents were part of a scheme to defraud. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 
554, 563 (1989). Applying this framework, several courts have deemed various forms of priv­
ilege inapplicable to industry documents or, at least, have found the allegation of fraud suffi­
ciently plausible to warrant the submission of disputed documents for in camera review. See, 
e.g., Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 357, 367-69 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Burton v. RJ. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 167 F.R.D. 134, 142-44 (D. Kan. 1996); Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 
140 F.R.D. 681, 688-92 (D.NJ.), revd. on other grounds, 915 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1992). 
Adverse publicity also surrounds the tenacious industry pursuit - some would say perse­
cution - of industry-researcher-turned-whistleblower Jeffrey Wigand, among other former 
insiders who have publicly challenged the industry's account of nicotine. See Marie Brenner, 
The Man Who Knew Too Much, VANITY FAIR, May 1996, at 170, 211-13; Suein L. Hwang & 
Milo Geyelin, Brown & Williamson Has 500-Page Dossier Attacking Chief Critic, WALL ST. 
J., Feb. 1, 1996, at Al. 
146. James F. Pankow et al., Conversion of Nicotine in Tobacco Smoke to Its Volatile and 
Available Free-Base Form Through the Action of Gaseous Ammonia, 31 ENVTL. Ser. TECH. 
2428, 2429 (1997). 
147. Thus far, no state Medicaid reimbursement action has proceeded to verdict. Missis­
sippi, Florida, and Texas settled their respective lawsuits with the industry on the eve of trial. 
See Barry Meier, Acting Alone, Mississippi Settles Suit With 4 Tobacco Companies, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 4, 1997, at Al; Barry Meier, Cigarette Makers Agree to Settle Florida Lawsuit, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1997, at Al; Barry Meier, Tobacco Concerns Settle Texas Case for $14.5 
Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1998, at Al. 
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mind, a longstanding provision of federal law requires states to 
"take all reasonable measures to ascertain the legal liability of third 
parties" to pay for services available under the Medicaid pro­
gram148 and, most notably, to have in effect laws that will consider 
the state to have "acquired the rights of" individuals to recover 
against such third parties.149 The upshot is that the states have an 
ordinary subrogation action - one that simply puts them in the 
shoes of individual plaintiffs in tort.15o To the extent that the focus 
upon nicotine addiction makes individual tort actions more palat­
able to juries, the same applies to litigation by state officials in their 
stead. 
Third, efforts to undercut the notion that smoking is the product 
of individual choice make more plausible the regulation of tobacco 
as a policy matter. As Justice Stephen Breyer has observed, federal 
regulatory programs in the environmental and occupational safety 
areas, among others, often seek to abate risks to human health that 
are lower by orders of magnitude than the well-documented risks 
148. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(A) (1994); cf. New York State Dept. of Social Serv. v. 
Bowen, 846 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1988) (discussing the legislative history of this provision 
and noting that states were permitted, but not required, to pursue third parties prior to the 
amendment of the Medicaid statute in the mid-1980s). 
149. The relevant statutory language requires state Medicaid plans to provide 
that to the extent that payment has been made under the State plan for medical assist­
ance in any case where a third party has a legal liability to make payment for such 
assistance, the State has in effect laws under which, to the extent that payment has been 
made under the State plan for medical assistance for health care items or services fur­
nished to an individual, the State is considered to have acquired the rights of such indi­
vidual to payment by any other party for such health care items or services • . • •  
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(I) (1994). 
150. Apparently with the tobacco industry very much in mind, one state enacted contro­
versial legislation to go beyond a conventional subrogation action. The Florida Medicaid 
Third-Party Liability Act strips defendants of "all . . . affirmative defenses normally avail­
able," including "assumption of risk." FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 409.910(1) (Harrison 1997); see 
also Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678 So. 2d 1239, 1250-
53 (Fla. 1996) (upholding this provision on its face, but leaving open the possibility for chal­
lenges to its application); Milo Geyelin, Tallahassee Tussle: Many Businesses Side with To­
bacco Industry to Fight a Florida Law, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 1996, at Al (describing the law as 
directed specifically against the tobacco industry and noting that "[n]o other state has passed 
a law like Florida's"). Even under the Florida statute, however, the state still would have had 
to prove causation. See Agency for Health Care Admin., 678 So. 2d at 1243 (noting that the 
state so conceded). Moreover, the Florida Supreme Court held that, as a matter of due 
process under the Florida Constitution, the state would have had to identify the specific 
Medicaid recipients for whom it sought recovery in order to enable defendants to dispute 
whether the benefits paid to those particular individuals were "necessitated by the defend­
ant's product." 678 So. 2d at 1254 (striking down a statutory provision to the contrary). As 
previously noted, see supra note 147, the parties settled the Florida lawsuit prior to trial. 
A second state, Massachusetts, recently enacted legislation that provides the state with "a 
separate and independent cause of action to recover, from any third party, assistance pro­
vided to a claimant." MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 118E, § 22 (West 1996). Acknowledging that the 
Massachusetts courts have yet to rule definitively on the question, a federal district court 
sitting in that state has characterized the law as simply providing a subrogation action. See 
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 946 F. Supp. 1067, 1077-78 (D. Mass. 1996). 
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from smoking.151 Such a focus arguably makes sense to the extent 
that the risks of smoking are voluntarily assumed, whereas many 
environmental and occupational risks are not. The discrepancy be­
comes less readily justifiable on policy grounds, however, if smok­
ers are the unwitting dupes of the tobacco industry. 
Fourth, and perhaps most significant, the focus on nicotine ad­
diction enables both litigants and regulators in whatever forum to 
advance the further, explosive allegation of industry efforts to mar­
ket cigarettes to underage consumers - teenagers and even chil­
dren - in order that they ultimately might replace those who die 
annually from smoking-related diseases.152 This contention has 
taken its most visible form in the rancor over the now-defunct in­
dustry icon Joe Camel.153 In fact, the concern is much broader, ex­
tending to the promotion of cigarettes through collectible items that 
may be especially appealing to youth,154 printed advertisements in 
magazines with substantial underage readership,155 billboards lo­
cated near schools,156 and industry sponsorship of sporting events 
as a vehicle for "free advertising" to children via television cover­
age.157 In fact, recently released internal documents from Camel 
manufacturer R.J. Reynolds refer explicitly to the marketing of cig-
151. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS Cm.CLE: Tow ARD EFFECTIVE RrsK 
REGULATION 13 tbl.2, 14-15 (1993). 
152. See Hn:rs, supra note 133, at 80 ("The tobacco market has this difficulty: it must be 
recreated in each generation. Each crop of young people must be addressed anew. The 
children must choose to smoke and they must choose brands."); Kelder & Daynard, supra 
note 134, at 65 ("Tobacco industry promotional activities aimed at minors lure generation 
after generation of underage Americans into beginning what will become for most of them a 
lifelong and deadly addiction."). For a history of the tobacco industry and children, see 
HILTS, supra note 133, at 63-101. 
153. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless 
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,480 (1996) (to be codi­
fied at 26 C.F.R. § 801) [hereinafter FDA Preamble] (summarizing internal RJ. Reynolds 
documents that "illustrate the creation of and execution of a decidedly youth-oriented cam­
paign" centered around Joe Camel); John M. Broder, F.T.C. Charges 'Joe Camel' Ad Illegally 
Takes Aim at Minors, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1997, at Al (reporting similar charges by the 
Federal Trade Commission). 
In the aftermath of the recent proposal to end the tobacco wars, R.J. Reynolds termi­
nated the Joe Camel advertising campaign. See Stuart Elliott, Joe Came� a Giant in Tobacco 
Marketing, Is Dead at 23, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1997, at Cl. 
154. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless 
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314, 41,336 (1995) (to be codi­
fied at 26 C.F.R. § 897) [hereinafter FDA Notice of Proposed Rulemaking] (citing examples 
of promotional items obtained upon redemption of "Camel cash" or "Marlboro miles"); cf. 
Sally Goll Beatty, Alcoholic-Drinks Marketers Face Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1997, at 
B2 (reporting criticism of the Anheuser-Busch promotional program involving "Bud Gear"). 
155. See FDA Preamble, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,513-14. 
156. See FDA Preamble, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,502-03. 
157. See FDA Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,337-38. 
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arettes to underage consumers.158 The prospect of such miscon­
duct, perhaps more than anything else, speaks to the 
blameworthiness of the industry in the eyes of many. From a strate­
gic standpoint, moreover, the focus upon the marketing of ciga­
rettes to children represents a further effort to undercut the 
supposition that smoking is simply a matter of individual choice. 
I do not purport here to resolve the longstanding debate within 
the social science and public health communities over the causal 
connection, if any, between tobacco advertising and the incidence 
of tobacco consumption, whether by underage consumers or by the 
public generally.159 Indeed, such resolution is unnecessary for pres­
ent purposes. The more significant observation consists of the de­
gree to which principles of criminal law cast new light upon the 
treatment of the tobacco industry, even if its duplicitous conduct 
ultimately did not cause consumers to smoke. 
Those who seek to deceive consumers, as distinct from those 
who simply fail to disclose information about product risk, bear 
more than a passing resemblance to the criminal defendant who 
tries unsuccessfully to commit a crime. Indeed, the addition of 
claims predicated upon fraudulent misrepresentation and similar 
notions serves to inject into the tobacco litigation the equivalent of 
a criminal mens rea. In contrast to the implant litigation, the allega­
tion here is that the defendants acted purposely, with the conscious 
objective of addicting consumers, perhaps including persons whom 
one might regard as especially vulnerable. This is not to say that 
the tobacco litigation heretofore has carried with it all the trappings 
of criminal law; indeed, that is precisely the problem when one con­
siders the significant obstacles of risk-decisional causation that the , 
litigation encounters. 
2. Independent Sources of Risk Information 
Allegations of fraud, at bottom, are informational in nature. 
They need not turn upon the content of product warnings, for 
158. See Milo Geyelin, Reynolds Sought Specifically to Lure Young Smokers Years Ago, 
Data Suggest, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 1998, at A4 (quoting an internal R.J. Reynolds document 
from 1975 that refers to the need for the Camel brand to "increase its share of penetration 
among the 14-to-24 age group"). 
159. For a mere smattering of the rancor on this question, compare FDA Preamble, 61 
Fed. Reg. at 44,489-93 (analyzing empirical literature for the purpose of demonstrating that 
advertising restrictions actually will advance the government's interest in reducing smoking) 
with Jean J. Boddewyn, Cigarette Advertising Bans and Smoking: The Flawed Policy Connec­
tion, 13 Um.. J. ADVERTISING 311 (1994) (presenting an analysis of the same empirical litera­
ture by an academic who has served as a consultant to the tobacco industry). 
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Cipollone forbids such an attack upon the tobacco -industry.160 In­
stead, as in tort law generally, fraud entails the manipulation of in­
formation to induce behavior that results in harm to the victim.161 
As such, claims of fraud, like the more common claim of a failure to 
warn, implicate the risk decision of the consumer. 
a. Nicotine in History. As noted earlier, mass tort disputes fre­
quently require one to cull out the effects of the defendant's mis­
conduct from those of background forces, be they alternate causes 
of disease in cases of scientific causation or alternate sources of in­
formation about product risk in cases of risk-decisional causa­
tion.162 In many mass tort contexts, this exercise is not problematic. 
The classic subjects of mass tort litigation frequently have consisted 
of newly developed products - breast implants,163 the morning 
sickness drug Bendectin,164 and the Dalkon Shield contraceptive 
device,165 to name only a few - over which the manufacturer re­
tains considerable control. As is true for innovative new products 
generally, the manufacturer may well have property rights that tend 
to inhibit analysis of the product by others.166 In these situations, it 
would be implausible to claim that consumers could have learned 
about the product from other sources. 
160. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., SOS U.S. S04 (1992). 
161. Such misconduct need not involve product warnings. For example, the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts provides that 
[ o ]ne engaged in the business of selling chattels who, by advertising, labels, or otherwise, 
makes to the public a misrepresentation of a material fact concerning the character or 
quality of a chattel sold by him is subject to liability for physical harm to a consumer of 
the chattel caused by justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation . . . .  
REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (196S) (emphasis"added); see also REsrATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF ToRTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 9 cmts. a-b (Proposed Fmal Draft 1997) (clarify­
ing that § 402B applies to product sellers); REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 310, SSO-Sl 
(196S) (stating that there should be similar liability for conscious misrepresentation involving 
the risk of physical harm as well as fraudulent concealment and nondisclosure). 
162. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. The Restatement requires that the reli­
ance of the plaintiff upon the defendant's misrepresentation must be "justifi[ed]." See 
REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (196S). Reliance is not justified if the plaintiff 
"knows" that the defendant's misrepresentation "is false or its falsity is obvious to him" 
based upon other sources. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § S41 (196S); see also 
REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B cmt j (noting that § S41 applies to limit liability 
under § 402B). 
163. See supra section II.A. 
164. See supra note 84. 
16S. See SoBOL, supra note 91. 
166. See Mary L. Lyndon, Secrecy and Innovation in Tort Law and Regulation, 23 N.M. L. 
REv. 1, 2-3, 39-SO (1993) (discussing trade secrecy in the context of chemical pollution regula­
tion). In fact, considerable controversy recently arose from revelations of efforts by one 
pharmaceutical manufacturer to exercise a right of prepublication approval over a scientific 
study that cast doubt upon the effectiveness, though not the safety, of a popular thyroid drug. 
See Lawrence K. Altman, Experts See Bias in Drug Data, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1997, at Cl. 
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By contrast, the tobacco wars have taken place amidst a wealth 
of independent information, not merely about the health risks asso­
ciated with smoking, but also, specifically, about the difficulty of 
smoking cessation. The newfound focus upon nicotine addiction is 
certainly a master stroke of litigation savvy, insofar as it draws at­
tention away from the longstanding awareness that smoking can 
kill. But it still runs headlong into the equally longstanding aware­
ness that smoking is hard to quit. 
Much controversy has swirled in recent years over the use of the 
medical term "addiction" in connection with nicotine.167 This de­
bate over nomenclature, though potentially worthwhile for the sake 
of medical precision, merely obscures the crucial point for purposes 
of tort law. "Irrespective of the label applied to the cost of altering 
cigarette smoking behavior, or whether one believes that cigarettes 
belong in the same category as crack cocaine and heroin, it is clear 
that cessation of smoking does involve real and substantial 
costs."168 Even more to the point, the fundamental recognition that 
it is difficult to stop smoking once one starts - for some, exceed­
ingly so - has been around for a very long time. 
In his Pulitzer Prize-winning history of the tobacco industry in 
America, Richard Kluger - a forceful advocate for extensive FDA 
regulation of tobacco - observes: 
While new evidence had emerged . . .  showing that Philip Morris and 
[Brown & Williamson], among others, had done research on the ad­
dictive nature of nicotine and had neither disclosed it to the public 
nor warned against the addicting potency, many similar findings by 
investigators outside the industry had long since been made and pub­
lished. Public-health advocates, moreover, had for years advised that 
nicotine was as addicting as heroin and cocaine, yet the Surgeon Gen­
eral had not declared smoking to be addicting until 1988. The point 
was that whether one categorized smoking as a practice, a habit, an 
indulgence, a vice, a dependency, or an addiction, it was commonly 
known - and had been for decades - to be hard to stop once 
begun.169 
167. See generally SURGEON GENERAL, U.S. DEPT. OF HEAL1H & HUMAN SERVICES, 
THE HEAL1H CoNSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: NICOTINE AomcnoN 14-15 (1988) (using the 
nomenclature of "addiction" to describe the impact of nicotine on smokers). For the many 
possible shadings of this term and their significance for tort doctrine, see Alan Schwartz, 
Views of Addiction and the Duty to Warn, 15 VA. L. REv. 509 (1989). 
168. W. Kn> VIscusI, SMOKING: MA.KING 1HE RISKY DECISION 17-18 (1992) (adding that 
alterations in various sorts of behavior often entail what economists would deem substantial 
transaction costs). 
169. Kr.uGER, supra note 7, at 760; see also GoooMAN, supra note 122, at 122 ("During 
the first two decades of the twentieth century medical researchers produced an enormous 
literature on the toxicology of tobacco . . . .  [T]here were many studies purporting to deal with 
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Historian Thomas Laqueur even more emphatically observes that, 
"[w]ith the exception of lung cancer, almost every adverse effect of 
tobacco use had been noted well before the advent of mass­
marketed cigarettes."170 Even the awareness of a link to lung can­
cer dates from the 1950s.171 The further notion "[t]hat tobacco con­
tains a drug, or is a drug, is without doubt the most ludicrous 
'discovery' of our day."172 As Laqueur notes: 
Bartolome de Las Casas, the friar who accompanied Columbus and 
wrote in defense of the Indians, is quoted . . .  to the effect that when 
he reproved some sailors for smoking "cigars" they replied that "they 
were not able to stop taking them." Christians have become "much 
attached to this plant," came the complaint from Brazil already in 
1517; and by the middle of the century there was the scandal of a 
bishop who was relieved of his see because without smoking "he 
could not live." . . .  [King] James I, in his famous Counterblaste on 
tobacco, observed that a smoker can no more forbear tobacco without 
"falling into an incurable weakness" than "an old drunkard can abide 
to be long sober." "Continual custom" have rendered them 
"habitum, alteram naturum. " In short, addicted. "Many light their 
pipes . . .  even before getting out of bed so that not an hour should 
pass without smoking," a Leipzig physician complains fifty years later. 
And so on, and so on, and so on.173 
These voices, moreover, are not alone amongst historians.174 
tobacco consumption as a form of addiction, called variously tobaccomania and 
tobaccoism."). 
170. Thomas A. Laqueur, Smoking and Nothingness, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 18 & 25, 
1995, at 39, 43. 
171. See id. at 42. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 42-43. 
174. In parsing thlough documents from sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England, 
medical historian David Harley points to criticism of tobacco on the ground that the smoking 
of this " 'divine drug"' was so rampant among the upper classes that '"purses are emptied 
and many gentlemen's patrimonies have expired in fumes and :flown out shamefully from the 
nose of their master."' David Harley, The Beginnings of the Tobacco Controversy: Puritan­
ism, James I, and the Royal Physicians, 67 BULL. HIST. MED. 28, 32, 34 (1993) (respectively, 
quoting THOMAS NASHE, NASHES LENTEN STUFFE 24-25 (1599) and translating from the 
original Latin JosEPH HALL, MUNDus ALTER ET IDEM, SIUE TERRA AUSTRALIS ANTE HAC 
SEMPER INcoGNITA 170-71 (1605)). For ease of reference, I have modified the spelling of the 
quoted phrase from Nashe to accord with current English spelling; the quoted phrase appears 
in the original as "diuine drugge." 
"By the end of the [nineteenth) century," medical historian R.B. Walker adds, "heavy 
smoking was beginning to be seen as a disease, an addiction based on physiological depen­
dence." R.B. Walker, Medical Aspects of Tobacco Smoking and the Anti-Tobacco Movement 
in Britain in the Nineteenth Century, 24 MED. HIST. 391, 398 (1980). In fact, Walker points to 
English fiction as painting "the most extreme picture of the physical, intellectual, and moral 
degeneration wrought by cigarette addiction." Id. at 396 (citing CYRIL ARTiiUR EDWARD 
RANGER GULL, THE CIGARETTE SMOKER, BEING TiiE TERRIBLE CASE OF UTiiER KENNEDY 
(1902)). Walker even goes on to recount a meeting at Cambridge University in the same 
period, at which Anti-Tobacco Society secretary Thomas Reynolds - in an attack upon stu­
dents with a brashness that only a law professor could admire - baldly "declared that nine-
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Since at least the nineteenth century, popular nicknames for cig­
arettes have underscored not only their risks to health - "coffin 
nails" - but also the notion that it is difficult to stop smoking -
"dope sticks" and "little white slavers."175 Even within the realm of 
medical research, studies from the 1930s explicitly treat nicotine as 
a source of "addiction" akin to that associated with drugs.176 By 
1961, the authors of a comprehensive review of the medical litera­
ture could state with regard to nicotine that "[t]he terms habitua­
tion and addiction" are "used more or less indiscriminately by many 
writers. "177 
All of this has been getting through to ordinary people. In its 
successful defense to a recent individual lawsuit, R.J. Reynolds led 
jurors through "decades of magazine articles, popular-song lyrics 
and books" on the hazards of smoking, dredging up public-opinion 
surveys from the 1960s and before that document the awareness on 
the part of both adults and teenagers that smoking causes cancer.178 
In fact, research by psychologists on the extent to which teenagers 
and children perceive the carcinogenicity of tobacco also indicates 
widespread awareness of the further notion that "it is very hard to 
stop smoking"179 - an awareness that notably predates by centu­
ries the contemporary focus upon the pharmacology of nicotine. 
tenths of all the undergraduates who failed were 'plucked' because of their addiction to to­
bacco." Id. at 398 (recounting the Cambridge Tobacco Riot). 
175. See Cassandra Tate, In the 1800s, Antismoking Was a Burning Issue, SMITHSONIAN, 
July 1989, at 107, 108. 
176. For an overview of such research, see P.S. LARSON ET AL., TOBACCO: EXPERIMEN· 
TAL AND CLINICAL STUDIES: A COMPREHENSIVE ACCOUNT OF THE WORLD LITERATURE 
526-27 {1961). 
177. Id. at 526. 
178. See Milo Geyelin, How RJR Won Its Latest Tobacco Case, WALL ST. J., May 7, 1997, 
at Bl (quoting juror Meg Goodrich's assessment that this survey evidence "weighed heavily" 
in the jury's deliberations). A first-hand account written by the forewoman of the jury re­
flects the same assessment: 
We all agreed that Reynolds had disregarded a moral responsibility to its customers. 
The company knew cigarettes can cause lung cancer; it chose not to disclose this and 
even raised doubts about it. But Reynolds's actions did not negate the fact that the risks 
were widely known. 
Laura T. Barrow, Why My Jury Let R.J. Reynolds Off, WASH. PoST, May 25, 1997, at Cl. 
179. Frank W. Schneider & Loretta A. Vanmastrigt,Adolescent-Preadolescent Differences 
in Beliefs and Attitudes About Cigarette Smoking, 87 J. PsYCHOL. 71, 74 (1974). This study of 
Canadian children and teenagers revealed that virtually all {99%) believed that smoking can 
cause cancer and that the vast majority (74%) further believed that "it is very hard to stop 
smoking." See id. 
Research in the United States is in accord. A 1979 survey of American teenagers pre­
pared under the auspices of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare documents 
that, "even among smokers, nine out of ten agree that the health information about smoking 
is true and that smoking can harm the health of teenagers." DOROTHY E. GREEN, U.S. 
DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDuc. & WELFARE, TEENAGE SMOKING: IMMEDIATE AND LoNG·TERM 
PATTERNS 23 (1979). The same study further indicates that over 72% of teenagers did not 
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In light of this lengthy history, economist W. Kip Viscusi has 
suggested that, if anything, consumers may be overestimating the 
risks associated with smoking. Specifically, smokers' perceptions of 
the risk of lung cancer alone appear to exceed scientific estimates of 
the actual mortality risk from all smoking-related causes of 
death.180 In Viscusi's estimation, "if people had accurate percep­
tions of the lung cancer risks linked to smoking, then societal smok­
ing rates would rise by 8 percentage points."181 Indeed, observers 
of American culture have argued more broadly that it is precisely 
the consciousness of danger - the knowledge that cigarettes are 
deadly - that makes smoking all the more alluring and all the 
more potent a symbol of rebellion against the forces of mortality.182 
b. Causation and the Marginal Consumer. The presence of in­
dependent sources of information about product risk has serious 
implications for the viability of fraud claims. Consumers are un­
likely to regard as credible a denial of nicotine addiction in the face 
of literally centuries of popular knowledge to the contrary. Put sim­
ply, fraud does not work when its would-be victims are not apt to 
believe the defendant's obfuscations. On this score, the tobacco in­
dustry's most notorious denial of the addictiveness of nicotine -
the 1994 testimony, oft-replayed in the media, of senior tobacco ex­
ecutives before a congressional committee183 - has been the sub­
ject more of incredulous ridicule than serious consideration, except 
in connection with suspicions of perjury.184 The executives might as 
well have said that the earth is flat. 
express agreement - indeed, nearly half "Strongly Disagree[d]" - with the statement that 
"[t]eenagers who smoke regularly can quit for good any time they like." See id. at 104, 110; 
see also Kathryn Urberg & Rochelle L. Robbins, Adolescents' Perceptions of the Costs and 
Benefits Associated with Cigarette Smoking: Sex Differences and Peer Influence, 10 J. YOUTH 
& .ADOLESCENCE 353, 356 (1981) (noting that among the costs "frequently cited" by Ameri­
can teenagers as associated with smoking is the prospect that they will "get hooked"). 
180. See V1scus1, supra note 168, at 65-70. This effect overwhelms the more widely 
known proposition that smokers' perceptions of the risks associated with smoking are lower 
than those of nonsmokers. The more significant point made by VIScusi is that the risk per­
ceived by both groups may well be higher than the actual level of risk. See id. at 68-69. 
181. Id. at 8 (emphasis added); see also id. at 99-100 (summarizing the calculation). 
182. See generally KLEIN, supra note 123, at 184. 
183. See Regulation of Tobacco Products (Pt. 1): Hearings Before the Subcomm on 
Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 628 
(1994). Industry executives recently changed their tune in congressional testimony. See 
supra note 138. 
184. For an example of such ridicule, see Art Buchwald, The Lung Goodbye, WASH. 
PoST, Apr. 21, 1994, at Cl. On the prospects for perjury charges, see Freedman, CEO Lied, 
supra note 2, at Al; Milo Geyelin, Even lf Tobacco Chiefs Did Lie, Perjury Conviction Is 
Uncertain, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 1996, at Bl. 
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If ever there were a case of outrageous fortune, this is it. No 
matter how blameworthy one might consider Big Tobacco, it ulti­
mately may well have failed to convince people that smoking is safe 
and nonaddictive, because nothing less than the entire history of 
tobacco in Western civilization was saying, loudly and clearly, that it 
was lying.185 One aptly might describe this as the Joe Isuzu scena­
rio.186 Indeed, one might liken the industry to the criminal defend­
ant who tries but fails to complete a crime, because circumstances 
beyond his control have rendered the completion of the crime 
impossible.181 
In the tobacco context, there are two additional wrinkles to the 
problem of risk-decisional causation. First, until very recently, the 
industry carefully couched its statements about the addictiveness of 
nicotine as a description of the prevailing view of the public-health 
community rather than as an admission that the industry itself takes 
the same view.188 That the industry nonetheless has succeeded in 
fending off most of the recent individual lawsuits that have focused 
upon the manifold revelations of its outrageous conduct,189 if any­
thing, attests to the depth of public awareness as to the difficulty of 
smoking cessation - wholly apart from the willingness of industry 
officials so to concur on the public record. 
The second wrinkle is that the causation question becomes more 
complicated when one considers the situation not from the stand-
185. These are, in effect, the words of the forewoman of the jury that returned a verdict 
in favor of RJ. Reynolds in one of the few actual trials to feature the recently revealed 
industry documents. See supra note 178. 
186. During the 1980s, Isuzu gained attention for its automobiles through a series of hu­
morous television commercials that depicted a slick salesman named Joe Isuzu making ex­
travagant claims about Isuzu automobiles. As Joe Isuzu spouted his sales pitch, the words 
"He's lying" would flash prominently on the screen. See Gerald Parshall, Too Much Truth ls 
Uncouth, U.S. NE WS & WORLD REP., Oct. 27, 1986, at 7. 
187. See supra note 35 (noting that impossibility generally is not a defense to an attempt 
crime). 
188. See supra note 138. 
189. The industry has prevailed in two of the three individual trials to feature the recently 
discovered industry documents. See Milo Geyelin, Reynolds Wins Ex-Smoker's Cancer Suit, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1997, at Bl2 (reporting a verdict for the tobacco industry by a Florida 
jury, notwithstanding that the jury saw "industry documents . . •  that suggest tobacco execu­
tives have long understood the addictiveness of nicotine and manipulated its content in ciga· 
rettes"); Milo Geyelin, RJR's Tobacco Unit Wins a Big Victory: Jury Clears It of Blame in 
Smoker's Death, WALL ST. J., May 6, 1997, at A3 (reporting a Florida jury's verdict for the 
tobacco industry, notwithstanding "a barrage of internal records"); Suein L. Hwang et al., 
Jury's Tobacco Verdict Suggests Tough Times Ahead for the Industry, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 
1996, at Al (reporting a $750,000 damage award by a Florida jury and attributing the result 
to the "availability of internal documents" on addiction). A fourth trial in Indiana resulted in 
a defense verdict, but the jury in that case "never saw a pile of new internal industry docu­
ments about nicotine, addiction and cancer." Milo Geyelin, Jury Sides with Tobacco Firms in 
Cigarette Suit Filed in Indiana, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 1996, at BB. 
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point of individual tort suits, but from the aggregate perspective 
presented in the state Medicaid context. Here, questions of risk­
decisional causation tum upon suppositions about the behavior, 
and even the existence, of persons whom one might describe as 
marginal consumers. Speaking outside of the tobacco context in 
connection with tort liability based upon a failure to warn, Mark 
Geistfeld observes that "the disclosure of unavoidable risks will 
predictably lead to a decline in the market demand for most prod­
ucts, but there is no good way to identify the consumers who would 
leave the market following disclosure."190 One might say the same 
with regard to the claims of fraud advanced against the tobacco in­
dustry. In the face of the pervasive awareness of risk that has char­
acterized tobacco consumption in the West for centuries, there is no 
good way to determine how many consumers today would have be­
haved differently, absent the quite serious misconduct on the part 
of the tobacco industry. Viewing the situation from an aggregate 
perspective, one finds it hard to believe that risk-decisional causa­
tion is literally impossible in the sense that the industry's misdeeds 
did not manage to tip the scales for at least one person. It is diffi­
cult to imagine that the industry had the truly outrageous good for­
tune to cause literally no one to smoke who would not have lit up 
anyway. But the industry might well have come close, and the more 
one considers both the lineage and the breadth of popular knowl­
edge about smoking, the lower the number of marginal consumers 
appears to be. 
The most striking feature of the tobacco wars is that we are un­
likely ever to get an answer to the marginal consumer question and, 
even more remarkably, that the legal system may very well not 
need one. Rather, the recent calls for national legislation to end the 
tobacco wars would make resolution of the question largely beside 
the point. As detailed in Part III, national legislation is likely to 
amount to a rehabilitation plan for the tobacco industry - a hybrid 
of tort and criminal concepts that does not depend upon a causal 
relationship between the blameworthy conduct of the industry and 
the current incidence of smoking. Insofar as proposals for national 
legislation have met with formidable political controversy, that fer­
ment centers not upon matters of causation, but instead upon just 
how hard to sock the industry for its misconduct. In this sense, the 
debate over tobacco legislation reveals as much for its points of 
common ground - that the industry should be punished for what 
190. Mark Geistfeld, Inadequate Product Warnings and Causation, 30 U. MrcH. J.L. 
REFORM 309, 349 (1997). 
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one might characterize as an attempted mass tort - as for its differ­
ences over details of public policy. 
Before one may assess the merits of these developments, how­
ever, it is essential to recognize that both the tobacco and the im­
plant litigations are unlikely to stand as anomalies. Instead, the 
problem of the blameworthy-but-fortunate mass tort defendant is 
likely to persist in the future.191 
C. Future Prospects 
Recent developments naturally raise the question of why mass 
tort litigation is brought against an arguably blameworthy defend­
ant in the face of uncertainty over causation, whether of a scientific 
or risk-decisional kind. In particular, is the impetus for these sorts 
of lawsuits such that one reasonably may expect the unfolding of 
events like those recounted above to be a recurring phenomenon in 
future mass tort disputes? The answer to this second question is 
yes, based upon the economic underpinnings of mass tort litigation 
and, relatedly, upon the interaction between litigation and other 
methods by which to influence the public agenda. 
In analyzing mass tort disputes, commentators have pointed to 
the phenomenon of entrepreneurial litigation.192 In this context, 
lawsuits - especially the earliest of their kind - entail the expen­
diture over an extended time period of substantial sums by the 
plaintiffs' bar in order to develop the documentary evidence and 
scientific expertise needed to bring a successful claim in tort.193 The 
plaintiffs' bar undertakes this effort upon the prospect of financial 
reward in the long run from contingency fees - specifically, fees 
obtained from the bringing of additional, successful claims of the 
same sort, such as will enable the plaintiffs' bar to draw upon the 
array of documents and expertise assembled in connection with its 
initial round of victories.194 The phenomenon of entrepreneurial 
litigation has taken on unprecedented proportions in the tobacco 
litigation, extending to the pooling of :financial resources by plain­
tiffs' law firms that previously had gained both prominence and 
191. Cf. infra note 266 and accompanying text. 
192. The term "entrepreneurial litigation" originated in scholarship focused primarily 
upon corporate and securities class actions. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of 
Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. 
Cm. L. REv. 877 (1987). Commentators have extended the analysis to the mass tort context. 
See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 93, at 1347, 1373-76. 
193. See Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REv. 
899, 909-10 (1996). 
194. See id. at 910. 
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capital through successful litigation over earlier forms of mass 
torts.195 In fact, the general-interest press has noted, with some 
trepidation, the pervasive involvement by the same group of private 
lawyers in Medicaid reimbursement actions ostensibly brought by 
state governments196 and, more recently, the riches that the tobacco 
wars might spell for such attomeys.197 
From the standpoint of the plaintiffs' bar, one fairly may de­
scribe mass tort litigation as a kind of investment - one with the 
potential to do good, certainly, but an investment nonetheless. No 
one invests money in something that she does not believe will pay 
off. The expected payo:� from litigation depends upon expectations 
about the behavior of juries. This is not to sugge�t that most, or 
even many, mass tort claims ultimately yield jury verdicts. · In the 
tort system as a whole, of course, most claims do not reach a jury at 
all.198 But expectations - perhaps only rough, unarticulated, and 
potentially inaccurate intuitions - about what a jury would do in a 
given kind of litigation will set the parameters for settlement nego­
tiations and, even earlier, for the decision to sue. As the implant 
litigation demonstrates, moreover, verdicts in a few early individual 
lawsuits can exercise considerable influence upon the subsequent 
course of events.199 That entrepreneurial litigation is brought 
against arguably blameworthy defendants even in the face of formi­
dable causation questions thus must stem, at least in significant 
part, from expectations about juries. 
· 
The behavior of juries is a notoriously murky subject much 
prone to exaggeration in many directions, whether to hail jurors' 
common sense or to decry their misconceptions.200 An assessment 
of the overall capabilities of the civil jury is far beyond the scope of 
195. See Glenn Collins, A Tobacco Case's Legal Buccaneers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1995, at 
Cl (reporting at the outset of the most recent wave of tobacco litigation that "[c]lose to 60 
prominent law firms known for so-called toxic torts are contributing $100,000 each to a con­
sortium, filling an annual war chest of nearly $6 million"); cf. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. 
Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 218 (2d Cir. 1987) (discussing an early example of resource pooling 
by plaintiffs' counsel in the Agent Orange litigation). 
196. See Barry Meier, In Tobacco Talks; Lawyers Hold Key, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1997, at 
Al. 
197. See Paul A. Gigot, $50 Million Men: Tobacco Lawyers Become Sultans, WALL ST. J., 
June 27, 1997, at Al4; Barry Meier, Record Legal Fees Emerge as Issue in Tobacco Dea� N.Y. 
TIMES, June 23, 1997, at All; Richard B. Schmitt, Big Winners in the Settlement Could Be the 
Lawyers, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1997, at Bl; Matthew Scully, A Modest Proposal on Tobacco 
Lawyers' Fees, WALL ST. J., July 9, 1997, at A14. 
198. See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort 
Litigation System - And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1183-89 (1992). 
199. See supra section II.A.1. 
200. For an even-handed exposition of many emerging issues with regard to civil juries, 
see Developments in the Law - The Civil Jury, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1408 (1997). 
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this article. In order to ascertain the potential for future mass tort 
disputes to raise problems of outrageous fortune, however, there 
are a number of more focused observations that one can make. 
Specifically, cognitive psychological research, Supreme Court case 
law, and empirical accounts of tort litigation all lend credence to the 
expectation that litigation against an arguably blameworthy defend­
ant can be economically viable, even in the face of formidable 
doubt over matters of causation. This body of learning has devel­
oped only recently and, as such, remains subject to additional, con­
firmatory research in the coming years. The upshot so far, 
however, is the perception that jurors sometimes might "commin­
gle" various legal elements. In particular, in tort cases, jurors might 
overlook weak evidence of causation when confronted with strong 
evidence of misconduct on the part of the defendant.201 In fact, as I 
explain after providing a summary of the emerging literature in the 
area, one need not believe that all jurors reason in this way in all 
cases in order to understand the economic attraction of mass tort 
litigation in situations of outrageous fortune. 
What does the literature tell us? Experimental research by cog­
nitive psychologists indicates that mock juries tend to return more 
verdicts for plaintiffs when they consider close questions of scien­
tific causation together with evidence of the defendant's fault, as 
compared to consideration of the causation issue alone.202 These 
results fit comfortably within a broader conception of jury decision­
making that has emerged in the cognitive psychological literature, 
positing that jurors someti.n;tes reason holistically rather than by fit­
ting discrete pieces of evidence to discrete legal elements.203 A 
prominent version of this hypothesis holds that jurors may seek to 
fit evidence into a coherent "story." In so doing, jurors may tend to 
side with the litigant whose position best accords with this story 
model as a whole rather than as considered element by element.204 
201. See Dresser et al., supra note 50, at 741; Sanders, supra note 84, at 53. Some com­
mentators go even further, describing this phenomenon as a form of jury "nullification." See 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Galileo's Tribute: Using Medical Evidence in Court, 95 MICH. L. 
REv. 2055, 2074 {1997) (reviewing ANGELL, supra note 50, and SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE 
AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA {1995)); Wagner, supra note 
27, at 827. 
202. See Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, An Experimental Investigation of 
Procedural Issues in Complex Tort Trials, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 269, 278 (1990). 
203. See MnuAN DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAw ADRIFI' 35-36 (1997) (relating psychological 
research on juries in this country to continental theories about modes of reasoning by jurors). 
204. For an overview of the "story" model, see Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The 
Story Model for Juror Decision Making, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR 
DECISION MAKING 190 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993) (citing underlying studies in cognitive psy­
chology). For a more detailed exposition of the same theory, see Nancy Pennington & Reid 
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This past Term, in Old Chief v. United States,205 the Supreme 
Court expressly recognized that evidence offered by a prosecutor to 
prove a particular element of a crime may have the secondary effect 
of making more credible the prosecution's case with regard to 
other, disputed elements. As the Court observed: 
Evidence . . .  has force beyond any linear scheme of reasoning, and as 
its pieces come together a narrative gains momentum, with power not 
only to support conclusions but to sustain the willingness of jurors to 
draw the [further] inferences, whatever they may be, necessary to 
reach an honest verdict . . . .  [T]he prosecution may fairly seek to place 
its evidence before the jurors . . .  to convince the jurors that a guilty 
verdict would be morally reasonable as much as to point to the dis­
crete elements of a defendant's legal fault.206 
Though the Court did not explicitly link these insights to the emerg­
ing research in cognitive psychology, "commingling" by jurors in 
the criminal context closely resembles the analytical processes be­
lieved to be applied by jurors in at least some tort cases as well. 
Neil Feigenson has shown that the rhetoric used by plaintiffs' 
counsel in actual tort litigation appeals to precisely this sort of rea­
soning on the part of jurors201 - a strong indication that the aca-
Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Mode� 13 CARDozo L. 
RE.v. 519 (1991). 
205. 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997). 
206. 117 S. Ct. at 653-54 (emphasis added). The defendant in Old Chief was charged with 
unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. See 117 S. Ct. at 647. The defense 
offered to stipulate not only to the existence of a prior felony conviction but also to the name 
and nature of that offense, in an effort to prevent the prosecution from so apprising the jury. 
See 117 S. Ct. at 648. The trial court concluded that the prosecution need not accept the 
stipulation, and the defendant was convicted. See 117 S. Ct. at 648. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court underscored that, as a general matter, "the prosecution is 
entitled to prove its case free from any defendant's option to stipulate the evidence away." 
117 S. Ct. at 654. A stipulation might interrupt the "story" that the prosecution otherwise is 
attempting to tell through the ordinary means of physical evidence and witness testimony; as 
such, a stipulation might leave the jury to "wonder what they are being kept from knowing." 
117 S. Ct. at 654. As the Court recognized, "a piece of evidence may address any number of 
separate elements, striking hard just because it shows so much at once; the account of a 
shooting that establishes capacity and causation may tell just as much about the triggerman's 
motive and intent." 117 S. Ct. at 653. This is, if anything, an endorsement of what commen­
tators describe as "commingling." 
Old Chief itself required deviation from this general principle, but only because of its 
unusual facts. The Court pointed to the risk that the jury might convict the defendant simply 
out of a belief that he was a person of bad character, were the jury to learn not only that he 
had a prior felony conviction but also the inflammatory details of that crime, see 117 S. Ct. at 
655: an "assault resulting in serious bodily injury" to the victim and a five-year prison sen­
tence for the defendant, see 117 S. Ct. at 658 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Punishment of the 
defendant for the crime at issue simply because of his prior bad act, the Court held, would 
entail precisely the sort of propensity reasoning that Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence forbids. See 117 S. Ct. at 651, 655; see also FED. R. Evm. 404(b) (providing that 
"[e]vidence of other crimes . . .  is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order 
to show action in conformity therewith" on the occasion in question). 
207. See Neil R. Feigenson, The Rhetoric of Torts: How Advocates Help Jurors Think 
About Causation, Reasonableness, and Responsibility, 47 HASTINGS LJ. 61, 140-47 (1995). 
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demic literature documents a phenomenon that resonates with real­
world practitioners. In the mass tort context specifically, Joseph 
Sanders and Michael Green separately attribute the handful of 
early victories for plaintiffs in the Bendectin litigation to the phe­
nomenon of commingling by jurors.2os The same phenomenon also 
helps to explain the whopping ratio of punitive to compensatory 
damages awarded to plaintiffs in the early, pathbreaking lawsuits 
over breast implants.209 
Notions of commingling by jurors suggest that mass tort litiga­
tion brought in spite of doubt on causation may be especially likely 
to involve substantial evidence of blameworthiness. The latter is 
what makes such a case economically viable, notwithstanding the 
former.210 Indeed, the commingling hypothesis helps to explain 
why blameworthy-but-fortunate defendants should be the recurring 
subject of mass tort litigation in particular, perhaps more so than 
ordinary kinds of tort actions. By definition,211 mass torts entail the 
exposure of large numbers of people to essentially the same mass­
produced item or substance. Blameworthy behavior in this context 
typically will consist of the willingness on the part of some corpo­
rate entity to run the risk of mass exposure for the sake of the 
riches to be had from product sales. The potential endangerment of 
thousands or millions of individuals in the pursuit of profits is 
bound to seem a good deal more worthy of blame than the endan­
germent of just one or a few. 
208. Invoking the cognitive psychological literature, Sanders observes that 
[c]ommingling generally helped Bendectin plaintiffs by implicitly encouraging the 
factfinder to balance a weak case on causation against a stronger case on breach and 
damages. It also helped the plaintiffs tell a better story . . . .  The story told how Merrell 
[Dow] negligently tested its new drug, leading to the release of a dangerous product. 
Sanders, supra note 84, at 54; see also GREEN, supra note 19, at 127, 263. For the reasons why 
Bendectin did not produce a deluge of lawsuits on the scale of the breast implant litigation, 
see supra note 84. 
209. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. See generally Wagner, supra note 27, 
at 828-29 ("It would seem more than coincidental that in those cases in which juries have 
awarded damages in spite of weak causation evidence, the defendant manufacturers' negli­
gence in testing [its product] often rose to the level of gross negligence or recklessness suffi­
cient to support the simultaneous award of punitive damages." (footnote omitted)). 
210. See Dresser et al., supra note 50, at 733 ("[S]ocially irresponsible behavior may even 
be a necessary pre-condition to mass products liability litigation for latent hazards: a manu­
facturer's failure to reasonably ensure the long-term safety of its product increases both the 
chance that the product will later be deemed hazardous and the outrage felt by victims and 
jurors."). Viewing the mass tort plaintiffs' bar as entrepreneurs in the truest sense, one might 
say that they have identified a scenario in which at least some civil juries may tend to over­
value certain kinds of claims in much the same manner as a savvy stock analyst might seek to 
identify particular companies that financial markets have overvalued. 
211. For a working definition of mass torts, see supra note 1. 
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Not all jurors necessarily reason in this way all the time. But in 
order to escape unscathed - in particular, to avoid the financial 
disaster that a few substantial punitive damage verdicts might bring 
- the defendant in such litigation must win the vast majority of 
cases. When evidence begins to mount about a manufacturer's 
blameworthy behavior, all it may take to bring such a firm to its 
knees is for a handful of juries to reject a defense built upon the 
lack of causation. At that point, the only question likely to remain 
open will center simply upon the calculation of damages. On that 
score, evidence of the defendant's misdeeds will weigh heavily. 
From the standpoint of the entrepreneurial plaintiffs' attorney, 
it is enough that the phenomenon of commingling might occur in 
some juries, not that it necessarily will do so in every instance. In­
deed, the foregoing analysis also explains why blameworthy­
but-fortunate defendants would be eager to resolve whole catego­
ries of mass tort litigation once smoking-gun evidence of their mis­
deeds has come to light. Defendants - and, for that matter, their 
shareholders - understandably may not wish to take the chance 
that some day some jury will reject a defense centered upon a lack 
of causation and proceed to sock it to defendants in a punitive dam­
age award. This concern helps to explain, among other things, why 
the securities market so heavily discounts shares of tobacco 
stock:212 investors are betting, quite understandably, that the indus­
try cannot win every case. 
Considerations of blameworthiness do not cut only against de­
fendants, of course. Some individual plaintiffs may be emotionally 
unappealing to jurors. As noted earlier,213 the small number of in­
dividual tobacco suits that have proceeded to verdict in recent years 
have produced mixed results, notwithstanding the emphasis by 
plaintiffs' counsel upon newly discovered documents that detail the 
conduct of the industry. These results, however, may be more of a 
testament to the depth and pervasiveness of popular awareness 
about the risks of smoking - and, relatedly, to the notion that 
smokers themselves are to blame for their maladies - than to any 
explanatory inadequacy in the commingling hypothesis. 
Apart from the perceived tendencies of jurors, the bringing of 
lawsuits in itself has the capacity to uncover additional information 
that may alter the understanding of the litigation. The bringing of 
212. See generally Suein L. Hwang & Milo Geyelin, B.A.T May Kick Tobacco Habit at 
Last, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1997, at BS ("Stock analysts have long argued that all tobacco 
stocks are undervalued."). 
213. See supra note 189. 
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suits against defendants that have engaged in suspicious behavior, 
notwithstanding uncertainty about causation, may reflect the famil­
iar adage: "Where there's smoke, there's fire." The understanda­
ble notion on the part of the plaintiffs' bar may be that defendants 
that have behaved in an arguably blameworthy manner might have 
done so in order to hide some darker secret - one that aggressive 
exploration might uncover. In this sense, ongoing litigation pro­
vides a vehicle by which plaintiffs' lawyers may search for addi­
tional evidence of causation from the defendants' own files. In the 
meantime, mass tort litigation itself can have the effect of spurring 
scientific research on the causation question.214 
Finally, it remains important to keep in mind that litigation is 
not the only force in play here. Lawsuits interact with other chan­
nels by which one may bring to public attention corporate conduct 
thought to be the source of a mass tort. In this regard, the claims 
advanced by the mass tort plaintiffs' bar gained credibility from me­
dia reports at early stages of the breast implant and tobacco contro­
versies. This is not to say that media attention consisted simply of 
alarming reports, as were aired with regard to implants.21s If any­
thing, the widely reported efforts of the tobacco industry to seek 
legal recourse against adverse television reports on grounds of libel 
- or to discourage the airing of such programming in the first 
place, through the implicit threat of legal action - served merely to 
reinforce public suspicions of the industry generally.216 In addition 
214. See JAsANOFF, supra note 201, at 50-51 (noting that scientific research may be "un­
dertaken only when a lawsuit points to the existence of a previously unsuspected causal 
connection"). 
215. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing an alarmist television report on 
breast implants that aired in 1990). See generally Hensler & Peterson, supra note 50, at 1020-
23 (discussing the impact of media coverage on mass tort litigation as a whole). 
216. In response to a 1994 report on ABC's news program Day One concerning efforts to 
manipulate the level of nicotine in cigarettes - one of the first media reports on the subject 
- Philip Morris filed and aggressively litigated a $10 billion claim for libel. See Steve 
Weinberg, Smoking Guns: ABC, Philip Morris and the Infamous Apology, CoLUM. JoUR· 
NALISM REv., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 29, 34. See generally Benjamin Weiser, Big Tobacco vs. Big 
Media, WASH. PoST NATL. WKLY. EnmoN, Jan. 15-21, 1996, at 6-9. The network ultimately 
settled the case by paying Philip Morris's legal expenses of $15 million and by providing an 
apology on the air, see Weiser, supra, at 6, notwithstanding what observers consider to be 
strong grounds for defense of the report as true. See Benjamin Wittes, Philip Morris v. ABC: 
The Defense the Network Never Mounted, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 15, 1996, at 1, 41-42. 
In the aftermath of the ABC apology, CBS refused to run a 60 Minutes interview with 
former Brown & Williamson head of research Jeffrey Wigand that would have focused upon, 
among other explosive topics, allegations of perjury by tobacco executives with regard to the 
addictiveness of nicotine. See Lawrence K. Grossman, CBS, 60 Minutes, and the Unseen 
Interview, CoLUM. JOURNALISM REv., Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 39, 40-44. The network's action set 
off a torrent of criticism. CBS's proinise to indemnify Wigand in the event of a libel action 
may have amounted to tortious interference with a confidentiality agreement he had entered 
into with his former employer. See Alix M. Freedman et al., CBS Legal Guarantees to "60 
Minutes" Source Muddy Tobacco Story, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1995, at Al. Even more 
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to media attention, moreover, tort suits may coincide with federal 
regulatory initiatives of the sort that appear to have contributed to 
the torrent of claims in the implant litigation217 and reinforced no­
tions of nicotine addiction from smoking.21s 
It is easy to place a sinister overlay upon the role of juries, the 
media, and government regulators - for example, to depict mass 
tort litigation simply as the product of runaway juries, investigative 
reporters with an appetite for narratives of corporate greed, and 
self-righteous regulators in the pursuit of political acclaim. Such an 
assessment, however, would treat as underlying causes what are 
simply external symptoms. Although the prospect that a jury might 
commingle causation and fault certainly is at odds with the organi­
zation of conventional tort doctrine into discrete legal elements, it 
would be a mistake to point the finger of doubt at jurors to the 
exclusion of doctrine. 
My contention is decidedly not that jurors are too stupid, but, 
instead, that they sometimes may be too wise. The growing body of 
evidence in support of the commingling hypothesis suggests that 
some jurors may be inclined to turn mass tort litigation into a vehi­
cle for the moral condemnation of corporate behavior thought to be 
irresponsible or malevolent.219 The intuition of jurors that moral 
condemnation may be appropriate should not be a cause for hapless 
dismay. Instead, it should form the impetus for an assessment of 
the appropriate constraints - both institutional and doctrinal -
upon such sentiments. The ordinary people who become commin-
loudly, however, commentators decried the implicit threat of Big Tobacco to bludgeon media 
critics into silence. See Walter Goodman, Enough Smoking Guns for All on "60 Minutes," 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1995, at B2; Self-Censorship at CBS, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1995, § 4, at 
14 (editorial). CBS ultimately aired the interview several months later, after the same infor­
mation had come to light through other means. See Bill Carter, "60 Minutes" Interview with 
Tobacco Insider Set for Tonight, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1996, § 1, at 14. 
This is not to say that the industry's efforts to seek legal recourse in these regards were 
necessarily wrongful. The law of libel and tortious interference does not protect only the 
virtuous. But the industry's response to these media investigations merely enhanced the im­
age of tobacco defendants as sinister actors. 
217. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
218. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text 
219. This assessment echoes one recently voiced elsewhere. As Rochelle Dreyfuss 
observes, 
the science problems that courts encounter will never be resolved fully without address­
ing the underlying rules of law of which they are a part . . . .  [S]ome of the "mistakes" 
juries made . . .  tell us more about the community's view of how best to resolve a difficult 
social dilemma than about the jury's assessment of the science. 
Dreyfuss, supra note 201, at 2074; see also Dresser et al., supra note 50, at 741 ("Rather than 
acting incompetently by ignoring or even shunning science in entering plaintiff verdicts, ju­
rors may be 'commingling' or nullifying the causation rule to produce a legal outcome that 
compensates for the lack of legal incentives to test products earlier in the development pro­
cess." (footnotes omitted)). 
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gling jurors are on to something important, but they are putting into 
effect their moral intuitions through channels wildly unsuited to 
their implicit goal. 
Ill. SHOULD THE CRIMINAL ANALOGY BE GENERALIZED? 
Insofar as mass tort litigation in cases of outrageous fortune has 
come to encompass notions analogous to those at the core of crimi­
nal law - albeit, in large part, via expectations on the part of both 
plaintiffs' lawyers and defendants about the moral intuitions of ju­
rors - the question is whether this development should be genera­
lized. In particular, the progress of both the implant and the 
tobacco litigations should lead us to explore the merits and hazards 
of a more explicit integration of tort and criminal concepts. The 
major benefit of an approach to cases of outrageous fortune rooted 
in criminal notions lies in the :flexibility that it lends to the formula­
tion of legal remedies. In particular, responses drawn from criminal 
law emphasize the prospective reduction of risk through means 
other than the payment of compensation. Put simply, responses 
that draw upon criminal notions have the capacity to focus the 
moral opprobrium of the community upon defendants without giv­
ing money to plaintiffs. Tiris is especially appropriate when the 
causal connection between the conduct of defendants and the harm 
suffered by plaintiffs is tenuous at best. The efforts to effect some 
form of national legislation to end the tobacco wars illustrate such 
an approach; indeed, one may draw from that example lessons for 
the ongoing controversy over breast implants. 
Negotiation amongst mass tort lawyers, however, is an unwieldy 
means by which to make the kinds of tradeoffs often needed in 
cases of outrageous fortune. One might well wish to place a prior..: 
ity upon the reduction of risk to future generations of consumers 
through punishment of the defendant rather than to give a mone­
tary jackpot to present-day tort claimants. The making of such 
tradeoffs should be the stuff of open discussion through political 
channels rather than simply the product of back-room dealmaking. 
Indeed, consideration of national tobacco legislation raises the 
prospect that mass tort litigation might form an impetus for demo­
cratic deliberation - specifically, a means to channel the intuition 
of ordinary people to impose moral condemnation upon outrageous 
corporate misconduct into a forum more suitable for consideration 
of such an approach. The influx of criminal analogies sub silentio 
through other means, by contrast, raises a genuine prospect that the 
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litigation system as a whole might be deployed in a private witch­
hunt against the manufacturers of risky products. 
In light of these concerns, the law, if anything, should look fur­
ther to the criminal system - specifically, to the institutional and 
doctrinal limitations that criminal law imposes upon its analogous 
process of moral condemnation. Familiar features of the criminal 
law - the central role of politically accountable institutions, limita­
tions based upon concepts of mens rea, and considerations of deter­
rence - offer significant constraints that speak to the concerns 
canvassed above. The challenge for academic commentators and 
those interested in legal reform is to move beyond the unacknowl­
edged and haphazard borrowing of criminal notions that has char­
acterized recent events. What is needed for the future is a 
systematic consideration of the manner in which the law of mass 
torts ought to draw upon criminal law. The assessment that follows 
is a first step in this enterprise. 
A. The Advantages of Remedial Flexibility 
As conventionally conceived, criminal sanctions differ in form 
from tort remedies. As John Coffee aptly phrases the distinction, 
criminal law "prohibits," whereas tort law "prices."220 Indeed, the 
stigma associated with imprisonment, as distinguished from the 
payment of damages, is a significant justification for the greater 
procedural protections available to criminal defendants.221 A crim­
inal sentence discharges the defendant's figurative "debt to society" 
rather than a debt to a particular individual in the form of a civil 
judgment.222 The victims of crime get the psychological satisfaction 
of knowing that the law will punish the person who harmed them, 
or who attempted to do so, whereas the victims of torts get cash. 
Even the feature of the current tort system that most clearly em­
bodies goals of retribution akin to those of criminal law - the 
availability of punitive damages - comes in the form of a transfer 
payment from defendants to plaintiffs. Conversely, the feature of 
the criminal system that most resembles the damage remedy of tort 
- the imposition of criminal fines - involves the taking of money 
220. See Coffee, Reflections, supra note 11, at 194; see also Mann, supra note 11, at 1808. 
221. See, e.g., In re Wmship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (noting that a criminal defendant 
has at stake "interests of immense importance" because of, among other things, "the cer­
tainty that he would be stigmatized by [a] conviction"). 
222. Blackstone, for example, distinguished between crimes as public wrongs and civil 
injuries, such as torts, as private wrongs. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5. 
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from the defendant. In the criminal system, fines generally do not 
go into the coffers of crime victims. 
This difference in remedial techniques helps to explain the dif­
fering significance of causation in the two systems. If a tort defend­
ant has not caused harm to the plaintiff, the conventional 
conception of tort law offers no justification for the compelled 
transfer of money to that individual, no matter how much good one 
might produce in the future by so doing.223 Causation matters, in 
other words, when legal remedies take the form of a monetary 
transfer. By contrast, the punishment of crimes - including those 
in which the would-be victim remains unharmed or may have been 
contributorily negligent - serves all of the conventional objectives 
of the criminal law as a vehicle for retribution, deterrence, incapaci­
tation, and rehabilitation.224 
For mass tort disputes centered upon outrageous fortune, the 
solutions wrought by negotiation have blurred the foregoing dis­
tinctions between tort remedies and criminal sanctions. As noted 
earlier, responses in the form of reorganizations in bankruptcy im­
pose a costly burden upon the debtor corporation that may stigma­
tize its future business affairs.225 A national legislative solution for 
the tobacco wars would take this trend several steps further. 
Although even the original $368.5 billion proposal negotiated by 
the industry and state attorneys general would not have resolved 
lawsuits currently pending in the tort system,226 that proposal does 
contain several controversial provisions that concern the industry's 
liability in tort for past acts: for example, by barring class actions 
henceforth;227 by prospectively forbidding punitive damage awards, 
apart from the payments that Congress might require by federal 
law;228 and by limiting the sums that the industry would have to pay 
annually in satisfaction of any outstanding tort judgments.229 It re-
223. Some commentators have offered substantial criticisms of this conventional view. 
See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
224. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of a contributory negli­
gence defense to a criminal prosecution and the punishment of attempt crimes). For a survey 
of the four conventional rationales for criminal punishment, see SANFORD H. KAmsH & 
STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, C!uMINAL LAw AND !Ts PROCESSES 102-31 (6th ed. 1995). 
225. See supra section II.A.2. 
226. Apart from any national legislation, the industry settled a class action brought on 
behalf of flight attendants exposed to secondary smoke. See Mireya Navarro, Cigarette Mak· 
ers Reach Settlement in Nonsmoker Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1997, at Al. 
227. See Proposed Resolution, supra note 7, at 39. 
228. See id. This limitation would not apply to lawsuits based upon future misconduct. 
See id. at 41-42. 
229. See id. at 40-41 (providing that judgments in excess of the annual cap would roll over 
to be paid in the following year). 
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mains unclear what mix of measures, if any, ultimately will be part 
of any national legislation, but the Clinton administration has indi­
cated that " 'reasonable provisions modifying the civil liability of 
the tobacco industry would not be a dealbreaker.' "230 
Unlike reorganization plans in bankruptcy, however, the most 
innovative aspects of national legislation in the tobacco area consist 
of features designed not to resolve questions of compensation for 
tort claimants, but instead to support dramatic new efforts to re­
duce smoking in the future. In its negotiations with the state attor­
neys general, the industry already has demonstrated its willingness 
to embrace dramatic new regulatory measures that would go well 
beyond even those promulgated by the FDA. These measures in­
clude: explicit statutory recognition of FDA authority to mandate 
the "gradual reduction . . .  of nicotine yields" and, potentially, to 
eliminate nicotine entirely in the long run;231 :financial penalties in 
the absence of specific percentage reductions in underage smok­
ing;232 warnings about health risks and addictiveness that would oc­
cupy twenty-five percent of the front panel of cigarette packs;233 
sweeping restrictions on marketing that would outlaw all outdoor 
230. Jeffrey Taylor, Clinton to Back Tobacco Firms on Suit Relief, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 
1998, at A4 (quoting the testimony of David W. Ogden, counselor to the Attorney General, 
before the House Committee on the Judiciary). 
231. See Proposed Resolution, supra note 7, at 16-18. It now appears likely that any na­
tional legislation will not encompass certain restrictions upon FDA authority that were part 
of the original proposal - for example, a requirement that the FDA use highly cumbersome 
formal rulemaking procedures in the event that it wishes to ban nicotine and a further de­
mand that the FDA demonstrate that such action would "not result in the creation of a 
significant demand" for contraband cigarettes. See id. at 17. Critics of the original deal made 
considerable headway by pointing out that FDA authority to take such action already exists, 
without the controversial limitations. See John M. Broder, White House Says Tobacco Propo­
sal Would Hurt F.D.A., N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1997, at Al. Such power follows from the propo­
sition, recently accepted by a federal district court, that the FDA has the legal authority to 
regulate nicotine in tobacco products under the current food and drug laws. See Coyne 
Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, 958 F. Supp. 1060, 1079-83 (M.D.N.C. 1997), appeal pending, No. 97-
1581 (4th Cir.). Whether there ever will be sufficient political will to ban nicotine, of course, 
is another question. 
232. See Proposed Resolution, supra note 7, at 24. Under the proposal, surcharges would 
be triggered in the event that underage smoking does not decline by at least 30% in 5 years, 
50% in 7 years, and 60% in 10 years. See id. (providing for surcharges totalling up to $2 
billion per year). 
Controversy remains not only over the specified percentages, but also over the qualifica­
tion that the industry may obtain abatement of up to 75% of the surcharge by showing that it 
has "taken all reasonably available measures to reduce youth tobacco use and ha[s] not taken 
any action to undermine the achievement of the required reductions." Id. Again, the contro­
versy is over the severity of the penalty upon the industry rather than its existence. See 
Broder, supra note 231; cf. Jeffrey Taylor, Shalala Offers Plan on Curbing Smoking, WAIL 
ST. J., Sept. 26, 1997, at A3 (reporting a suggestion by Secretary of Health and Human Serv­
ices Donna Shalala that penalties be levied "on a company-by-company basis, so that those 
that make brands popular among underage smokers pay more than others"). 
233. See Proposed Resolution, supra note 7, at 10. 
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advertisements as well as the use of human images or cartoon char­
acters;234 expenditure of funds collected from the industry to sup­
port antismoking advertisements to be developed by the public 
health conup.unity;235 and the dissolution of industry disinformation 
organizations, coupled with the creation of a public depository for 
the documents therefrom.236 
Apart from the foregoing measures, considerable attention has 
focused, in recent months, upon the prospect that dramatic in­
creases in cigarette prices - as much as $1.50 per pack, as Presi­
dent Clinton has suggested, or even more - may help to reduce 
cigarette consumption.237 The precise mechanism through which to 
achieve price increases of this magnitude remains open to debate. 
As part of national legislation in the tobacco area, Congress simply 
might increase federal taxes upon tobacco products. Alternatively, 
Congress might increase the amount of money the tobacco industry 
itself would have to pay under the national legislation - above the 
$368.5 billion originally proposed - with the expectation that the 
industry will pass along the cost to consumers. Whatever the mech­
anism, the impact of price hikes may be especially pronounced for 
underage consumers, whose disposable income tends to be rela­
tively :fixed.238 Economists Frank Chaloupka and Michael Gross­
man, for example, have estimated that a seventy-five-cent-per-pack 
234. See id. at 9. This aspect of the proposal, if ultimately included in national legislation, 
would overcome the current lack of statutory authority for the more narrow set of advertis­
ing restrictions in existing FDA regulations. See Coyne Beahm, 958 F. Supp. at 1083-86. In 
an attempt to reduce the prospects for a constitutional challenge on grounds of commercial 
speech, the proposal would not have applied advertising restrictions to tobacco firms other 
than the major companies that control virtually all of the domestic market for cigarettes and 
that negotiated the proposal with the state attorneys general. See Proposed Resolution, supra 
note 7, at 28-29; cf. Edmund L. Andrews, European Officials Agree to Ban on Most Tobacco 
Ads by 2006, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1997, at Cl (reporting an agreement of European health 
ministers on sweeping restrictions on tobacco advertising in their respective countries). 
I leave for others the merits of the Frrst Amendment issue. Compare, e.g., Martin H. 
Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 lowA L. REv. 589, 620 {1996) 
(expressing skepticism over the constitutionality of advertising restrictions) with, e.g., Vincent 
Blasi & Henry Paul Monaghan, The First Amendment and Cigarette Advertising, 256 JAMA 
502 {1986) (asserting the constitutionality of advertising restrictions) and Sylvia A. Law, Ad­
diction, Autonomy, and Advertising, 77 lowA L. REv. 909 {1992) (same). 
235. See Proposed Resolution, supra note 7, at 37-38. 
236. See id. at 22, 64-65. 
237. See Jeffrey Taylor, Clinton Presses Tougher Deal on Tobacco, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 
1997, at A3; see also Jeffrey Taylor, More Senators Seem to Back Increasing Cigarette Prices 
Beyond Level in Accord, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 1997, at A6 (noting congressional support for 
large price increases); cf. LeBel, supra note 133, at 640 {calling for a massive increase in 
cigarette taxes as a means, among other things, to reduce consumption). 
238. For internal industry documents expressing such a concern with respect to past price 
increases, see GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 133, at 249. 
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increase in cigarettes prices would be associated with a twenty-five 
percent reduction in underage smoking.239 
Full-fl.edged debate in Congress over the precise details of any 
national legislation remains to be had. For present purposes, how­
ever, the most noteworthy feature of the emerging debate consists 
of its focus upon what critics regard as the excessive leniency of the 
regulatory measures originally negotiated by state attorneys general 
- their failure to go even further to punish the industry - rather 
than upon their existence. The debate, in short, is over how far to 
go in the direction of criminal-law-like remedies. The premise so to 
proceed in the first place has now become the starting point for 
discussion. Only a short time ago, measures along the lines out­
lined here would have been dismissed as fantasy, even if accompa­
nied by many more gaping loopholes. 
The regulatory aspects of the proposed national legislation 
amount to nothing less than an effort to rehabilitate Big Tobacco. 
Indeed, the first paragraph of the original proposal states explicitly 
that regulatory measures of the sort outlined therein would "man­
date a total reformation and restructuring" of the tobacco industry 
- one that would have the effect of "changing the corporate cul­
ture. "240 Here is the rhetoric of criminal law writ large. Indeed, the 
prospect of national legislation that would establish a rehabilitation 
program for defendants without mandating cash transfers to current 
smokers speaks specifically to the problem of risk­
decisional causation raised in Part II: legislation along these lines 
would make sense of both the formidable evidence of the industry's 
blameworthiness and the equally formidable amount of information 
in society about the harmful and addictive nature of smoking. It 
would bring moral condemnation upon the industry without, at the 
same time, transferring money to those who, in all likelihood, well 
understood the harmful nature of smoking but considered the 
pleasures of nicotine to be worth it. For this, national legislation 
would be an elegant solution to the problem of outrageous fortune. 
There is more than just the culture of Big Tobacco at stake, of 
course. Given the longstanding awareness of the nature of smok­
ing, there are eminently sensible grounds upon which to be skepti­
cal about the impact that more explicit warnings and restrictions 
upon advertising, in themselves, might have upon the incidence of 
239. See Frank J. Chaloupka & Michael Grossman, Price, Tobacco Control Policies and 
Youth Smoking 23 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 5740, 1996). 
240. Proposed Resolution, supra note 7, at 1. 
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smoking.241 Along similar lines, some critics have questioned the 
effect of cigarette price hikes upon demand.242 The parsing of any 
legislative proposal on a point-by-point basis, however, may miss 
the forest for the trees. Its significance for future generations may 
well lie not in any of its particulars but, rather, in its expressive 
impact as a whole. 
One of the growing movements in criminal law scholarship cen­
ters upon the role of criminal sanctions as a vehicle to express social 
norms. Under this view, featured most prominently in the recent 
writing of Dan Kahan, criminal regimes are significant as much for 
what they say to people about the prevailing social culture as for 
what they do.243 As Kahan explains, 
[s]ocial meaning plays a critical role in criminal law. Economists 
speak of criminal law as a mechanism for pricing misconduct, but or­
dinary citizens think of it as a convention for morally condemning it. 
Against the background of that expectation, the positions that the law 
takes become suffused with meaning. What it punishes . . .  can tell us 
what kind of life the community views as virtuous; how it punishes 
{imprisonment, corporal punishment, fines) can tell us what forms of 
affliction it views as appropriate to mark wrongdoers' disgrace; how 
severely it punishes . . .  can tell us whose interests it values and how 
much.244 
Kahan argues that the articulation and enforcement of criminal 
sanctions has the capacity to change the social meaning of behavior 
- to deter crime not simply out of some cold-blooded calculus cen­
tered upon the expected costs of punishment, but from a sense of 
shame and rebuke from society at large.24s 
241. See Klein, supra note 10 (arguing that macabre warnings simply may make cigarettes 
seem like even more of a forbidden fruit for underage consumers); see also Stanton A. 
Glantz, Editorial: Preventing Tobacco Use - The Youth Access Trap, 86 .AM. J. PuB. 
HEALTH 156, 157 (1996) (expressing a similar criticism by an antitobacco activist of the more 
limited advertising restrictions set forth by the FDA). 
242. For an overview of this debate, see Jeffrey Taylor, Critics Question Tobacco Pact's 
Effect on Teen Smoking, WAIL ST. J., Aug. 19, 1997, at A20. Other observers have pointed to 
the related concern that consumers as a whole may blunt the effect of price hikes by purchas­
ing cigarettes at the growing number of discount smoke shops that focus virtually exclusively 
upon high-volume sales of tobacco products. See Barnaby J. Feder, Tough Climate May Ben­
efit Smoke Shops, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1997, at Cl. 
243. See Kahan, supra note 33, at 362-65; see also Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative 
Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Cm. L. REv. 591, 594-605 (1996) (discussing the "expressive dimen­
sion" of criminal punishment). 
244. Kahan, supra note 33, at 362 (footnotes omitted). 
245. See id. at 363 (noting that "criminal law can produce social meaning through the 
regulation of social norms" (emphasis omitted)). For empirical support, see Robert J. 
Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 
277 SCIENCE 918 (1997). 
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To the extent that any conceivable national legislation has genu­
ine prospects for success, those prospects lie primarily in its poten­
tial to alter not merely the culture of industry but also the social 
meaning of smoking itself. Legislation, in particular, can serve to 
recharacterize the underage smoker not as a rugged individualist 
but simply as one in a herd of thousands duped by a clever cam­
paign of corporate disinformation. Understood in this light, the no­
tion of nicotine addiction as some sort of new-found revelation is a 
well-constructed myth; but it may be a myth that serves an expres­
sive purpose, apart from historical accuracy. 
An understanding of the pr�posed tobacco legislation drawn 
from criminal law has implications for the appropriate resolution of 
the breast implant controversy. As noted earlier, there certainly 
remains some debate over whether implant makers did anything 
worthy of moral condemnation.246 Insofar as one might think they 
did, a sensible approach would be to punish the conduct of defend­
ants without giving a windfall to plaintiffs who, apparently by sheer 
coincidence, happened to receive implants and later to develop con­
nective tissue disease. Chapter 11 bankruptcy is a useful procedural 
vehicle for disentangling various creditors' claims established under 
some body of substantive law; only by accident does the bankruptcy 
process itself act as a means by which to punish the debtor.247 
Whatever one might think of implant makers, it does seem clear 
that their degree of culpability is lower - indeed, significantly 
lower - than that of Big Tobacco. Implant defendants, for all their 
arguable foibles, did not affirmatively set out to harm consumers in 
the manner alleged of the tobacco industry. I turn to that line of 
distinction later, in connection with the limitations that one should 
draw from criminal concepts of mens rea.248 For the moment, the 
point is that bankruptcy too may serve, unwittingly and without 
political input, as a vehicle for punishment of defendants that ulti­
mately need not give money to plaintiffs. As compared to legisla­
tion on the scale being discussed for tobacco, bankruptcy is a far 
lesser vehicle for altering the social meaning of product consump­
tion, but that difference may not be especially significant. Silicone 
gel breast implants, unlike cigarettes, have been withdrawn from 
the market.249 
246. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
247. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text. 
248. See infra section ill.B.2. 
249. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. 
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B. The Importance of Institutional and Doctrinal Constraints 
Although the foregoing remedial advantages are by no means 
inconsiderable, it would be a serious mistake simply to pluck from 
criminal law the notion of moral condemnation without regard to 
causation and to transfer that idea, unadorned, to the mass tort con­
text. Both tort and criminal law are coordinated systems in which 
each component of substantive doctrine exists within a collection of 
suppositions not only about the content of other, related doctrines 
but also about the appropriate roles of various legal institutions.25° 
Attention to these aspects of criminal law - specifically the role of 
political institutions, gradations of mens rea, and goals of deter­
rence - helps to frame the appropriate parameters upon the pro­
cess of moral condemnation for corporate misdeeds. 
1. The Role of Political Institutions 
Mass tort disputes have not previously garnered significant con­
sideration by political institutions. Indeed, one generally might re­
gard as desirable the relative lack of involvement by political 
bodies, insofar as litigation can serve as an independent means by 
which to bring to light questions of product safety.251 The identifi­
cation of safety issues by way of entrepreneurial litigation, however, 
does not necessitate their resolution completely outside of channels 
for public discussion and political accountability. In these respects, 
the proposal to resolve the tobacco litigation is notable for the cru­
cial role contemplated for Congress. 
a. Plaintiffs and Accountability. A recurring problem in the 
fashioning of any kind of collective solution to mass tort disputes 
lies in balancing the interests of current plaintiffs with those of fu­
ture generations. In previous mass tort scenarios, litigation typi­
cally has driven the product in question and, in some instances, 
entire manufacturing firms from the market.252 For cases in which 
the causal link between defendants and plaintiffs is reasonably 
clear, the challenge has been to provide appropriate redress to 
those who currently _suffer from disease and, at the same time, to 
250. This remains the enduring insight of the Legal Process school. See HENRY M. HART, 
JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND 
APPUCATION OF LAw at cxxxvii (William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). 
251. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
252. The most prominent example remains the asbestos litigation. For a detailed account, 
see generally PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MrscoNDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON 
TRIAL (1985). 
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fashion a sustainable compensation framework for those who may 
manifest disease only years or decades later. 
The situation is even more complex in cases of outrageous for­
tune. The national legislation currently contemplated for the to­
b acco area focuses not upon compensation per se but, 
predominantly, upon measures to reduce the consumption of a 
product expected to remain on the market in the future. Here, the 
tradeoff is not merely temporal - measures of concern to present­
day persons versus measures for the protection of others in the fu­
ture - but also of kind - compensation for past harms versus reg­
ulation to discourage product use prospectively. Indeed, as 
explained above,253 cases of outrageous fortune often cry out for 
solutions that will punish the conduct of defendants but that, due to 
lack of causation, will not result in a windfall for present-day 
plaintiffs. 
These are not the sorts of matters that one can compare on a 
balance sheet; rather, they inherently entail the application of 
rough value judgments. Private negotiation alone - whether in the 
context of reorganization proceedings in bankruptcy or in connec­
tion with aggregate lawsuits, such as the state Medicaid reimburse­
ment actions - is ill-suited for this task. Private negotiations to 
effect solutions along these lines frequently, for understandable 
practical reasons, tend to focus upon those mass tort plaintiffs' at­
torneys who already have substantial numbers of current clients: 
they are the ones who need to sign on to any deal in order to assure 
defendants that the deal really does mark a solution to the litiga­
tion. One does not have peace unless all of the entities who might 
attack you have signed the peace treaty. 
Plaintiffs' lawyers with a large stable of clients in the particular 
area at issue, however, are not positioned to trade off dollars for 
current claimants in order to punish the conduct of defendants 
through other, potentially more suitable, means. Negotiations of 
this sort place plaintiffs' lawyers not in the position of zealous and 
loyal advocates for present-day clients,254 but rather in a posture 
akin to that of a regulatory agency charged with the advancement 
of the public interest as a whole. Indeed, attention recently has fo-
253. See supra section ill.A. 
254. Longstanding principles of legal ethics impose upon attorneys duties of zealous rep­
resentation and loyalty. See MODEL Rm.ES OF PRoFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.3 cmt. 
(1995) ("A lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interest of the client 
and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."); MoDEL Rm.ES oF PRoFESsroNAL CoN­
DUcr Rule 1.7 cmt. ("Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a 
client."). 
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cused upon the possibility that prominent plaintiffs' attorneys in­
volved in the tobacco negotiations in their separate capacity as 
counsel for various state governments may have labored under a 
conflict of interest by calling for legislation that would put no dol­
lars in the hands of their present clients in exchange for industry 
assent to measures designed to reduce smoking prospectively.255 
To address this problem, courts in aggregate proceedings some­
times have subdivided the representation of the various interests 
aligned against defendants. Courts in the class action and bank­
ruptcy contexts, for instance, sporadically have insisted upon the 
creation of subclasses for future claimants or have appointed a 
guardian ad litem to review any deal as a whole.256 The effective­
ness of these measures is itself a subject of debate in the academic 
literature. 257 
For present purposes, however, the more significant observation 
goes not to the potential effectiveness of efforts to subdivide legal 
representation but, rather, to the existence of such efforts in the 
:first place. These attempts to bring the negotiation process into line 
with conventional understandings of legal representation stand as 
an effort - again, unacknowledged - to push mass tort litigation 
toward the institutional arrangements familiar in other substantive 
areas of law: in particular, areas like criminal law that contemplate 
a significant role for politically accountable bodies. It is as if courts 
are seeking, sub silentio, to create the kind of vehicle for wide­
ranging consideration of contending interests that is more readily 
akin to the mechanisms for political representation. 
255. See Milo Geyelin, Tobacco Plaintiff Sues Her Ex-Attorney, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 
1997, at B7 (reporting on a lawsuit raising such allegations); Bob Van Voris, Tobacco Negotia­
tions Created Sharp Client Conflicts, NATL. L.J., Aug. 4, 1997, at AS (same). Although this 
particular lawsuit resulted in a settlement on undisclosed terms, see Milo Geyelin, Lawyers 
on Florida's Antitobacco Team Try to Hold Up Pact in Bid for More Fees, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
10, 1997, at B3, the larger question of ethical propriety remains open. 
256. See, e.g., Flanagan v. Ahearn (In re Asbestos Litig.), 90 F.3d 963, 972 (5th Cir. 1996), 
vacated on other grounds, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997) (using guardian ad litem to review a class 
action settlement involving asbestos products manufactured by Fibreboard); In re Joint E. & 
S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721, 743-45 (2d Cir. 1992) (striking down a plan to restruc­
ture the Manville bankruptcy trust due to a lack of sufficient subclasses). 
257. Compare Coffee, supra note 93, at 1445-46 (endorsing the use of subclasses in the 
class action context) with Smith, supra note 87, at 383-91 (suggesting that even this may be 
inadequate to safeguard the interests of future claimants in bankruptcy). Especially in cases 
of outrageous fortune, there may be practical limitations upon efforts to subdivide legal rep­
resentation: if solutions in this situation ideally should give little or nothing to one or more 
of the contending groups, it is difficult to imagine an attorney willing to take on the represen­
tation of a subclass composed only of such persons. Alternatively, if the attorney simply acts 
in the role of a guardian ad litem, one wonders whether there will be sufficient incentive to 
press vigorously for financial returns. 
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The major concern is not that plaintiffs' attorneys are incapable 
of making tradeoffs, especially if suitable subclasses can be created; 
instead, it is that they - even when they negotiate subject to judi­
cial approval from, say, a bankruptcy court - are not politically 
accountable. There may well be many plausible approaches with 
regard to tobacco, for example - conceivably, including the out­
right rejection of any national legislation - and it is not only ap­
propriate but desirable for political institutions to hash them out. 
Given the need for value judgments that are both temporal and 
qualitative in character, legislative consideration is vastly preferable 
on grounds of public deliberation and accountability to lawyer- or 
court-centered solutions. 
In casting the resolution of mass tort disputes into the political 
realm, one must not underestimate the role of interest groups, as 
distinct from the negotiators themselves. In fact, the national de­
bate occasioned by the tobacco litigation is an especially vivid illus­
tration of the role that such groups may play. The strongest 
advocates for both FDA authority and measures to reduce under­
age smoking have been leaders within the public health community 
who were not present at the negotiating table when the original 
proposal was formulated.258 
b. Defendants and the Problem of Line-Drawing. For prospec­
tive defendants, there is a different concern: the danger that litiga­
tion at the behest of entrepreneurial plaintiffs' lawyers will amount 
to little more than a witch-hunt that might be richly deserved by its 
initial target, but that could give rise to a whirlwind of subsequent 
repercussions for other manufacturers. Some observers have raised 
serious fears along these lines with respect to the tobacco litigation, 
questioning whether the techniques used against that industry are 
258. See Broder, supra note 231 (discussing criticism of the proposal by an independent 
group of public-health leaders). This observation arguably runs contrary to the claim of 
public-choice theory that the legislative process generally tends to favor the interests of nar­
row, concentrated groups and, in so doing, may disserve interests that are more broadly dis­
persed in society. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBuc 
CHOICE: A CRITICAL INmonucnoN 12-37 (1991) (providing an overview of the public­
choice account of legislation). A full-scale examination of the tobacco litigation from a 
public-choice perspective is an intriguing enterprise that nonetheless lies beyond the scope of 
this article. For present purposes, it is enough to say that, when one considers the present 
mass tort litigation system and the channels of private negotiation used therein, deliberation 
in the public realm holds comparatively greater prospects for political accountability. For a 
broader defense of interest groups as important sources of information for government deci­
sionmakers, see Peter H. Schuck, Against (and for) Madison: An Essay in Praise of Factions, 
15 YALE L. & POLY. REv. 553, 583-86 (1997). 
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the harbingers of even more troubling attacks upon other manufac­
turers long understood to make harmful products.259 
Under this view, it is not so much that antitobacco lawyers un­
covered wrongs committed by Big Tobacco and then sought to 
bring that industry to justice but, rather, the reverse: one may un­
derstand the development of new theories of liability based upon 
nicotine addiction and Medicaid reimbursement primarily as strate­
gic devices to enable antitobacco forces, at long last, to tap into "the 
plumpest, juiciest, golden-egg layer of all time."260 In the criminal 
system, there is reason for concern when prosecutors seek to pin 
crimes on people rather than match people to crimes.261 In the 
·mass tort context, the trouble is how - specifically, how as an insti­
tutional matter - to go about finding a sensible stopping point for 
such theories. 
Consideration of the tobacco proposal by Congress is especially 
valuable as a vehicle by which to facilitate public debate on whether 
moral condemnation should be visited upon mass tort defendants 
generally.262 Insofar as national legislation would break down the 
conventional tort-crime distinction, the decision to do so clearly is a 
subject for public deliberation. Criminal law teaches us that it is the 
distinctive role of legislatures, not courts or private negotiators, to 
serve as the vessel for the moral condemnation of conduct.263 
With all the acrimony directed at the tobacco industry - much 
of it long overdue - it is easy to lose sight of the premise that the 
involvement of political bodies in the criminal system can act as a 
major safeguard against the kind of private vendetta that some have 
labeled the tobacco litigation. A significant attraction of a legisla-
259. See Robert H. Bork, Addicted to Health, NATL. REv., July 28, 1997, at 28-30; White 
Smoke, and Black, EcoNOMIST, June 28, 1997, at 16. 
260. Weiser, supra note 132, at 19 (quoting tobacco stock analyst Gary D. Black concern­
ing the motivations of tobacco plaintiffs' lawyers). 
261. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 728-29 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing 
on these grounds the independent counsel statute for the criminal prosecution of senior 
Executive Branch officials). 
262. Apart from legislative consideration of the tobacco proposal at the back end, there 
also has been a modicum of political accountability at the front end - albeit, not directed to 
the incorporation of criminal law principles. Lawsuits by state attorneys general are, on their 
face, similar to the standard mode for the enforcement of substantive criminal law - namely, 
publicly initiated prosecutions under the auspices of the very same state officials. That said, 
however, political constraints are significantly attenuated insofar as state officials do not pur­
sue litigation against the tobacco industry through expenditure of their own limited budget­
ary resources, but instead retain entrepreneurial private attorneys on an off-budget, 
contingency-fee basis. 
263. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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tive solution for the tobacco wars consists precisely of the ad hoc 
character of legislation itself. 
A legislative solution indeed would break the political logjam 
upon regulation of the tobacco industry264 - a source of public 
health risk much greater in magnitude than others addressed by 
governmental regulation.265 Even more notable, however, is that a 
legislative deal would do so without creating a body of precedent 
that might be deployed, by analogy, in similar attacks upon other 
longstanding sources of risk to consumers - employed without the 
benefit of additional political deliberation upon the merits of such 
extensions. Stores are full of products that, like tobacco, come from 
controlled industrial processes that might be said to "spike" the 
levels of various ingredients, some of which may make it more diffi­
cult physically or psychologically for consumers to discontinue use. 
One can strike a legislative deal with respect to tobacco icons that 
appeal to children, in other words, without building a corpus of ju­
dicial decisions that could fuel attacks upon the Budweiser frogs, 
the Coca-Cola polar bears, and Ronald McDonald. Some may 
think that moral condemnation of the purveyors of products laden 
with alcohol, sugar, caffeine, fat, or salt would be a good idea;266 
some may not. The major point, however, does not concern indi­
vidual policy preferences, but instead the appropriateness of fora 
that are expressly political as the vehicles through which to decide 
such questions collectively and in a manner sensitive to the distinc­
tive risk-benefit tradeoffs involved in each context. 
264. Leaders of the antitobacco movement draw upon this insight when they describe 
mass tort litigation as a way to overcome "the failure of conventional legislative and adminis­
trative regulation" in the area due to what they consider the inordinate political influence of 
the industry. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 134, at 66. For a highly critical assessment of 
industry influence in earlier periods, see Stephen Moore et al., Epidemiology of Failed To­
bacco Control Legislation, 272 JAMA 1171 (1994). The proposed tobacco legislation notably 
casts the subject before Congress under circumstances in which antitobacco forces appear 
especially influential. Cf. supra note 258 and accompanying text. 
265. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
266. This is not as far-fetched as it initially might seem. See, e.g., MARIErrA 
WHITILESEY, KILLER SALT 78 (1977) (arguing that "food manufacturers first carefully foster 
a taste for salt in the public and then stay in business by meeting and fostering that salt 
dependency"); Sally Goll Beatty, How the Beer Industry Uses TV Ads to Mollify Critics, Buff 
Its Image, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 1997, at Al (detailing the beer industry's use of advertising 
to deflect criticism of the effects of its product); Bruce Ingersoll & Sally Goll Beatty, FTC 
Broadens Probe of Brewers' TV Ads, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1997, at BlO (reporting an FTC 
investigation into the possibility that beer manufacturers may have targeted underage con­
sumers with television advertisements); cf. William J. Bennett, Face the Facts About Alcohol 
and Crime, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1997, at A13 (forecasting that "[i]f the liquor industry does 
not start acting in a more socially responsible way, it may soon find itself held in the same 
kind of esteem in which the tobacco companies are now held"). 
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The tobacco litigation and the variations that one might imagine 
for the future - indeed, the implant controversy too - all pose the 
same tension between two broader trends in modem America: re­
spect for individual choice and respect for what Richard Klein has 
aptly labeled "healthism. "267 The first trend resonates not only in 
the demand of the products liability revolution for information as a 
vehicle for individual risk decisions, but also in the roughly contem­
poraneous recognition of a constitutional right of privacy.26s In 
both contexts, the objective of th� law has been to facilitate and, 
often, to insulate from coercion the making of significant individual 
choices, even choices that many might regard as socially destructive 
or contrary to the best interests of the individual in question. 
The second trend is more subtle, but equally important. As 
Klein pointedly observes, cigarettes have soothed human nerves for 
centuries - an achievement that is not trivial amid the stress of 
modem life - yet "their value these days is exclusively determined 
with reference to their noxious effects."269 In Klein's view, 
"[h]ealthism has become part of the dominant ideology of 
America," an ideology that "has sought to make longevity the prin­
cipal measure of a good life."270 It is this neo-Puritanical tendency 
to define for others what makes life worth living, not any allegiance 
to Big Tobacco, that makes recent developments so disturbing and 
so threatening to some. In fact, the Medicaid reimbursement suits 
brought by state attorneys general fuel this sentiment by suggesting 
- quite possibly incorrectly - that smokers' implicit rejection of 
healthism is costing the rest of society big money.271 That those 
who advance these sentiments should draw upon concepts from 
267. KLEIN, supra note 123, at 191. 
268. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (abortion); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception). See generally Cruzan v. Director, Mo. 
Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (assuming that competent persons have a constitutional 
right to refuse life-extending treatment). I leave for others the quite considerable debate 
over privacy rights under the Constitution. For two classic explorations of the issue, compare 
John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf.· A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 
935-36 (1973) (criticizing the right to privacy in the abortion context as "not inferable from 
the language of the Constitution, the framers' thinking . . .  any general value from the provi­
sions they included, or the nation's governmental structure") with Jed Rubenfeld, The Right 
of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REv. 737, 740 (1989) (defending the constitutional right to privacy 
based upon the capacity of prohibitory laws "to direct and to occupy individuals' lives"). 
269. KLEIN, supra note 123, at 184-85. 
270. Id. at 185, 191. 
271. It is by no means clear that smokers impose a net loss upon the public fisc when one 
accounts - admittedly, with a cold heart - for the taxes levied on cigarettes and the prema­
ture deaths attributable to smoking. For surveys of the economic literature on this subject, 
see Kluger, Peace Plan, supra note 7, at 29; Laura Mansnerus, Making a Case for Death, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 5, 1996, at El. 
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criminal law is especially troubling, given what one commentator 
vividly describes as the tendency of criminal prosecutions in general 
to give wing to "the self-congratulatory emotion of blame" toward 
the defendant and "a self-conscious attitude of moral superiority" 
on the part of the prosecutor.212 
The job of mediating between these two trends within the con­
straints of the Constitution273 is not merely the province of political 
institutions; it is the ordinary business of criminal law. The very 
existence of criminal law stands as powerful evidence that there are 
some choices that civilized societies are prepared to deny com­
pletely, both to individuals and to those who otherwise might turn a 
handsome profit from the satisfaction of public demand. Criminal 
law does so even in the face of arguments that the dangers posed by 
the underlying activity stem not from the exercise of choice itself, 
but instead from the effects of its denial by the law. That is often 
the quandary that criminal sanctions pose, as both the history of 
efforts to prohibit alcohol274 and the longstanding debate over the 
criminalization of narcotics exemplify.21s 
Outright criminalization, of course, is not the only option avail­
able. Were one to imagine a continuum ranging from, say, the strict 
criminal prohibition of heroin down to the free availability and 
overt promotion to children of fast-food hamburgers, there would 
be legitimate debate over precisely where one ought to place ciga­
rette smoking. The measures now being debated, in practical effect, 
would seek to rehabilitate the tobacco industry, but would leave 
adult consumers free to choose its deadly wares. The role of polit­
ical bodies in criminal law has long been to make - or not to make 
272. See Donald Dripps, The Exclusivity of the Criminal Law: Toward a "Regulatory 
Model" of, or "Pathological Perspective" on, the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 7 J. CoNTEMP. 
LEGAL IssUES 199, 204 (1996); see also Steiker, supra note 11, at 806 (citing the quoted lan­
guage from Dripps and adding that the "ability to harness the force of blaming represents a 
particularly threatening aspect of state power" when wielded in the ordinary criminal 
system). 
273. No one seriously claims, for example, that there exists a fundamental right either to 
sell or to smoke cigarettes. 
274. For illustrative accounts of Prohibition, see, e.g., NoruJAN H. CLARK, DELIVER Us 
FROM EVIL: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN PRoliIBmoN (1976); JAMES H. 
TIMBERLAKE, PRoHIBmoN AND THE PROGRESSIVE MoVEMENi" 1900-1920 (1963); LAW, AL­
COHOL, AND ORDER: PERSPECTIVES ON NATIONAL PRoHIBmoN' (David E. Kyvig ed., 1985). 
275. For an overview of the debate on this subject, see Ronald Bayer, Introduction: The 
Great Drug Policy Debate - What Means This Thing Called Decriminalization?, in CON­
FRONTING DRUG PoLicr. ILLICIT DRUGS IN A FREE SOCIETY 1-23 (Ronald Bayer & Gerald 
M. Oppenheimer eds., 1993). For an illustrative sampling of recent academic criticism of 
drug interdiction efforts, see, e.g., Ev A BERTRAM ET AL., DRUG WAR PoLITics: THE PRICE 
OF DENIAL (1996); STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT c. GROSS, AMERICA'S LoNGEST w AR: RE­
THINKING OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS (1993); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & 
GORDON HAWKINS, THE SEARCH FOR RATIONAL DRUG CoNTROL (1992). 
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- compromises of this sort upon public deliberation, and that insti­
tutional lesson should accompany any importation of criminal no­
tions into mass tort litigation. 
c. The Future of Politics. As a practical matter, it appears un­
likely that anything on the horizon will gamer the attention of polit­
ical bodies in quite the manner of the tobacco wars. It would be a 
mistake, however, to dismiss the role of political institutions to fa­
cilitate public discourse on mass torts as the product of some anom­
alous alignment of the planets. Rather, any solution to mass tort 
disputes that entails both measures that concern liability for past 
misdeeds and commitments with regard to future regulation must 
necessarily entail political action in some form. It is only the polit­
ical process at the federal level - not entrepreneurial litigators, 
state attorneys general, or public health advocates - that ulti­
mately can make commitments about the content of regulatory 
statutes. 
Even when current statutes are sufficiently broad and open­
textured as to be capable of encompassing the kind of regulatory 
regime envisioned by negotiators without amendment by Congress, 
the decision so to read the relevant statutes itself is a matter given 
over to political bodies - specifically, the President. That is the 
central lesson of the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Chev­
ron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,276 which ob­
ligates the courts to defer to reasonable interpretations rendered by 
the Executive Branch to fill gaps and to resolve ambiguities in regu­
latory statutes.277 As the Court emphasized in support of this prin­
ciple, the judiciary is not politically accountable, whereas the 
Executive Branch is.278 As a practical matter, of course, interested 
parties nonetheless might insist upon statutory amendment, rather 
than leave themselves open to the possible ebb-and-flow of Execu­
tive Branch interpretation of a statute. 
Apart from the need for legislative or executive action to effect 
future deals similar to that under debate for tobacco products, one 
should not underestimate the impact that the overall political cli­
mate may have upon the prospects for deal making in the first 
place. Litigation by the mass tort plaintiffs' bar and the states might 
not have brought Big Tobacco so quickly to the negotiating table 
but for the contemporaneous regulatory initiative undertaken by 
276. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
277. See 467 U.S. at 843-44. 
278. See 467 U.S. at 865. 
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the FDA. In fact, secondary sources have suggested that then­
White House advisor Dick Morris played a crucial role in persuad­
ing a hesitant President Clinton to pursue the FDA initiative, pre­
cisely because of its perceived ability to enhance his political 
standing for purposes of reelection.279 That a different administra­
tion might have made a different calculus - and, in so doing, may 
have changed the course or, at least, the timing of events - is the 
stuff of which presidential elections are made. 
This, however, is only a partial prescription. Collective resolu­
tion of claims against blameworthy mass tort defendants in the face 
of disputes ove,r risk-decisional causation may well necessitate polit­
ical action as a matter of sheer practicality, insofar as the product in 
question is to remain on the market in some form. But what about 
cases of scientific causation? As the controversy over silicone gel 
breast implants indicates, cases of this sort are less likely to result in 
the relevant product remaining on the market. Apart from how the 
scientific community ultimately might answer the causation ques­
tion, the publicity generated by mass tort litigation - especially 
revelations of defendants' awareness of a possible safety risk -
may produce the same result. In such a situation, there is no need 
to debate the posture of future regulatory efforts. 
As I have described in greater detail elsewhere in connection 
with the implant controversy,280 there are other ways to enhance 
deliberation through political channels with regard to disputes over 
scientific causation. Specifically, I have called for the recognition, 
by statute, of channels by which private petitioners may obtain con­
sideration by the relevant federal regulatory agency of safety issues 
identified by way of mass tort litigation.281 Statutorily mandated 
consideration at the agency level, in turn, would trigger the applica­
tion of existing prudential limitations of administrative law upon 
litigation on the same subject in the tort system. The effect would 
be to call "time out" to prevent the sheer momentum brought on by 
an avalanche of lawsuits from dictating the outcome.282 This does 
not mean that the law always must stand idly by, awaiting some 
279. See Alix M. Freedman & Suein L. Hwang, How Se��n Individuals with Diverse 
Motives Halted Tobacco's Wars, WALL ST. J., July 11, 1997, at Al. 
280. See Nagareda, supra note 50, at 351-67. 
281. See id. at 353 (conditioning the right so to petition upon the filing of mass tort ac­
tions in sufficient numbers such as to trigger consolidation of federal lawsuits by the MDL 
Panel). 
282. See id. at 359-63 (discussing the application of the existing administrative law doc­
trine of primary jurisdiction as a means by which to effect a "time out" in the tort system 
pending agency review). 
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definitive pronouncement on causation from the scientific commu­
nity. The benefits of some products may be sufficiently ephemeral 
that the mere existence of uncertainty about their long-term effects, 
coupled with irresponsible conduct on the part of manufacturers, 
may warrant the effective punishment of defendants by way of reor­
ganization in bankruptcy.283 The key is that the choice of whether 
and when to let matters take that course should stem from public 
input and deliberation focused upon a politically accountable 
agency.284 
2. Mens Rea, Deterrence, and the Significance of Context 
Apart from institutional considerations of the sort sketched 
above, moral condemnation for misconduct in the absence of causa­
tion remains intertwined with doctrinal qualifications. Even crimi­
nal law is not prepared to punish attempts, for example, without the 
presence of a highly culpable mens rea on the part of the defendant 
- a purposeful effort to complete a crime, rather than a merely 
reckless or negligent one.28s 
This doctrinal distinction sheds light upon a potential difference 
between mass tort cases centered upon addiction as an impediment 
to risk decisions and those, like the implant controversy, that tum 
upon scientific causation. The notion that any collective entity, 
such as a corporate manufacturer, might have an ascertainable 
mental state partakes of legal fiction to a degree. One need not 
attempt to parse the corporate mindset in depth, however, in order 
to draw useful lessons from the distinction between purposeful con­
duct and lesser states of culpability. 
In the tobacco litigation, the plaintiffs' theory is that it was eco­
nomically rational for defendants to engage in fraud with respect to 
the addictiveness of nicotine - indeed, that such action was essen­
tial to the survival of Big Tobacco as an industry, insofar as adult 
consumers ultimately must be replaced.286 A manufacturer of this 
283. See id. at 342 (contrasting the appropriate treatment of cosmetic devices such as 
breast implants with that of lifesaving, but potentially quite risky, products such as heart 
valves). 
284. The agency might conclude its review of the matter and let bankruptcy ensue, or, 
alternatively, the agency itself might seek to oversee negotiations amongst the concerned 
parties in order to reach a proposed resolution of the matter that the agency then might issue 
in the form of a rule. See id. at 355 (discussing the potential for agencies to draw upon 
existing authority for negotiated rulemaking in lieu of class action settlements); Nagareda, 
supra note 193, at 976-81 (same). 
285. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. 
286. See supra note 152 (discussing criticism of industry marketing to children on the 
theory of customer replacement). 
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sort makes money from the repeated use of its product and, hence, 
has an incentive to promote usage through everything from the 
composition of the product itself to the strategies deployed for its 
promotion. Allegations of fraud in these regards fit comfortably 
with the punishment of purposeful efforts to complete a crime. 
Cases of scientific causation are different. They certainly may 
entail allegations that the defendant failed to warn consumers or, 
potentially, that it made some sort of misrepresentation concerning 
product safety. But the defendant's mens rea, if one can call it that, 
is different, and the difference stems not from chance or circum­
stance, but instead from the essential nature of the situation. No 
one suggests, nor could they plausibly say, that Dow Corning set 
out with the objective of developing a silicone gel breast implant 
that would cause connective tissue disease in women. The possibil­
ity of connective tissue disease, if any exists, stems at the very most 
from recklessness - a willingness to proceed forward with sales of 
the product in disregard of "substantial and unjustifiable" health 
risks.287 Simply put, the most serious charge that one possibly 
could level against Dow Corning is that it rolled the dice; the charge 
against Big Tobacco is that it engaged in a campaign of fraud while 
not only knowing, but affirmatively desiring, that addiction to a 
harmful product would result in many consumers. 
This is not to say that economic considerations are absent en­
tirely from cases of scientific causation. Having sunk substantial 
sums of money in the development of a new product, a manufac­
turer might well hesitate to withdraw it, even upon quite strong in­
dications of risk. Within the parlance of criminal law, one might be 
able to push such a case from the category of recklessness to the 
more culpable mental state of knowledge - namely, conduct un­
dertaken with an awareness of a "high probability" of harm.288 
One surely would regard such behavior as irresponsible, but that 
still would not get one all the way to purposefulness. 
In addition, there is at least one other scenario that might give 
rise to a dispute over scientific causation and that has a counterpart 
in the mental states used by criminal law. If there is only a remote 
prospect for the generation of independent risk information, manu-
287. See MoDEL PENAL CODE § 2.02{2)(c) (1985) (defining "recklessly" as "conscious[ ]  
disregard[ ]" of "a substantial and unjustifiable risk"); supra notes 59-60 and accompanying 
text (summarizing revelations of implant manufacturers' conduct); supra note 84 (summariz­
ing conduct on the part of Bendectin manufacturer Merrell Dow). 
288. See MoDEL PENAL CoDE § 2.02(7). 
1194 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:1121 
facturers might choose a course of ignorance about their products. 
As Wendy Wagner explains: 
A manufacturer that conducts no research can generally avoid liabil­
ity because plaintiffs and government research programs are unlikely 
to conduct scientific research on their own. Voluntary safety re­
search, on the other hand, might reveal a long-term risk associated 
with a product, a revelation that could provide vital evidence for ag­
gressive plaintiffs' attorneys and ultimately increase, rather than re­
duce, the manufacturer's exposure to lawsuits and potentially 
catastrophic liability.289 · 
Failure to conduct safety tests in the first place, as distinct from 
conscious disregard of their results, tracks closely the concept of 
criminal negligence290 - a mental state that differs merely by de­
gree from its more familiar namesake in tort law. Criminal negli­
gence is what one would label gross negligence in tort.291 
Standing alone, then, the principle that attempt crimes call for 
purposefulness rather than some less culpable mental state sheds 
doubt upon the extension of moral condemnation to cases of scien­
tific causation. That, however, does not mean that such extensions 
are always ill-advised. The heightened mens rea requirement for 
attempts is a vehicle by which to narrow the reach of criminal sanc­
tions; it seeks to separate those who really are trying to commit 
some serious misdeed from those whose conduct amounts, at most, 
to a reckless near-miss. 
Mens rea, however, is not the only consideration implicated in 
the criminalization of conduct that falls short of a completed crime. 
A familiar justification for the punishment of attempt crimes in any 
form stems from goals of deterrence.292 Absent the perfect detec­
tion of completed crimes, the next best way to induce adherence to 
the strictures of criminal law consists of efforts to "expand[ ] the set 
of circumstances in which sanctions are imposed" to encompass at­
tempts.293 "Those who would shoot at another person will realize 
· that they may be penalized if they miss as well as if they 
succeed. "294 
289. Wagner, supra note 27, at 775 (footnotes omitted). For a similar point, see Berger, 
supra note 1, at 2139. 
290. See MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.02(2)(d) (defining "negligently" to refer to situations 
in which the defendant "should be aware," but actually remains unaware, "of a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk" posed by his conduct). 
291. See MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.02(2)(d) (calling for a "gross deviation from the stan­
dard of care that a reasonal?le person would observe"). 
292. See Steven Shaven,. Deterrence and the Punishment of Attempts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 
435, 457 (1990). 
293. See id. at 43_6. 
294. Id. 
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An analogous concern arises in the mass tort context. Here the 
fear is not so much that completed mass torts will go undetected; 
their often horrible consequences are not easy to overlook. The 
fear instead is that, by letting off completely blameworthy manufac­
turers that manage to avoid causing harm to others by sheer hap­
penstance, the law would inadequately deter risk taking by other 
manufacturers in the future. Such a shortfall in deterrence simply 
might add to existing disincentives to generate information about 
product risk. The insight, in other words, is that the law ought to 
take action against at least some near misses in order to prevent the 
recurrence of misconduct that might produce a direct hit the next 
time around. This concern for deterrence is especially pronounced 
with regard to the kinds of innovative new products that tend to 
give rise to disputes over scientific causation, given the proprietary 
control that manufacturers tend to have over product 
information.295 
For mass tort cases centered upon scientific causation, context is 
crucial in three respects for the evaluation of deterrence arguments. 
First and most important, pleas for deterrence entail implicit trade­
offs between risks and benefits that are not amenable to resolution 
on a categorical basis. In at least some areas, the risk-benefit trade­
off may be such that the gains from deterrence come only at the 
cost of product innovation. Though one easily can overplay this 
concern, there are indications that, even now, the prospect of mass 
tort litigation can be especially inhibiting in particular discrete ar­
eas, such as the market for new methods of contraception.296 In 
addition, there are areas for product innovation - artificial devices 
to replace critical organs, such as the heart297 - wherein the risk to 
which a new product might respond already may be so great as to 
make desirable innovations that hold any prospect of success. 
295. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
296. See CoMMITTEE ON CoNTRACEPI'IVE DEv., NATL. REsEARCH CoUNCIL, DEVELOP­
ING NEw CoNTRACEPTIVES: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 141 (Luigi Mastroianni, Jr. et 
al. eds., 1990) (National Research Council report concluding that "recent products liability 
litigation and the impact of that litigation on the cost and availability of liability insurance 
have contributed significantly to the climate of disincentives for the development of contra­
ceptive products"); cf. Alan 0. Sykes, Reformulating Tort Reform, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1153, 
1158 {1989) (reviewing PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REvoLUTION AND !TS 
CoNsEQUENCES (1988)) (criticizing the indiscriminate advancement of concerns about the 
impact of tort liability upon product innovation). _In recent years, the one notable innovation 
in contraception - Norplant - itself has been the target of mass tort litigation. See Gina 
Kolata, Will the Lawyers Kill Off Norplant?, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1995, § 3, at 1. 
297. Cf. Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1261, 1263-64 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (recounting 
the history of litigation over the Bjork-Shiley heart valve). 
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Second, as commentators increasingly have emphasized in the 
regulatory context, the abatement of risk in one area sometimes 
comes only with unintended effects that actually may increase other 
sorts of risk.298 The impact of litigation over silicone gel breast im­
plants upon the availability of silicone-containing shunts needed to 
divert excess water from the brains of children with hydrocephalus 
illustrates this broader phenomenon.299 
Third, the need to provide additional deterrence through the 
use of moral condemnation in the mass tort area will depend upon 
an assessment of the relevant administrative framework, if any, for 
product testing - especially the existence and enforcement of pen­
alties for failure to bring suspicions of product risk to the attention 
of regulatory agencies.3°0 In this regard, record-setting criminal 
fines recently imposed by the FDA against major pharmaceutical 
firms and executives who misled government regulators offer a 
modicum of promise.301 
Given the foregoing considerations, moral condemnation on the 
criminal model should turn upon an evaluation of the need for de­
terrence in the particular situation relative to the degree of culpabil­
ity exhibited by manufacturers - whether their actions are totally 
blameless, merely negligent, reckless or, potentially, knowing. Un­
doubtedly without thinking explicitly in such terms, entrepreneurial 
mass tort litigators already may do a rough job of focusing upon 
those instances in which blameworthiness is relatively high, to the 
extent that such attorneys select cases according to the prospect 
that some jurors might commingle evidence of blameworthiness 
and causation.302 Mass tort litigation, however, is a relatively poor 
298. For examples of this phenomenon, see John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, 
Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in RrsK VERSUS RrsK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT 1, 10-19 {John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995). 
299. See Linda Ransom, Lawyers May Kill My Daughter, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1996, at 
A14. 
300. For an assessment that many such frameworks are quite dismal, see Wagner, supra 
note 27, at 784-90. 
301. In "one of the largest [corporate fines] ever imposed on a brand-name manufac­
turer," the FDA obtained a guilty plea and an agreement to pay $10 million in fines from 
Warner-Lambert Company "for hiding from the [FDA] faulty manufacturing processes used 
for several drugs." Philip J. Hilts, Drug Maker Pleads Guilty to Deceit in Product Testing, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1995, at Al. More recently, "Copley Pharmaceutical, Inc. agreed to 
plead guilty to federal criminal charges and pay a $10.65 million fine for falsifying drug­
manufacturing reports to the [FDA] . . .  the largest [fine] ever for a generic-drug maker." 
William M. Bulkeley, Copley Pharmaceutical to Plead Guilty to Federal Criminal Charges, 
WALL ST. J., May 29, 1997, at B2. 
302. See supra section II.C. In this respect, the economic incentives of plaintiffs' counsel 
serve to screen out instances in which product risk could not have been identified due to the 
methodological limitations of science. See Wagner, supra note 27, at 777-80. 
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vehicle for consideration - in any manner, much less a politically 
accountable vehicle for consideration - of the kinds of broader 
policy implications outlined here. Litigation focuses upon the 
plaintiff, the defendant, and the particular product in question, not 
upon related products or the efficacy of related regulatory regimes. 
In short, considerations of mens rea and deterrence together 
suggest that the law should not extend moral condemnation on the 
criminal model to all cases in which an arguably culpable manufac­
turer has given rise to a dispute over scientific causation. The law 
certainly should not do so in the manner of attempt statutes in the 
ordinary criminal system - by creating, in one fell swoop, a corre­
sponding tort of attempt for every completed tort.303 In some ar­
eas, the need for deterrence may well take precedence over 
limitations upon the application of moral condemnation derived 
from the usual criminal law requirements of mens rea; in others, it 
may not. The crucial observation is that such an evaluation is heav­
ily dependent upon qualitative judgments made in context and, as 
such, speaks further to the desirability of consideration by political 
institutions. 
CONCLUSION 
Recent efforts to resolve mass tort disputes centered upon 
blameworthy-but-fortunate defendants have eroded the conven­
tional tort-crime distinction. In this setting, mass tort litigation has 
become a troubling and unwieldy vehicle for the application of 
moral condemnation, wholly apart from the causation of harm. 
This transformation has taken place not through some policy deter­
mination by common law courts or legislatures, but rather primarily 
through negotiation to resolve particular disputes on an ad hoc ba­
sis. The unwitting incorporation of criminal notions holds promise 
for the development of innovative prospective remedies for miscon­
duct by manufacturers that would not necessitate an undeserved 
windfall for tort claimants. The current debate over national legis­
lation in the tobacco area exemplifies such an approach. At the 
same time, however, the influx of criminal notions of moral con­
demnation also carries quite considerable risks, both for the appro­
priate resolution of cases centered upon outrageous fortune and for 
prospective defendants. 
303. Tue Model Penal Code exemplifies this approach to the codification of criminal 
sanctions for attempts. See MooEL PENAL CooE § 5.01(1) (1985). 
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To address these concerns, the law should look for guidance to 
the institutional and doctrinal constraints found in ordinary features 
of criminal law, especially in the central role of political accounta­
bility, but also in concepts of mens rea and deterrence. In this man­
ner, the law of mass torts may move away from the haphazard 
incorporation of criminal concepts to suit particular disputes and 
toward a truly integrated and politically legitimate system to ad­
dress blameworthy corporate behavior. 
